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LEGAL CHANGE IN THE POST-COMMUNIST WORLD
AND BEYOND
JACQUES DELISLE*
1. INTRODUCTION
Asked to provide advice to a Central or Eastern European na-
tion drafting its first post-socialist constitution, a prominent
American legal academic promptly produces an elaborate manu-
script headed "Constitution of the Republic of _ _ " The
document is .a form-book charter of economic liberties, liberal
rights, democratic governance, and limited governmental powers
that awaits only a few strokes of the pen to insert the recipient
* Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School. The author
thanks, for their helpful comments, participants in a seminar at the Institute
for Advanced Study of the United Nations University (where an earlier ver-
sion of this Article was presented) and participants in a session on"importing
and exporting legal models," chaired by John Reitz, at the XV International
Congress of Comparative Law. The author also thanks Chuck Mooney, Kim
Lane Scheppele, Stephen Holmes, and several current and former participants
in many o the legal advice projects described in this article for their comments
about their experiences with several of the modes of alegal assistance" and "le-
gal export" analyzed in this article. Last, but far from the least, the author
thanks the staff of theJournal for heroic work, especially on the footnotes of
this article.
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script headed "Constitution of the Republic of ." The
document is a form-book charter of economic liberties, liberal
rights, democratic governance, and limited governmental powers
that awaits only a few strokes of the pen to insert the recipient
country's name.1 Half a world away, a young Mongolian official
gratefully accepts a stack of documents detailing United States se-
curities laws from American experts who are in Ulan Batar on a
short visit. He asks the members of the delegation to send him
more such materials, also photocopied on one side of the page, af-
ter they return home. When the group departs, the Mongolian
explains (to another American advisor) that the texts are, of
course, of little use in his efforts to craft laws for his country's in-
fant equities markets, but that the blank side of the pages will
help to alleviate his office's chronic shortage of quality paper.2
These two episodes lie at the unhappy end of a spectrum of
contemporary United States efforts to export legal models and
provide legal assistance around the world. They represent only
very small, and strikingly ineffective, parts of the extraordinarily
ambitious and multifaceted drive undertaken or supported by
U.S. organizations and individuals to transplant laws and legal
ideas and to foster legal reform or development abroad. Al-
though in some respects atypical, the anecdotes from Mongolia
and the new European republic point to several basic features of
the recent career of U.S. legal assistance and export efforts.
Both stories reflect common contexts that have framed diverse
efforts to promote U.S. legal models and provide U.S. legal assis-
tance during the last decade or more. During this period, two de-
velopments have accorded the United States a new and uniquely
important role in international processes of legal change. First,
there has been a "globalization" of economic activity that has
taken markets and, to a degree, international openness as its or-
See Symposium, Constitutional "Refolution" in the Ex-Communist World-
The Rule of Law, September 26, 1996, 12 AM. U. J. INT'LL. & POL'Y 45, 118-19
(1997) (providing the remarks of Central and Eastern European Law Initiative
(CEELI") Executive Director Mark Ellis); cf BERNARD H. SIEGAN,
DRAFTING A CONSTiTUTION FOR A NATION OR REPUBLIc EMERGING INTO
FREEDOM, app. I (2d ed. 1994) (setting forth a model constitution for a post-
authoritarian republic).
2 See William E. Kovacic, The Competition Policy Entrepreneur and Law Re-
form in Formerly Communist and Socialist Countries, 11 AM. U. J. INT'L L. &
POL'Y 437, 438 (1996) (relating the anecdote) [hereinafter Kovacic, Competition
Policy Entrepreneur].
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ganizing principles. Second, the crumbling of state socialism has
precipitated a world-wide wave of democratization. These trans-
formations have produced a seemingly insatiable appetite for legal
and constitutional reforms suited to the new political and eco-
nomic orders. The opening of new areas (both geographic and
substantive) to American influence, the removal of the principal
rivals to U.S. power and American-supported ideologies, and the
seemingly sweeping embrace of principles that official and unoffi-
cial U.S. actors have seen as congenial (or even as proprietarily
American) thus have provided the setting for countless U.S. legal
export-promotion and advice-offering activities that have sought
to respond to the demands and opportunities of the era.
Large or small, successful or embarrassing, such programs and
projects almost all have pursued one or more elements of an
agenda that has included building multi-party electoral democ-
racy, a generally liberal rule of law supported by an independent
judiciary and bar, and a legal framework for a market-oriented
economy that is generally receptive to international trade and
foreign investment. Many of the efforts that have focused on the
economic aspects of this agenda have seen market-friendly legal
changes as harbingers of- or as dependent upon- changes in
more "political" aspects of law. A similar sense of interconnect-
edness of aims has characterized many attempts to foster changes
in constitutional structure, civil liberties laws, and the like.
As the great distance and obvious differences between Ulan
Batar and the post-socialist European capital underscore, the
scope of such undertakings has been truly global, with major pro-
grams- as well as more discrete and less formal activities- target-
ing every region of the world except Western Europe, North
America, and the most economically advanced nations of East
Asia.
The U.S. securities law specialists' junket to Mongolia (where
another American consultant was present during the copying pa-
per incident and later recounted the tale when arguing for a much
less "prescriptive" approach to providing U.S. legal assistance)
and the American law professor's offer of "remote" constitutional
advice (which passed to the new leaders of a European state via an
intermediary who himself had been a significant participant in
more sustained and structured American programs of legal advice
to post-Soviet states) also provide glimpses of the diversity of
channels for legal export and assistance. These anecdotes also un-
1999]
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derscore the complicated relationships among U.S. participants in
those processes, and the difficulty of defining what counts as a
"U.S." legal export or "U.S." assistance. Even more than these
Central Asian and Central/Eastern European "snapshots" sug-
gest, the connections among U.S. funders and providers (and their
relationships with foreign rivals, collaborators and counterparts)
have been highly varied and complex. By some standards, many
aid and advice projects run or joined by American organizations
and individuals might not count as offering "U.S." models or
"U.S." views or "U.S." programs. On the other hand, formal or
purposive "programs" or "projects" offering "advice" also have
not been the only significant media through which Americans
and others have been transmitting U.S. legal rules and ideals
abroad.
As the ill-fated pair of ventures at opposite fringes of the for-
mer socialist world illustrate, recent U.S. efforts to influence or
implant laws or elements of legal systems abroad have focused as
never before on the two regions where globalization and "mar-
ketization" in the economic realm and democratization and "con-
stitutionalization" in the political realm have had perhaps their
most striking impacts, if not always their best results: (1) Central
and Eastern Europe ("CEE") and the Newly Independent States
("NIS") of the former Soviet Union, and (2) the People's Repub-
lic of China ("P.R.C.") and other reforming socialist or authori-
tarian states in its region. As the subject matter of the advice of-
fered to the Mongolian law reformer and the CEE nation's
constitution-drafters also reflect, formal U.S. programs and less
institutionalized projects have addressed an extremely wide range
of legal issues related to the broad themes of markets, democrati-
zation, and the rule of law. These legal subjects have ranged from
questions of economic regulation, to technical training for the
makers and implementers of laws to constitutional and quasi-
constitutional issues of government structures and individual
rights, to the reform of legal education and the promotion of
judges' and lawyers' voluntary organizations.
The anecdotes from Mongolia and the unnamed European re-
public also depict one point on a very wide continuum of types of
U.S. advisors and processes for offering U.S. advice. The two sto-
ries describe strikingly uninstitutionalized participants who have
little knowledge of the recipient countries and who offer highly
detailed prescriptions in a "one-off" mode of providing advice.
[Vol120:2
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Other programs and projects for exporting U.S. models and ex-
tending U.S. legal assistance have been fundamentally different in
some or all of these respects. The forms and providers have been
as heterogeneous as the efforts' substantive legal foci.
The Mongolian and CEE vignettes also remind us that appar-
ently promising opportunities may still leave U.S. purveyors of
advice and disseminators of U.S. models without a recipe for
crafting effective and appropriate content or delivery mechanisms
for legal exports and assistance. On the whole, the impact of U.S.
programs and projects and the influence of U.S. models have been
uneven and relatively modest in their key target areas of the for-
mer Soviet Bloc and the P.R.C. and its region. Although the ob-
vious and abject failures of the U.S. advice efforts reflected in the
Mongolian's quest for blank paper and in the unhappy fate that
awaited the fill-in-the-blank constitution have not been ubiqui-
tous, many seeming successes have been illusory or may prove to
be so over time or upon closer inspection. On the other hand,
and contrary to what the report from Ulan Batar and the case of
the off-the-rack constitution suggest, some significant effects of
U.S. legal aid and U.S. legal ideas may not yet be fully visible and
may remain hard to discern (in part because of the controversies
that inevitably attend attempts to define what counts as "success-
ful" advice or exportation).
The diversity of agendas and methods and the complex recipi-
ent-country contexts of the current drives to extend U.S. legal aid
and export U.S. legal models, together with the recent origin and
still-unfolding story of such undertakings, make it impossible to
offer firm and confident empirical generalizations about success
and failure. The impact of U.S. legal export and assistance efforts
has varied greatly- but not in any simple way- with the form,
scale, and methods of programs and projects, the substantive sub-
jects they have addressed, and circumstances in recipient coun-
tries. The experience of ventures that have focused on the former
Soviet world and on China and its neighbors suggests several ten-
tative- and not always mutually consistent- lessons about the
types of "procedural" and "substantive" features which are con-
ducive to effectiveness. They also point to one overarching lesson
about the importance of establishing favorable legal-institutional
and legal-cultural environments in countries where U.S. actors
seek to promote markets, democracy, and the rule of law.
1999]
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2. U.S. LEGAL ASSISTANCE AND THE EXPORT
OF U.S. LEGAL MODELS
2.1. An Overview
Federal government agencies and large private foundations
have established substantial programs to extend legal assistance
and offer legal advice abroad. They have been joined in this effort
by countless U.S. institutions and individuals who have under-
taken broadly similar but smaller scale projects, and by Ameri-
cans who have participated in other modes of offering advice and
spreading U.S. legal ideas and ideals.3 Collectively, these under-
takings have placed the United States at the forefront of current
international efforts to export legal models and to provide assis-
tance to those seeking to reform laws and reconstruct legal insti-
tutions around the world.
2.1.1. SharedAims, Global Reach, and Diverse Programs
In defining their overall aims, virtually all U.S. legal advice
and aid programs explicitly have sought to promote the develop-
ment of some or all of the following: the rule of law, legal and in-
stitutional requisites of sustainable multiparty democracy, and le-
gal and institutional frameworks for economic markets. In
pursuing such goals, legal assistance and export programs have re-
flected and supported broader imperatives of U.S. foreign policy.4
3 One partial, and dated, directory of U.S. initiatives to support constitu-
tionalism, democracy and the rule of law in Eastern Europe has over two hun-
dred pages of entries. See A.E. DICK HOWARD, DEMOCRACY'S DAWN: A
DIRECTORY OF AMERICAN INITIATIVES ON CONSTITUTIONAIUSM,
DEMOCRACY AND THE RULE OF LAW IN EASTERN EUROPE (1991).
4 In an approach which had discernible roots in the Reagan years, the Bush
and Clinton administrations have pursued this agenda (especially with respect
to the CEE/NIS region and the P.R.C.) throughout the period after the col-
lapse of the Soviet Union and its empire. This period has also included most of
the "reform era" in China and in neighboring socialist or authoritarian re-
gimes. Prominent examples from the Bush era include the SEED and
FREEDOM support acts which, respectively, provided funds to support
democratic and market-oriented reforms- in part by providing legal advice
and assistance- in CEE countries and in the NIS. Reflecting a broadly similar
agenda are the Clinton administration's policies of promoting "market democ-
racies," pursuing "democratic enlargement," assigning U.S. trading interests an
extremely prominent role in U.S. foreign policy, and at times, pressing a hu-
man rights agenda in China and elsewhere. See, e.g., Thomas Carothers, Recent
US Experience with Democracy Promotion, 26 IDS BULL., No. 2, at 62 (1995);
[Vol120:2
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Further, they have often defined these goals in strikingly, if un-
selfconsciously, "American" terms.
The United States Agency for International Development
("USAID"), which administers and distributes the lion's share of
the federal government's budget for legal export and assistance,
has supported a range of programs that have sought to promote
the "rule of law," defined as fostering the legitimacy, accountabil-
ity, fairness, and effectiveness of laws and legal systems in recipi-
ent countries.' In Latin America, where USAID has claimed that
the work it has supported has been the region's foremost "rule of
law"-supporting aid initiative, USAID-backed programs' stated
aims have been increasing the professionalism of the judiciary, ac-
cess to justice, respect for human rights, and support for demo-
cratic elections." From South and Southeast Asia to Latin Amer-
ica to South Africa to the former Soviet Bloc, country-specific
USAID-supported projects officially have endeavored to make
democratic legislatures more competent and more independent.7
USAID's law-related programs for CEE and the NIS have been
underwritten by funds provided under the Support for Eastern
European Democracies ("SEED") and Freedom for Russia and
Emerging Eurasian Democracies and Open Markets
("FREEDOM") Support Acts, which mandate support for demo-
cratic and market-oriented change. USAID has used those re-
sources to underwrite legal assistance (along with other programs)
in pursuit of declared principal goals that include "economic re-
structuring" and "democratic transition," and subsidiary goals
that include fostering the rule of law, civil society, "checks and
Jacques deLisle, Disquiet on the Eastern Frontk Liberal Agendas, Domestic Legal
Orders, and the Role of International Law After the Cold War and Amid Resur-
gent Cultural Identities, 18 FoRDHAM INT'L L.J. 1725 (1995); David M. Lamp-
ton, America's China Policy in the Age of the Finance Minister: Clinton Ends
Linkage, 139 CHINA Q. 597 (1994).
' See Ross Bankson, Four Strategies for Supporting the Rule of Law, 8
USAID EVALUATION NEWS No. 1 at 2.
6 See USAID, USAID FY 1998 Congressional Presentation (last modified
Mar. 24, 1999) <http://www.info.usaid.gov/pubs/cp98> [hereinafter 1998
Congressional Presentation].
' See USAID, Publications (last modified Mar. 24, 1999)
<http://www.info.usaid.gov/pubs/> (citing reports on legislature programs
in Nepal, Philippines, Poland, and Central America); see also USAID, Democ-
racy (last modifled Mar. 24, 1999) < http://www.info.usaid.gov/democracy/>
(discussing democratization and rule of law promoting activities in Cambodia
and Soutl Africa).
1999]
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balances" in government structures, legal accountability of gov-
ernment, the free flow of information about government, privati-
zation of state-owned assets, and market-compatible law reforms.8
USAID's "rule of law" program for the NIS region has set forth a
set of ends that include enhancing the capacity and accountability
of judicial systems, increasing access to justice for ordinary citi-
zens, promoting protection for "due process" values, and support-
ing the development of market-oriented commercial law."
Other government agencies' programs, operated independ-
ently or with support and cooperation from USAID, have articu-
lated similar aims. A few examples suggest the broader pattern.
The United States Information Agency ("USIA") has adopted a
"human rights and democracy" agenda that seeks to advance the
rule of law abroad by providing many foreign countries with ac-
cess to U.S. legal experts and expertise.10 USIA's substantial In-
ternational Visitors' Program has welcomed groups of foreign
lawyers, officials, and others to the United States to meet and ex-
change views on such subjects as human rights, democracy,
criminal justice, administrative law, and judicial administration.
11
The Department of State's "rule of law" program, in conjunc-
tion with USAID's Democratic Pluralism Initiative, has had an
official purpose of helping foreign governments to build political
and judicial systems that promote democracy, protect human
rights, and provide accountable government.12 The Administra-
tive Conference of the United States ("ACUS)- a body that in-
cludes representatives of most major federal government agen-
cies- has provided advice to foreign states on improving
administrative law, thereby increasing the legal accountability of
8 See 1998 Congressional Presentation, supra note 6.
9 Many of the details about USAID programs can be found in USAID's
Congressional Presentations, which are annual report-like documents prepared
in connection with the agency's budget requests to Congress, and in USAID's
periodical publication, USAID Evaluation News.
0 See 1998 Congressional Presentation, supra note 6.
" See USIA, International Visitor Program (visited Mar. 24, 1999) < http://
e.usia.gov/education/ivp/usintiv.htm >.
12 See United States Information Agency, United States Gov't Int'l Ex-
change & Training Program Report for Fiscal Year 1995 [hereinafter USIA In-
ternational Exchange 1995]; United States Information Agency, United States
Gov't Int'l Exchange & Training Program Report for Fiscal Year 1994 [herein-
after USIA International Exchange 1994].
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government in recipient countries.13 The federally funded Na-
tional Endowment for Democracy ("NED") has supported advice
on matters relating to electoral laws and legislative procedures
under its general mandate to support efforts to strengthen demo-
cratic institutions abroad. 4 The U.S. government's "democracy
assistance" programs more generally have included "rule of law"-
promoting programs as a significant component."
Programs with similar aims have been scattered throughout
the federal government's legislative and judicial branches as well.
For example, the Committee on International Judicial Relations
of the Judicial Conference of the United States has had a stated
goal of promoting the rule of law abroad (in part through serving
as a repository for rule of law materials).16 The Congressional Re-
search Service has participated in USAID-supported programs to
strengthen emerging democratic legislatures in several developing
countries and former socialist states."
Federal agencies' efforts have addressed reforms in economic
as well as "political" law. The Commerce Department's USAID-
funded Commercial Law Development Program ("CLDP") has
offered a variety of services avowedly seeking to contribute to the
United States' overall effort to support political and economic re-
form abroad by providing assistance (primarily to the NIS and
CEE countries) "with respect to the development and implemen-
tation of laws... affecting trade and investment."1 The De-
13 See Sally Katzen, The Role of the Administrative Conference in Improving
the Regulatory Process, 8 ADMIN. LJ. AM. U. 649, 662 (1994) (describing 1993
activities).
14 Among other activities, the NED publishes the Journal of Democracy.
On the NED, see generally Thomas Carothers, The NED at 10, 95 Foreign
Pol'y 123 (1994).
15 See, e.g., THOMAS CAROTHERS, ASSESSINGDEMOCRAcy ASSISTANCE:
THE CASE OF ROMANIA 51 (1996) [hereinafter CAROTHERS, ASSESSING
DEMOCRACY ASSISTANCE].
16 See Glenn Robert Lawrence, Are We Exporting Our Legal System?, 41
FED. B. NEws& J. 672, 676-77 (1994).
17 See 1998 Congressional Presentation, supra note 6; United States Agency
for International Development, Legislative Strengthening in Poland (visited
Mar. 30, 1999) <http:/fwww.dec.org/pdf docs/pnaby213.pdf> [hereinafter
Legislative Strengthening in Poland]; United States Agency for International
Development, Parliamentary Assistance in Nepal (visited Mar. 30, 1999) < http:
//wwvw.dec.org/pdf docs/pnaby2l8.pdf> [hereinafter Parliamentary Assis-
tance in Nepal]. -
IS United States Department of Commerce, Office of General Counsel,
Commercial Law Development Program (visited Mar. 15, 1999)
1999]
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partment of Justice, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), the
Securities and Exchange Commission, and other agencies with a
substantial focus on economic law also have been operating assis-
tance programs supporting market-oriented legal reforms
abroad.' SEED funds have been combined with additional
USAID allocations to support advice on market-promoting laws
in Central and Eastern Europe. NED's "democracy" mandate
has been taken to include support for market-oriented reforms, as
is reflected by the presence of the Center for International Private
Enterprise (an affiliate of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce)
among its half-dozen core grantees.
Major legal export and assistance endeavors from the private,
non-profit sector have followed the same general creed of mar-
kets, democracy, and the rule of law. The massive Central and
Eastern European Law Initiative ("CEELI") of the American Bar
Association ("ABA") has defined itself as "a public service proj-
ect.., designed to advance the rule of law in the world by sup-
porting legal reform" in CEE and the NIS.' Specific CEELI pro-
gram titles include Bar Development (which has sought to
advance the development of more competent and independent le-
gal professions), the Commercial Law Program (which has sought
to aid transitions to market economies), Criminal Law Reform
(which has sought to improve the quality of personnel on all sides
of the criminal justice system and to address problems of corrup-
tion and gangs), and Judicial Reform (which has sought to foster
independent and professional judiciaries).21
Since before CEELI was established in 1990, the ABA Interna-
tional Law and Practice Section has supported projects seeking to
advance "the world rule of law," including a decades-old legal
<http://www.ogc.doc.gov/ogc/cldp/cldp.html> [hereinafter Commercial
Law Development Program].
19 See, e.g., USIA International Exchange 1995, supra note 12; USIA Inter-
national Exchange 1994, supra note 12; Lawrence, supra note 16, at 672.
20 CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPEAN LAW INmATIVE, AMERICAN BAR
ASSOCIATION, ASSISTING EMERGING DEMOCRACIES (1997) [hereinafter
CEELI PAMPHLET].
21 For descriptions of CEELI and its activities, see Central and Eastern
European Law Initiative, American Bar Association, American Bar Association
Central and East European Law Initiative (last modified Aug. 29, 1998)
<http://www.abanet.oig/ceeli/home.html> [hereinafter CEELI Website],
and CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPEAN LAW INITIATIVE, AMERICAN BAR
AssoCIATION, CEELI UPDATE (1998).
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educational and professional exchange program. More recent
ABA assistance efforts with similar aims have included technical
assistance to nations in the Arab world that have pursued legal re-
forms "conforming to international legal standards," a "law and
democracy program" for Cambodia to aid in "planning and im-
plementing legal and judicial reforms to promote democracy, a
market economy and the rule of law," and a planned CEELI-like
initiative for Africa.'
Smaller scale efforts by other U.S. lawyers' voluntary organi-
zations have embraced many of the same ends. The Federal Bar
Association, for example, has established a "Democracy Devel-
opment Initiative" to promote the rule of law by assisting coun-
tries (primarily in the former Soviet Bloc) in reforming "govern-
mental and legal systems in accordance with democratic principles
such as the protection of due process and civil rights."' Al-
though they often have not articulated their purposes so fully and
formally, a myriad of smaller efforts by state and local bar asso-
ciations have undertaken "rule of law" and "legal reform" proj-
ects in various countries and sub-national regions that have
broadly paralleled the methods and, at least implicitly, embraced
the articulated goals of the core ABA programs.
Large, multipurpose philanthropic foundations have been an
important part of the picture as well. The Ford Foundation has
Support for the world role of law is found in Goal VIII of the ABA, and
the world role of law is a principal focus of the International Law and Practice
Section of the ABA. The educational and professional exchange program re-
ferred to in the text is ILEX, established in 1968 and dedicated to the proposi-
tion that a worldwide exchange of ideas and programs will lead to a heightened
level of learning and understanding for all." American Bar Association,ABA
Section of International Law and Practice Webpage (last modified Feb. 26, 1999)
<http://www.abanet.org/intlaw/home.html> [hereinafter ABA Website of
International Law].
2 Lawrence, supra note 16, at 672; see also Alfred F. Belcuore, Meeting the
Founders: Russians and Kazakhs Work for Democracy, 25 L. & POL'Y INT'L Bus.
461 (1994) (describing the Federal Bar Association's Democracy Development
Initiative).
24 See, e.g., Ron Brown, Legal Exchange with China, 1995 HAW. B.J. 22, 23-
24 (1995) (describing projects involving China); John D. Shullenberger, The
Russian Federation and Karelia: Rapid Change and the Rule of Law, 21 VT. B.J.
& L. DIG. 20 (1995) (describing Vermont-Karelia Rule of Law Project). See
generally Spencer Weber Waller, Neo-Realism and the International Harmoniza-
tion of Law: Lessons from Antitrust, 42 U. KAN. L. REV. 557, 569 (1994) (de-
scribing Illinois State Bar Association-Warsaw lawyers' group "sister bar pro-
gram") [hereinafter Waller, Neo-Realism].
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provided considerable funding for law-related projects in the con-
text of programs which have declared their aims to be the ad-
vancement of democracy, markets and legality. Its "governance
and public policy" program has supported efforts to reform and
strengthen government institutions (especially parliaments), to
provide resources for legal services for the poor and other under-
served populations, and, more broadly, to encourage activities
that reinforce democracy in a number of developing and reform-
ing countries." The beneficiaries of the Ford Foundation's
"rights and social justice" programs include projects that under-
take to train judges, enhance awareness of human rights concerns,
increase access to justice, and strengthen the rule of law under-
pinnings of democracy in many parts of the developing world.26
The express purposes of Ford Foundation programs that have
targeted specific regions include supporting efforts to: (1) develop
"institutional and individual skills"v' necessary for economic re-
form in countries that are abandoning centralized planning; (2)
make governments more accountable in the emerging democra-
cies of Asia; (3) strengthen democracy, human rights, and gov-
ernment accountability in Latin America; (4) establish open elec-
tions, the rule of law, human rights and government
accountability in Africa; (5) strengthen democratic institutions
(including legislatures and courts), legal reform, and the rehabili-
tation of legal education in the CEE and NIS countries; and (6)
facilitate "China's efforts to rule by law." 28 In the same general
vein, the Asia Foundation, which has included law-related assis-
2 See, e.g., The Ford Foundation, Ford Foundation 1995 Annual Report
<http://www.fordfound.org/AR.95/AR.95.WholeThing.html> (describing
the Governance and Public Policy program) [hereinafterFord Foundation 1995
Annual Report].
26 See, e.g., The Ford Foundation, Rights and Social Justice, Ford Foundation
AnnualReport 1995 <http://www.fordfound.org/AR.95/AR9511.html>.
' See The Ford Foundation, Regional Overviews: Asia, Ford Foundation
1995 Annual Report <http://www.fordfound.org/AR.95/AR9519.html>
[hereinafter Ford Foundation Regional Overviews].
28 Iad (describing the "Legal Services" offered under the "Rights and Social
Justice" Program). One-third of the Foundation's Africa funds are devoted to
the agenda described in the text. The China agenda referred to in the text is
described as one of "the major objectives of the Foundation's work" in the
P.R.C. See id. Accounts of the Ford Foundation's relevant activities and aims
can be found in the Ford Foundation Annual Reports, and the organization's
quarterly publication, The Ford Foundation REPORT, which are available at
<http://www.fordfound.org/about/about.html>.
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tance efforts among its programs for China and several other na-
tions in East and Southeast Asia, has declared that building de-
mocracy, strengthening the rule of law, and furthering economic
reforms are among its principal stated goals.29
Created and steered by international financier and Hungarian
emigre' George Soros, the Soros Foundation has sponsored signifi-
cant law-related programs as a part of its extensive program of
support for "open societies"- a term that encompasses democ-
racy, free markets, and the protection of individual liberties. Co-
ordinated and overseen by its main offices in New York and Bu-
dapest, the Soros Foundation network operates primarily through
national-level "Open Society Foundations," with approximately
fifty offices in over a dozen countries, mostly in the CEE-NIS re-
gion. Guided and supported by the Soros Foundation's Constitu-
tional and Legal Policy Institute ("COLPI"), the law-related ac-
tivities of the national-level foundations and the projects of their
associated law centers have pursued an agenda of supporting legal
reform efforts to improve the protection of human rights, the
training of judges and lawyers, and the efficacy of mechanisms for
government accountability (including support for organizations
that monitor and report on legislatures, support for education,
and support for journalists who cover legal and government is-
sues, and support for efforts to reform administrative law).30 In
addition, the Soros initiatives have included the Central European
University, located in Budapest, which has offered U.S.-accredited
degree courses in legal studies to students from around the region
and has operated a "Privatization Project" that has sought to pro-
vide education and training to support a key element in the re-
29 The economic reform goal includes increasing the system's capacity to
deal with the adverse consequences of reform processes. Other goals of the
Foundation include fostering peace and cooperation in international relations.
See The Asia Foundation, The Asia Foundation (last modified Nov. 7, 1998)
< http://www.asiafoundation.org > [hereinafterAsia Foundation Website].
3 Descriptions of the Soros Foundation, the various Open Society Foun-
dations and Institutes, and the Constitutional and Legal Policy Institute can be
found in the Soros Foundation Annual Reports and on the Soros Foundation's
Webpage, (visited Mar. 27, 1999) <http://www.soros.org> [hereinafter Soros
Fouidation Website]. See also Constitutional and Legal Policy Institute, Consti-
tutional and Legal Policy Institute Website (last modified Sept. 28, 1998)
< http://www.osi.HU/COLPI/> (detailing the mission, work, and research
of the institute) [hereinafter COLPI Website].
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gion's turn to economic markets." Major U.S.-based foundations,
including the German Marshall Fund of the United States, Soros,
and Ford, have provided support, or funded technical assistance,
to emerging non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in CEE
countries that have included legal education and "rule of law" ini-
tiatives on their human rights and democracy agendas.32
As the foregoing descriptions suggest, U.S.-based and U.S.-
funded legal export and assistance efforts have pursued their
agendas of promoting democracy, markets, and/or legality in
nearly every part of the world outside the established industrial
democracies of the West and Japan. USAID has funded "rule of
law" and other legal assistance projects at the regional level in
Sub-Saharan Africa, South Africa, CEE, 'NIS, Asia, and Latin
America, and at the national level in the vast majority of coun-
tries in these regions (including an especially large program to de-
velop pro-market business, commercial, and other laws in Indo-
nesia). ACUS's administrative law work has counted China and
Ukraine among its targets, and its "rule of law" program has sent
academics, judges, and court staffs to several African states.34
USIA's law programs have included the NIS, Latin America, and
31 See KEViN F.F. QUIGLEY, FOR DEMOCRACY'S SAKE: FOUNDATIONS
AND DEMOCRACY ASSISTANCE 97-101 (1997) (describing the creation, objec-
tives, and accomplishments of the Central European University); Thomas Ca-
rothers, Aiding Post-Communist Societies: A Better Way?, PROBS. OF POST
COMMUNISM, Sept.-Oct. 1996, para. 5 (describing the Soros Foundation's em-
phasis on education) [hereinafter Carothers, Aiding Post-Communist Societies];
Central European University, Central European University (visited Mar. 23,
1999) <http://www.soros.org/ceu.html> [hereinafter Central European Uni-
versity].
32 Examples of direct and indirect recipients include the Democracy After
Communism foundation in Hungary and Romanian human rights groups.
' For accounts of USAID's Caribbean and Central American "justice im-
provement" programs and the USAID-funded program on commercial law for
Indonesia (which are beyond the scope of the CEE/NIS and P.R.C.-focused
efforts that provide the main examples in this article), see Michael Ross Fowler
& Julie M. Bunck, Legal Imperialism or Disinterested Assistance?: American Legal
Aid in the Caribbean Basin, 55 ALB. L. REV. 815 (1992) (providing case studies
of the role of American legal assistance in the Central American states of Gua-
temala and Belize) and David M. Trubek et al., Global Restructuring and the
Law: Studies of the Internationalization of Legal Fields and the Creation of Trans-
national Arenas, 44 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 407, 482-87 (1994) (describing the
goal of the USAID-funded program for Indonesia known as ELIPS).
' See Katzen, supra note 13, at 662 (describing efforts conducted by ACUS
in 1993).
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other areas.3" Programs of the Departments of State, Commerce
and Justice, the SEC, and the FTC have provided technical legal
assistance to their counterparts, and to post-socialist governments
more broadly, in Central and Eastern Europe and elsewhere."
Assistance from the judicial and legislative branches has concen-
trated primarily on the CEE and NIS region, but (especially on
the legislative side) has extended to a number of Asian nations as
well.37
Programs funded or operated by non-governmental, non-
profit organizations have had similarly broad geographic cover-
age. The Ford Foundation has supported "rule of law" and law-
related democracy-supporting projects and more technical forms
of legal assistance in Africa, Latin America, China, South Asia,
Southeast Asia, and in recent years parts of the former Soviet
Bloc.3" The Asia Foundation has run programs to bolster legisla-
tive skills and to support democracy and legal reform on a multi-
national level in East and South Asia and in individual countries,
including China, Vietnam, and Cambodia. The various Soros
Foundations' legal programs have operated primarily, but not ex-
clusively, in Central and Eastern Europe. Since two years after its
1990 founding, CEELI's jurisdiction has included most of the
former Soviet Union, as well as Central and Eastern Europe.
Other bar association projects have ranged from the former So-
viet world to China and the Middle East.39 In addition, univer-
sity-based "institutes" and "projects" have offered formal pro-
grams of legal advice to support market-oriented reforms in a
similarly broad array of recipients including, for example, Mon-
golia and Russia.'
" See 1998 Congressional Presentation, supra note 6.
36 See Kovacic, Competition Policy Entrepreneur, supra note 2, at 470-73
(discussing USAID-funded DOJ-FTC programs for assisting competition pol-
icy agencies in CEE).
31 See id (discussing efforts to reform competition law in Mongolia).
38 See, e.g., Rights and Social Justice, supra note 26; Ford Foundation, Peace
and Social Justice, Ford Foundation 1997 Annual Report (last modified Mar. 26,
1999) <http://www.fordfound.org/AR.97/psj/index.html>.
39 See Brown, supra note 24; Lawrence, supra note 16; Shullenberger, supra
note 24; ABA Website of International Law, supra note 22 (regarding the Middle
East).
' See, e.g., Kovacic, Competition Policy Entrepreneur, supra note 2, at 437-
74 (describing the University of Maryland's Center for Institutional Reform
and the Informal Sector (RIS) and its work with Mongolia); Robert L. Knauss,
University of Houston Russian Petroleum Legislation Project, 15 HOUS. J. INT'L
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2.1.2. The Complexity of "U.S. Exporters" and the
Ambiguity of "U.S. Exports"
A complicated web of relationships among sources of funding,
intermediary organizations, and end-point providers of advice
connects the diverse participants in the U.S. "legal export" and
"legal aid" processes to one another and to entities in "importing
states" and "beneficiary countries."
While USAID disburses the greatest portion of government
resources for these programs, its role in the direct provision of le-
gal advice and assistance is modest. USAID helps to fund, and
sometimes cooperates with, other federal government agencies
that operate programs of technical assistance. Some of these gov-
ernment programs have included the direct provision of legal ad-
vice and technical legal assistance by government lawyers,
economists, and other federal employees. Examples of such
partly USAID-supported government activities include: (1) the
State Department's various "rule of law" programs;41 (2) a joint
venture between the FTC and the Department of Justice's Anti-
trust Division to provide advice and assistance on competition
law and policy to several CEE countries;42 (3) SEC projects to ad-
vise its Hungarian counterpart and to assist Hungary in preparing
corporations and securities laws;43 (4) ACUS's advice to foreign
governments on administrative law and related matters;' and
Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, and (5)
L. 633 (1993) (describing the role played by the University of Houston Law
Center in helping to draft Petroleum Legislation for Russia).
41 See USIA International Exchange 1995, supra note 12; see also USIA In-
ternational Exchange 1994, supra note 12.
42 See Foreign Authorities Expect to Focus on Mergers and Anticartel Law En-
forcement, 62 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Re. (BNA) No. 1550, at 104 (an. 30,
1992) (stating that USAID issued a $7.2 million grant to assist legal programs in
Poland and Czechoslovakia); Kathleen E. McDermott, U.S. Officials Provide
Competition Counseling to Eastern Europe, ANTITRUST, Fall/Winter 1991, at 4
[hereinafter McDermott, Competition Counseling to Eastern Europe].
" See James R. Doty, Capital Market Developments in Central and Eastern
Europe: The SEC Perspective, 743 PRACTISING L. INST.: CORP. L. PRACTICE
COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 111, at 128-29 (1991) [hereinafter Doty, SEC Per-
spective].
" See Katzen, supra note 13, at 662 (1994) (noting that Congress has
authorized ACUS to offer such advice, on a "reimbursable" basis, with the
concurrence of USAID, the State Department, or USIA).
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other organizations' work to strengthen legislatures in CEE, Asia,
and Central America.
45
Some of USAID's (and other government agencies') efforts to
offer legal advice and assistance abroad have blended public and
private sector participation. Some initiatives backed by USAID
or USIA have employed private lawyers or experts, often in com-
bination with government personnel, as direct providers of advice
and assistance. Examples include the Commerce Department's
seminars, which have involved groups of lawyers from across sev-
eral government departments and commissions and private law-
yers (some with experience in federal agencies),46 as well as pro-
grams that send judges, Department of Justice lawyers, and
private experts to provide criminal law reform assistance in the
former Soviet world.4'
USAID, and other government entities (often operating with
USAID allocations), also have channeled federal funds for legal
exports and assistance to a wide variety of private sector pro-
grams, typically through the mechanism of grants to U.S. inter-
mediary organizations. Major recipients have included some of
the principal foundations active in the provision of legal advice
and aid abroad, including CEELI (the expenses of which are
largely covered by USAID) and the Asia Foundation. 4' A modest
portion of the National Endowment for Democracy's limited
pool of federal government money has been expended through
grants to law-related programs operated in the CEE/NIS region,
East Asia, and other parts of the developing world, by the inter-
national affairs wings of the Democratic and Republican Parties,
the Center for International Private Enterprise (associated with
" See, e.g., 1998 Congressional Presentation, suPTa note 6 (detailing the
budget for economic and humanitarian assistance activities).
4 See U.S. Department of Commerce, Commercial Law Development Pro-
gram: Consultive Services and Training Programs (Oct. 1997) (inpublished
document on file with Department of Commerce) [hereinafter CLDP: Consult-
ing and Training]; see also Commercial Law Development Program, supra note
18.
See Lawrence, supra note 16, at 672-74; 1998 Congressional Presentation,
supra note 6.
48 See CEELI Website, supra note 21 (noting the importance of USAID
funding; Parliamentary Assistance in Nepal, supra note 17 (describig a pro-
gram teat dates to 1990 and includes USAID grants to the Asia Foundation).
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the U.S. Chamber of Commerce), and the Free Trade Union In-
stitute (affiliated with the AFL-CIO).
Through numerous, usually smaller, and more discrete alloca-
tions, USAID and other federal agencies (again, often using
USAID-provided funds) have supported a wide range of "contrac-
tors" who have offered direct legal assistance or extended material
and technical support to reformers seeking legal, legal-
institutional, and legal-educational reform in many countries."0
Typically, the contractors have been U.S. entities. Recipients of
USAID funds under such arrangements have included particular
projects of large, established assistance-providing organizations,
such as CEELI and the Harvard Institute for International Devel-
opment."' Beneficiaries also have included smaller and more spe-
cialized legal assistance projects, such as a Central European Uni-
versity program to train officials in the requisites of privatizing
state-owned economies, a University of Maryland-based institute
that provided assistance to drafters of Armenia's bankruptcy law,
and a Georgetown Law School program to advise on a range of
economic law reform issues in then-newly independent Estonia. 2
Major accounting firms, local bar associations, other private vol-
untary organizations, and individual expert consultants can also
be counted among the vast and varied pool of USAID's U.S. con-
tractors.
53
"' See 1998 Congressional Presentation, supra note 6 (describing the national
Endowment for Democracy, for which the congressional appropriation allo-
cates 40% to the CEE/NIS, 17% to East Asia, and 8%-15% each for other re-
gions of the developing world).
M See, e.g., Kovacic, Competition Policy Entrepreneur, supra note 2, at 470-
73.
5" See 1998 Congressional Presentation, supra note 6.
52 See Central European University, supra note 31 (regarding the Central
European University ("CEU") program); 1998 Congressional Presentation, su-
pra note 6 (concerning the University of Maryland project); J. Peter Byrne &
Philip G. Schrag, Law Reform in Estonia: The Role of Georgetown University
Law Center, 25 L. & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 449 (1994) (describing the Georgetown
project, supported through the Commerce Department's CLDP, which re-
ceives USA)ID funds).
-" See Shullenberger, supra note 24; Samuel L. Bufford, Bankruptcy Law in
European Countries Emerging from Communism: The Special Legal and Eco-
nomic Challenges, 70 AM. BANKR. L.J. 459, 460 n.20 (1996) (describing Deloitte
& Touche's role in training Romanian judges in bankruptcy); Hungary (last
modified Mar. 3, 1999) <http://www.info.usaid.gov/pubs/cp98/eni/countries
/hu.htm > (describing the use of SEED money for individual consultants sent
to Hungary).
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The U.S. government-aid sources' heavy reliance on U.S. in-
termediary organizations has been the object of concern and criti-
cism, particularly on the grounds of high costs and the poor forg-
ing of links with indigenous organizations and individuals in
recipient countries. Perhaps partly in response to such external
critiques and in-house worries, official U.S. legal assistance and
advice programs increasingly have disbursed a modest portion of
their budgets in the form of grants made directly to host-country
organizations that pursue goals compatible with the grant-issuing
agency's agenda. Recipients of such aid from USAID and other
federal government agencies have included democracy-supporting
non-governmental organizations in South Africa, Central and
Eastern Europe, and the former Soviet Union.'
As the variety of these federally-supported legal assistance and
advice programs suggests, the official U.S. effort has been institu-
tionally fragmented. The resulting low level of coordination and
occasionally conflicting agendas of government and government-
funded programs have led to some organizational reform efforts
in the middle and late 1990s. These changes have included the
creation of a senior office in the Department of State to coordi-
nate "rule of law" programs and calls to bring greater integration
and harmony to the activities of USAID's relatively autonomous
regional bureaus and country programs.
The pattern in privately funded endeavors has been broadly
similar and equally complex. Some grants from major U.S. non-
profit foundations have supported the legal export and assistance
programs of other U.S. foundations and voluntary organizations,
with recipients ranging from the well-established, multi-purpose
Asia Foundation to new, eclectic, and rather ad hoc programs
that have sprung up under the auspices of local bar associations
and other groups around the United States."5 Some of the re-
sources of private legal export and aid organizations have sup-
5' See 1998 Congressional Presentation, supra note 6; Democracy (last modi-
fied Mar. 3, 1999) < http://www.info.usaid.gov/democracy >.
" See, e.g., About the Asia Foundation (visited Mar. 3, 1999)
< http://wwv.asiafoundation.or/taf/about/abou-abou.html > (describing the
sources of the Asia Foundation's funding as including grants from U.S. founda-
tions); Governance and Public Policy: Approved Grants and Projects (visited Mar.
3, 1999) <http://www.fordfound.org/AR.96/AR9652.htil> (noting the
grant to the Asia Foundation under the Ford Foundation's Government and
Public Policy Program); Brown, supra note 24, at 22 (describing foundation
grants to the US-ASIA Law Institute).
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ported their relatively long-term employees' or volunteers' direct
provision of legal advice and assistance to governments and educa-
tional and professional entities in recipient countries. Examples
include some of CEELI's legal specialist postings to the former
Soviet world, and some of the Asia Foundation's work with na-
tional legislatures in South and Southeast Asia. 6 Foundation and
non-profit sector funds also have sent experts, who otherwise
have not been affiliated with the sponsoring organizations, over-
seas for brief stints as lecturers and consultants. CEELI and the
Ford Foundation have been active in this area.' z The experts have
often been American legal academics, and the most frequent re-
cipients have been countries in the CEE/NIS region.
Some foundations, including the Ford, Soros, and Asia Foun-
dations, have expended a large portion of their resources for legal
assistance through direct support for recipient-country organiza-
tions and institutions, including judges' organizations, bar associa-
tions, government bodies charged with institutional reform, and
universities (for research on law-reform issues as well as for librar-
ies and for legal education programs). The degree of oversight
and supervision the granters exercise over such funded projects
has varied considerably. The Ford Foundation's practice of hav-
ing a resident staff member to coordinate and monitor its legal
programs in China lies near the more engaged end of the spec-
trum of this relatively non-"command and control" mode of as-
sistance. The role of the Soros Foundation's national-level Open
Society Foundations and the regional coordinating function of
COLPI seem to have been less "hands-on." Other instances of
foundation support have tended toward a model of more "arm's-
length" grant-giving."
56 See, e.g., CEELI Website, supra note 21; Asia Foundation Website, supra
note 29.
Examples include the "Raising Rights Consciousness" program of lec-
tures and seminars that the Ford Foundation supported for CEE-NIS coun-
tries, and CEELI's program of short term seminars. See The Ford Foundation,
The Ford Foundation Report, Summer 1993, (visited Mar. 3, 1999)
< http://www.fordfound.org/QR.24.2/QR242.html >; Liaison and Legal Spe-
cialist Program (visited Mar. 3, 1999) <http://www.abanet.org/ceeli~liason.
html>.
" Examples include some of CEELI's work handled through resident liai-
sons and some of the Asia Foundation's work with local NGOs. See, e.g., Par-
liamentary Assistance in Nepal, supra note 17 (describing the Asia Founation's
role).
[Vol120:2
LEXAMERICANA?
Resources for private, non-profit sector programs, and gov-
ernment-supported ones as well, have included a substantial com-
ponent of volunteer services. CEELI, for example, has placed
well over a hundred lawyers as volunteer liaisons or long-term
specialists, hundreds more as short-term visiting advisors, and
thousands more as U.S.-based sources of advice. CEELI estimates
that the value of pro bono time provided by its volunteer lawyers
reached $55 million by mid-1996 and $77 million by mid-1997.5 9
On a more modest scale, the Federal Bar Association's Democ-
racy Development Initiative established a "talent bank" of U.S.
lawyers volunteering to assist CEE countries in constitutional and
economic law reforms.' Efforts by local bar groups and other
voluntary organizations generally have followed the same pattern.
In the public sector, the ACUS program, various USAID-
backed initiatives, and USIA projects have relied upon the un-
compensated services of federal judges, government lawyers, fed-
eral officials, and private lawyers who have offered legal advice
and assistance by traveling to Africa, Asia, and the former Soviet
Bloc or by meeting with, or lecturing to, visitors from most parts
of the economically developing or formerly socialist world.61 Be-
yond such institutional programs, more ad hoc groups of lawyers,
scholars, and individual consultants have offered pro bono advice
on constitutional and legal reform in the former Soviet Bloc and
elsewhere.
University-based law schools have been another important
component in the complicated pattern of providing and funding
U.S. legal, exports and advice. Sometimes with the support and
cooperation of private foundations and government programs,
and sometimes with their own resources, these U.S. educational
institutions have offered everything from discrete projects that
'9 See William Funk, News from the Circuits, 19 ADMIN. & REG. L. NEWS,
Spring 1994, at 3; Paul Moxley, CEELI: A Pro Bono Project of the ABA, 9 UTAH
BJ., Dec. 1996, 27 (describing data concerning CEELI's initial years); see also
Lawrence, supra note 16, at 678 (noting that CEELI has 24 liaisons in
CEE/NIS countries at any one time); Abner J. Mikva, Building Justice in Cen-
tral and Eastern Europe: When We're the Good Guys, LEGAL TIMES, Aug. 19/26,
1996, at 21 (stating that 4000 attorneys, judges, and law professors participated
in CEELI's first decade); CEELI Website, supra note 21 (providing more recent
statistics on the number of participating lawyers and the value of contribu-
tions).
' See Lawrence, supra note 16, at 678.
61 See, e.g., Lawrence, supra note 16, at 673-75, 677; 1998 Congressional Pres-
entation, supra note 6.
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provide a single country with technical advice on a single legal
subject, to pre-existing educational programs that broadly expose
foreign lawyers to U.S. laws and U.S.-style legal thinking. Exam-
ples of the former include the Russian Petroleum Legislation pro-
ject at the University of Houston and some of a University of
Maryland-based institute's work as a USAID contractor. Exam-
ples of the latter include LL.M. programs at many U.S. law
schools and more specialized training sessions for foreign judges
and legislators. Government funding for such activities has been
provided through USAID contractor arrangements and a variety
of scholarship and fellowship programs (such as those operated
under IREX and the USIA/Fulbright John Marshall scholars pro-
grams for parts of the former Soviet world and by the Fulbright
programs for many regions). Foundation support has come
through such channels as the Committee on Legal Educational
Exchange with China's programs (which, with the support of the
Luce, Ford, and other foundations, have brought hundreds of
P.R.C. legal scholars to the United States) and CEELI's sister law
school program (which has matched more than a hundred U.S.
law schools with a few dozen schools in the CEE states). Law
schools' own financial aid packages to foreign graduate students
have been another source.
Finally, modest funding for projects that seek to export U.S.
legal models and assistance has come from abroad. Foreign gov-
ernments and organizations have sometimes paid for the cost of
U.S. legal consultants and experts (either directly or through mul-
tilateral organizations). Some U.S. foundations that have pro-
vided legal advice and assistance abroad have received donations
from foreign governments and foundations.62
In sum, even a general overview shows a pattern of funding
and providing "U.S. legal exports" that is complex, varied, and
fragmented. The sources of resources for "export programs" have
ranged from government appropriations to foundation money,
foreign funds, and donated services. These resources have been
disbursed and deployed through a tangled pattern of mixed
sources, "nested" grants, and sub-grants among public and private
organizations that have differed radically in size, style, purpose,
62 See, e.g., About the Asia Foundation: Corporate Partners Program (last
modified March 3, 1999) <http://www.asiafoundation.org/taf/about/abou-
corp.htm1> (listinig foreign governments and a wide range of corporate and
individual donors as sources of its funding).
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and nationality. The degree of oversight and control that granters
or intermediary organizations have exercised over direct provid-
ers and grant recipients also has varied enormously. Predictably,
there has been relatively little effective coordination among pro-
grams that have involved such numerous and diverse underwrit-
ers, providers, recipient nations, and funding arrangements.
The picture becomes more complex, and generalizations more
difficult, when one focuses on the problems of defining "U.S. le-
gal advice" or the export of "U.S. legal models." On one hand,
labeling all of the relevant activities undertaken or funded by
formal programs of the U.S. government and U.S. non-
governmental organizations as "U.S. legal exports" overstates the
scope and scale of efforts to export distinctly "U.S." laws and le-
gal models. Not all aid and advice offered by U.S. entities and in-
dividuals have endorsed solutions that are distinctively American,
or that are even minimally consistent with U.S. laws, the U.S. le-
gal system, or the dominant views in U.S. legal culture. There are
several possible motives for U.S. assistance providers' having es-
chewed a full-fledged effort to export U.S. laws and legal models.
They range from a prudential calculation that such a strategy has
offered the best chance of achieving outcomes that approach U.S.
programs' goal of market-oriented, rights-protecting, and demo-
cratic orders abroad, to a genuine belief that U.S. models are basi-
cally flawed or, at least, ill-suited to the legal inheritance and fu-
ture needs of recipient countries.63
However mixed or murky the motives, the pattern seems
fairly clear. Many U.S. programs and providers have had an af-
firmative policy or practice of providing legal advice that is not
distinctly "American." In some cases, this has taken the form of
not focusing on substantive legal fields where U.S. models seem
most at odds with world standards." In other instances, this has
meant emphasizing "universal," "international," or unspecified
"general" standards as the well-spring of advice that also could be
63 The last of these views seems to be especially prominent in programs
that target CEE, where U.S. models are claimed to be out of step with recipi-
ent countries' pre-socialist civil law traditions, and at odds with tnose nations'
need to harmonize their laws with European Union norms in order to smooth
their integration into Europe.
' For instance, full-blown U.S.-style separation of powers arrangements
have not figured prominently in U.S. providers' advice on constitution draft-
ing.
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accurately presented as based on U.S. principles and experiences.65
CEELI, some USAID-supported projects, and other U.S. provid-
ers focusing on the CEE region often have leaned toward provid-
ing advice that has emphasized Western European (rather than
U.S.) models and have included Europeans on sponsored panels of
advisors. Moreover, some U.S. experts- especially some legal
academics- have been quite critical of existing U.S. models when
they have offered advice on matters ranging from criminal proce-
dure, to social and economic rights of citizens and antitrust regu-
lation.66 In addition, the practice of providing some legal assis-
tance in the form of grants to organizations in recipient countries
(and sometimes only loosely monitoring their activities) seems
certain to have invited law reform and legal development efforts
that look substantially to non-U.S. models and influences.
On the other hand, counting only formal U.S.-based and U.S.-
run programs and projects of legal aid and advice as sources of
"U.S. legal exports" and "U.S. legal assistance" significantly un-
derstates the extent of the phenomena. Much of the export and
attempted export of U.S. laws and legal models has been occur-
ring through other media. The U.S. government has promoted
indirect "exports" of U.S. models. For example, it has pushed
U.S.-style or U.S.-acceptable standards in multilateral organiza-
tions that shape "international" model standards or provide legal
advice to countries undertaking legal reforms. Sometimes, this is
a matter primarily of advocacy (as in the SEC's role in pressing
for standardized securities market regulations in IOSCO and
other fora).67 Other times, it has been more a matter of exercising
65 CEELI's judicial reform programs cite the United Nations' principles
defining an independent judiciary, and CEELI's description of its program of
providing "concept papers" on general fields of law declares that such papers
are not intended to provide instruction in, or advocate the adoption of, laws
based particularly on U.S. models. See CEELI Website, supra note 21.
66 Anecdotal examples from the literature on legal assistance abroad in-
clude a USAID official in Zimbabwe who scuttled efforts to support the devel-
opment of a U.S.-style antitrust regime and U.S. academic experts who offered
prescriptions concerning competition policy and laws that the Nepalese recipi-
ents of advice knew were at odds with existing U.S. rules and practices. See
Kovacic, Competition Policy Entrepreneur, supra note 2, at 447, 461.
67 See, e.g., Alejandro M. Garro, On Some Practical Implications of the Di-
versity of Legal Cultures for Lawyering in the Americas, 64 REVISTA JURIDICA
UNIVERSIDAD DE PUERTO RICO 461 (1995) (describing U.S. participation in
multilateral foreign aid organizations, especially those concerning private in-
ternational law and the Americas).
[Vol120:2
LEXAMERICANA?
power (for example, through U.S. votes in multilateral aid-
providing organizations that condition support for law reform
and other activities on potential recipients' practices and progress
in such law reform-related areas as protecting human rights and
establishing market economies).68
In addition, U.S. government programs sometimes have coop-
erated with foreign government donors in ways that may have
expanded (although they may also have diluted) the resources ef-
fectively devoted to promoting the export of U.S. or U.S.-
compatible legal ideas and ideals.69 Such collaboration, and the
"leveraging" effect it may have had on U.S. resources, appears to
be more commonplace in private foundation-funded activities.'
Further, U.S. experts frequently have worked on projects sup-
ported and operated by international or multilateral organiza-
tions. Certainly these individual U.S. providers could be ex-
pected to draw upon and disseminate "U.S." models, and
anecdotal evidence suggests that they have done so."1 Moreover,
just as U.S. lawyers and experts sometimes have declined or re-
fused to endorse U.S. models, foreign lawyers and experts appear
to have occasionally offered advice that has embraced some sig-
63 See, e.g., 12 U.S.C.A. S 635 (West Supp. 1999); 22 U.S.C.A. S 262d (West
1990).
69 See 1998 Congressional Presentation, supra note 6.
" Examples include The Ford Foundation's support for the London-based
International Center for the Legal Protection of Human Rights (Interrights),
which promotes broadly U.S. Bill of Rights-style values and models in some of
its workshops, as well as the collaboration between the Asia Foundation and
Germany's Adenauer Foundation in working with the Cambodian Interior
Ministry to develop and disseminate ideas on Tree and fair elections. See Ford
Foundation, Report Summer/Fall 1997: Recent Grants (visited March 3, 1999)
<http://www.f ordfoundation.org/QR.28.3/QR28310.html>; Asia Founda-
tion, Pro grams: Project List, Camlodia (visited March 3, 1999) <http://www.
asiafoundation.com/taf/programs/prog-proj-camb.html >.
71 One prominent example is a UNDP-sponsored program for China that
included a large number of Americans in its limited cadre of foreign consult-
ants and trainers. Even within the framework of a program that insisted, and
to a significant degree acted, on the premise that laws are not readily "trans-
planted," the consultants and trainers relied heavily on American law materials
as references and sources of comparative insight when they sought to equip
Chinese recipients with the analytical tools necessary to ciaft legislation ap-
propriate to local circumstances. See Ann Seidman & Robert B. Seidman,
Drfting Legislation for Development: Lessons from a Chinese Project, 44 AM. J.
COMP. L. 1, 3-4 (1996) [hereinafter Seidman & Seidman, Drafting].
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nificant elements of U.S. laws, legal ideals, and models of a legal
system.'
Finally, an apparently significant set of components in the
contemporary export of U.S. legal models has included U.S.-based
influences that have operated outside the structure of formal U.S.
or multilateral aid or advice programs, and sometimes without
any apparent or asserted element of offering assistance.
2.1.3. Other Channels of U.S. Legal Export: Beyond Formal
Assistance Programs
In addition to the vast array of programs that have defined
their principal goals as the provision of technical legal advice or
the cultivation abroad of U.S.-style laws and legal orders, there
have been several other unilateral U.S. channels for "exporting"
U.S. law and legal models. These modes sometimes have been at
least as formidable as formal advice or assistance efforts.
First, U.S. educational institutions have given foreign nation-
als extensive exposure to U.S. laws and ideas about law. Probably
the most significant elements in this process are the burgeoning
LL.M. programs at U.S. law schools. Many among the top tiers
of U.S. law schools have provided these one-year graduate study
programs for young and mid-career lawyers from around the
world. LL.M. programs typically include a basic course that pro-
vides an introduction to U.S. law for foreign students, and several
more specialized elective courses, most of which typically focus
on some field of U.S. law and include both foreign LL.M. stu-
dents and American J.D. students. The largest of these graduate
programs have more than one hundred students, and the total
number of foreign students studying law in the United States is
thousands annually. Most participants are from Western Europe
and the most prosperous nations in East Asia, but some have
come from the regions that have been targeted by formal U.S. le-
gal export and assistance programs. With rising prosperity in
their home countries making more resources available for legal
education abroad and U.S. government programs, foundation
7 Sometimes, this seems to have been prompted by recipients' demands.
For example, some CEE audiences reportedly have sought a discussion of what
they took to be the "original" or "underlying" U.S. model instead of what
they saw as an imperfect Western European copy. See, e.g., Symposium, supra
note 1, at 140-43 (providing remarks of-Ambassador Richard Schifter and Pro-
fessor Herman Schwartz).
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grants, and law scholarships providing some support as well, stu-
dents from the former Soviet Bloc, China, and other developing
nations have come to comprise a small but growing share of the
LL.M. population at U.S. law schools. 3
A much smaller contingent of foreign lawyers and legal aca-
demics has been exposed to U.S. law and legal thinking as doc-
toral students or occasionally as visiting scholars or longer-term,
part-time faculty members with formal appointments at U.S. law
schools.74 Many relatively long-term visits have occurred under
the auspices of centers or programs for the study of the laws of
the visitors' home countries or regions.7 Much shorter term, but
fairly intense, exposure to the ways of U.S. legal academe has oc-
curred through visits to American law schools by delegations of
deans from Central and Eastern European law schools, typically
arranged by CEELI, and from the P.R.C.
7 6
3 See R. Randle Edwards, Legal Training for China Ventures, 295, 310-11
(PLI Comm. Law & Practice Course Handbook Series No. 349, 1985) (describ-
ing the programs of the Committee on Legal Educational Exchange with
China ("CLEEC", funded by the Luce, Ford, and Chinn Ho Foundations.
These programs placed over two hundred P.R.C. students and scholars at U.S.
law schools and universities under agreements with various Chinese institu-
tions during the 1980s and early 1990s). U.S. government programs that pro-
vide funding include IREX (particularly the new Ron Brown scholarship pro-
gram) for students from CEE, and the Fulbright program for scholars from
many countries. See United States Information Agency, United States Informa-
tion Agency Website (visited Mar. 3, 1999) <http://www.usia.gov>.
' New York University's "Global Law School" program has been the
most heavily publicized undertaking for giving a substantial number of promi-
nent foreign legal scholars a formal affiliation with, and opportunities for a
regular, intermittent presence at an American law school. More typical are vis-
iting appointments, or the permanent but part-time appointments that some
foreign legal academics hold on U.S. law faculties in conjunction with retained
appointments at universities in their home countries.
7s Examples include Harvard's East Asian Legal Studies program, Colum-
bia's Center for Chinese Legal Studies, Center for Japanese L (al Studies, Cen-
ter for Comparative Constitutionalism, and the Uiversity of Chicago's Cen-
ter for the Study of Constitutionalism in Eastern Europe. See Nei Boyden
Tanner, The Failure of International Law to Internationalize the Legal Profession,
17 J.L. & COM. 131 (1997).
76 See Mary C. Daly, Thinking Globally: Will National Borders Matter to
Lauyers a Century from Now?, J. INST. FOR STUD. LEGAL ETHICS 297, 306-07
(1996) (describing CEELI-supported deans' visits);see also University of Michi-
gan Law School, 42 LAW QUADRANGLE NOTES, no. 1, 33 (1999) (describing a
visit by a delegation of P.R.C. law deans to Stanford, Berkeley, Harvard,
Georgetown, CUNY, Columbia, and Yale Law Schools).
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A less extensive and intensive channel of legal export by
American institutions of legal education has been the summer
programs that dozens of U.S. law schools operate in conjunction
with foreign universities' campuses in Beijing, Moscow, and
throughout Europe, Asia, Latin America, and parts of Africa."
Such programs usually focus on teaching U.S. students about U.S.
and foreign law, but many of them also have included some struc-
tured or informal contact between U.S. participants in the pro-
grams and students, law faculty or lawyers from the host country.
The summer abroad law programs thus have provided an oppor-
tunity for American students and faculty to disseminate informa-
tion and ideas about U.S. law."8 In addition, some of the summer
programs for U.S. students have enrolled foreign students, and a
handful of U.S. law schools have run overseas programs that
teach foreign students U.S. law, sometimes as a preparatory
course for pursuing an LL.M. in the United States. 9
A substantial number of U.S. legal academics have also been
teaching in law departments of foreign universities, sometimes of-
fering courses in U.S. law and "general" or "international"
courses that, in many cases, have been tinged with a U.S. perspec-
tive. Fulbright grants have supported dozens of law lecturer and
researcher slots per year, with various other foundation and ex-
change programs adding considerably to that number." Many of
the slots have been in countries and regions that have been the
principal foci of contemporary government and foundation-
" Examples include Duquesne University's summer program at the Uni-
versity of Political Science and Law in Beijing, the University of San Diego's
program in Moscow, and a host of programs in Western Europe. See Tom Sta-
bile, The Savvy Student's Guide to Studying Abroad, NAT'L JURIST, Jan. 1999, at
36.
" In order to receive credit for foreign study, the study or summer abroad
program must be affiliated with an ABA accredited law school. See American
Bar Association, Study Abroad (visited Mar. 23, 1999) <http://www.abanet.
orgflegaled/approved.html >.
"" Examples include Columbia's established summer program in Amster-
dam and Temple's new masters program with the University of Political Sci-
ence and Law in Beijing.
"0 In the case of China, the Fulbright program has recently had roughly
five or six "law" slots per year, while the CLEEC program has supported doz-
ens of U.S. scholars' research or teaching in China during the 1980s and 1990s.
See COUNCIL FOR INTERNATIONAL EXCHANGE OF SCHOLARS, UNITED
STATES INFORMATION AGENCY, FULBRIGHT SCHOLAR PROGRAM 1998-1999
(1997) [hereinafter FULBRIGHT PROGRAM]. For an overview of these programs
in the 1980s, see Edwards, supra note 73.
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supported U.S. legal assistance programs." In addition, there has
been some direct hiring of U.S. lawyers and legal academics as vis-
iting or long-term members of foreign law faculties.8 2 Some U.S.
legal academics also have acted as legal exporters at the individual
level when they have conducted research abroad and interacted
with foreign colleagues and students.
Second, U.S. practicing lawyers have become a significant, if
diffuse and unprogrammatic, means for exporting U.S. legal ideas
and ideals. The growth of this phenomenon is largely a product
of the globalization of the legal profession and U.S. lawyers' lead-
ing roles in that process. Most of the largest U.S. firms have
opened several foreign offices, to which they have posted U.S.
lawyers who have worked closely with host-country counter-
parts, both outside and, increasingly, inside the firm. It has also
become fairly commonplace for U.S. firms to have foreign law-
yers working as associates or consultants in their U.S. offices for
one to a few years, generally with the expectation that those law-
yers will return to their home countries. In addition to the effects
of such extended and intense contact among colleagues, a less in-
tensive but more widespread flow of U.S. laws and legal values
presumably has been occurring through the regular contacts that
inhere in almost all major U.S. firms having foreign clients or
having domestic clients with overseas business interests.83 The
latter sort of work, not infrequently, has made U.S. lawyers de
facto ambassadors- often quite aggressive ones- for the adoption
of U.S.-style practices in other countries' commercial and finan-
cial legal practices.84
81 In recent years, the Fulbright program advertised law positions in the
CEE/NIS region. See FULBRIGHT PROGRAM, supra note 80.
82 Law faculties in Hong Kong, Hungary, Japan, and the United Kingdom
provide a few examples of long-term hires ofU.S.-trained, U.S.-national law
professors.
83 By one estimate, legal services have become the U.S.'s fourth largest
business and professional services sector export. Several studies have surveyed
and assessed the broader phenomenon of the internationalization of U.S. law
firms and legal practice. See, e.g., Richard L. Abel, Transnational Law Practice,
44 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 737, 764-824 (1994); Daly, supra note 76, at 297; Peter
Roorda, The Internationalization of the Practice of Law, 28 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 141, 151-58 (1993).
" One frequently noted example is the pressure from U.S. banks (and
other off-shore lenders) for New York-style documentation or for clauses
specifying that New York law governs a transaction. See generally Barry W.
Rashkouer, Note, Title 14, New York Choice of Law Rule for Contractual Dis-
putes: Avoiding the Unreasonable Results, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 227 (1985).
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Third, the U.S. government has employed several legal means
to press foreign states and foreign nationals to conform to U.S.
laws or U.S.-acceptable legal standards on issues related to mar-
kets, democracy, and the rule of law. Most simply, many U.S.
laws have at least de facto extraterritorial reach."5 For example,
the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice has asserted
its authority to apply U.S. competition laws to regulate activities
outside the U.S., so long as the anti-competitive behavior abroad
has a direct, foreseeable, and substantial effect on U.S. exports,
commerce, or consumers. 6 Similarly, the U.S. Securities and Ex-
change Commission ("SEC") has long claimed jurisdiction over
foreign traders whose activities have an impact on U.S. markets,
or where frauds occurring primarily abroad include fairly minor
actions in the U.S."7
While much of this can be handled by contract law and directly involves only
the foreign-linked sectors of the economy (and thus need not entail formal
statutory or doctrinal change in the host country, especially in its domestic
law), the practice certainly exposes recipient-country lawyers to U.S. legal ideas
and approaches. It also can, and does, generate pressure for change in host-
country law, both because of foreigners' desire for something more secure and
less costly to establish than case-by-case contracting and because of the porous-
ness of imagined boundaries between the "foreign-linked" and "purely domes-
tic sectors of the economy.
85 For a general overview of the extraterritorial effect of U.S. laws, princi-
pally economic regulatory laws, see, for example, Gary B. BornA Reappraisal
of the Extraterritorial Reach of U.S. Law, 24 LAW & POL'Y INT'L BUs. 1 (1992).
86 Although the U.S. approach to applying U.S. antitrust laws to foreign
activities has been somewhat controversia an-has changed somewhat during
the last two decades, there has been a broad and consistent pattern of regulating
or seeking to regulate activities outside the United States. See, e.g., Eleanor M.
Fox, Toward World Antitrust and Market Access, 91 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 10-12
(1997) (describing the movement in U.S. antitrust enforcement toward extra-
territorial application of U.S. antitrust laws) [hereinafter Fox, Toward World
Antitrust]; Barry E. Hawk, The International Application of the Sherman Act in
Its Second Century, 59 ANTiTRUST L.J. 161, 163-67 (1990); 60 Minutes with Anne
K. Bingaman, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, U.S. Department of
Justice, 63 ANTITRUST L.J. 323, 338-39 (1994) (arguing that the extraterritorial
application of antitrust laws is grounded in long-standing U.S. jurisprudence).
In 1995, the ABA urged the U.S. government to support and ensure U.S. firms'
access to foreign markets by enforcing U.S. antitrust laws extraterritorially,
and by encouraging foreign states to enact, improve or enforce competition
and intellectual property laws and to adopt laws prohibiting private agree-
ments that impose restraints on trade that restrict U.S. companies' access. 1995
ABA SEC. INT'L L. & PRACTICE.
87' See, eg., James R. Doty, The Role of the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion in an Internationalized Marketplace, 60 FOR<DHAM L. REV. S77, S8 1-84
(1992) (discussing extraterritorial application of SEC regulations); Jill E. Fisch,
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More diffusely and less controversially, U.S. economic regula-
tory laws have addressed the activities of the growing number of
foreign subsidiaries, branches, joint-venture partners, and indi-
viduals conducting business in the United States. One prominent
example is SEC registration and reporting requirements that ap-
ply to hundreds of foreign companies that have sought to issue
equities in the United States."8 Although such laws generally have
limited direct effect abroad, their impact is doubtless felt back at
the "home office," particularly where compliance with U.S. laws
has required changes in the firm's organization or practices that
would be inefficient or impossible to "compartmentalize" and to
limit to either U.S. or overseas operations.
U.S. laws and proposed laws that address only U.S. nationals'
activities have exerted another form of indirect legal pressure on
foreign states to conform to U.S. legal standards. For example,
the restrictions that the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act89 impose
on U.S. businesses' dealings with foreign governments, in effect,
have demanded that foreign officials conform a portion of their
public behavior to U.S.-style norms of proper government behav-
ior.' The U.S. government has considered mandatory or model
human rights standards for U.S. firms investing abroad, address-
ing issues ranging from U.S. subsidiaries' or contractors' labor
practices to definitions of minimum acceptable human rights
conditions in the countries in which U.S. companies may invest.
Sometimes in the shadow of proposed laws and regulations of this
sort, U.S. companies have adopted individual corporate codes of
conduct or have pledged to adhere to broader initiatives in the
Imprudent Power: Reconsidering U.S. Regulation of Foreign Tender Offers, 87
Nw. U. L. REV. 523, 541-46 (1993) (describing legal doctrines allowing for ex-
traterritorial application of U.S. securities laws); Anne C. Flannery & Ben A.
Indek, SEC Enforcement Efforts Reach Abroad, 651, 653-54 (PLI Corp. Law &
Practice Course Handbook Series No. 713, 1990) (tracing the evolution of SEC
efforts to reach foreign activity).
88 See, e.g., Linda C. Quinn et al., Internationalization of the Securities
Markets, 325, 327-37 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice Course Handbook Series No.
705, 1990) (describing the SEC reporting process for foreign issuers); James R.
Silkenat, Overview of U.S. Securities Markets and Foreign Issuers, 17 FORDHAM
INT'L ... S4, S4-S9 (1994) (same).
89 See Julia Christine Bliss & Gregory J. Spak, The Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act of 1988: Clarification or Evisceration?, 20L. & PoL'Y INT'L Bus. 441 (1989).
o See Robert J. Lubicic, Corporate Codes of Conduct and Product Labeling
Schemes: The Limits and Possibilities of Promoting International Labor Rights
Through Private Initiatives, 30 L. & POL'Y INT'L BUs. 111 (1998).
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tradition of the Sullivan Principles for investment in South Africa
before the end of apartheid.9' By making some level of protection
for human rights and labor rights a precondition for firms' in-
vestment abroad, such moves may have become another U.S.-
based channel for communicating and for pressing foreign states
to implement U.S. or U.S.-acceptable standards and values.92
U.S. laws governing access to U.S. consumer and capital mar-
kets and to the benefits of U.S. government-funded programs
have provided another channel for pressing foreign states to con-
form to U.S.-defined standards that concern matters of economic
markets, political democracy, and the rule of law. For example,
the "special 301," "super 301," and general anti-dumping and
countervailing duty provisions in the U.S. trade laws authorize
sanctions (primarily in the form of imposing targeted trade re-
strictions) as a response to other states' failure to live up to U.S.
statutory definitions of adequate protection for intellectual prop-
erty rights, or of fair international trade practices.93 In addition,
U.S. statutes provide that countries with very bad human rights
records, non-market economies, or Marxist-Leninist systems are,
variously, not to enjoy most-favored-nation ("MIFN") trading
privileges, several forms of U.S.-provided development assistance,
favorable U.S. votes in multilateral aid-providing institutions, ac-
cess to certain sensitive technologies, the benefits of Overseas Pri-
vate Investment Corporation insurance, or the benefits of Export-
Import Bank credit guarantees for their U.S. trading and invest-
ment partners.94 These laws' role as vehicles for promoting accep-
91 See, e.g., Barbara A. Frey, The Legal and Ethical Responsibilities of Trans.
national Corporations in the Protection of International Human Rights, 6 MINN.
J . GLOBAL TRADE 153, 156-60 (1997); Diane F. Orentlicher & Timothy A. Ge-
latt, Public Law, Private Actors: The Impact of Human Rights on Business Inves-
tors in China, 14 Nw. J. INT'L L. &BUs. 66, 80-82 (1993).
92 See id.
" If the country allegedly engaging in unfair trade practices is a non-
market economy, only the anti-dumpmng law, not the countervailing duty law,
is available to domestic industries claiming injury. See generally Gary N. Hor-
lick & Shannon S. Shuman, Nonmarket Economy Trade and U.S. Antidumping!
Countervailing Duty Laws, 18 INT'L LAW. 807 (1984).
" Many post-Soviet states' rapid but incomplete economic reforms in the
aftermath of the dismantling of communist systems, and China's sustained and
accelerating but still-limited economic reform, amid continuing human rights
shortcomings and official commitments to a Marxist-Leninist political order,
have made application of such laws to the P.R.C. and to countries in the
CEE/NIS region especially complex, controversial, and subject to change. See
generally Robert H. Lantz, The Search for Consistency: Treatment of Nonmarket
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tance abroad of U.S.-defined standards has been enhanced by the
existence and fairly frequent exercise of the President's authority
to waive many of the restrictions they impose, and Congress's
plenary power to revise the statutes, in response to particular
countries' "progress" toward meeting statutory standards.'
These varied U.S. laws applicable to foreign states and firms
and to overseas activities of U.S. entities, of course, have not al-
ways or inevitably demanded legal change in affected countries.
Nevertheless, one should not therefore dismiss their possible sig-
nificance as mechanisms for exporting U.S. models. Even where
the focus of U.S. laws has been the behavior of foreign govern-
ments or overall conditions in foreign countries, legal and regula-
tory responses often seem to have been contemplated or de-
manded by the drafters or implementers of U.S. laws. For
example, changes to China's intellectual property laws have been
a key component in forestalling U.S. trade sanctions against the
P.R.C. As another example, U.S. government determinations of
whether countries in the CEE/NIS region qualify for privileges
that the U.S. law makes available to "market economies" have
depended in significant part on reforms in those countries' com-
mercial and economic regulatory legislation.
Economies in Transition Under United States Antidumping and Countervailing
Duty Laws, 10 AM. U. J. INT'LL. & POL'Y 993 (1995).
" During the post-Soviet era, the privileges such laws authorize have been
extended gradually to countries in the CEE/NIS region that have made the
greatest progress in reforms toward political democracy, economic markets,
and legal protection of human rights. See 22 U.S.C.A. S 2151n (West
1990)(tying human rights with development assistance); 22 U.S.C.A. S 2430b
(West 1990)(same); Support for East European Democracy Program, 22
U.S.C.A. S 5401; Pub. L. No. 104-162, 110 Stat. 1414 (1996) (regarding Bulgaria
and the emergence of market economies); Pub. L. No. 104-171, 110 Stat. 1539
(1996) (regarding Romania and the emergence of market economies);see gener-
ally FREEDOM Support Act, 22 U.S.C.A. S 5801 (West 1990); 50 U.S.C.A.
app. S 2401-2404 (West 1991) (regarding technology export controls). During
the late 1980s and 1990s, the President has repeatedly exercised his statutory
power to grant MFN trading privileges to the P.R.C. and threatened to retali-ate against unchecked copyright piracy, amid political controversies over how
closely trading privileges shouldbe linked to-human rights performance, and
whether intellectual property-related sanctions would be prudent. See 19
U.S.C.A. S 2242 (West Supp. 1998) (regarding P.R.C. and intellectual prop-
erty); Freedom of Emigration in East-West Trade, 19 U.S.C.A. S 2432 (West
Supp. 1998); Michael Yeh, Note, Up Against a Great Wall: The Fight against In-
tellectual Property Piracy in China, 5 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 503 (1996);
Lampton, supra note 4.
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Moreover, the complicated and economically significant busi-
ness of interpreting, administering, and enforcing the array of
relevant U.S. statutes has entailed extensive and protracted con-
tact among U.S. government lawyers and officials, their counter-
parts in countries subject to those laws, officers of U.S. and for-
eign companies seeking to do business in one another's
jurisdictions, and private lawyers advising such companies about
the requirements of compliance. Thus, foreign company officers'
and foreign government officials' experiences in dealing with U.S.
legal and regulatory structures in these contexts have been an-
other channel for the transmission of information about U.S.
laws, legal ideas, and practices, and, in some cases, for pressure to
adopt or support legal reforms at home that emulate U.S. models.
Finally, in an era that has combined an explosion of access to
information and a rising global interest in things American, it is
reasonable to assume (and nearly impossible to prove) that con-
siderable foreign importation of U.S. legal ideas and ideals has
been occurring outside of any focused statutory framework, sig-
nificant commercial transaction, public or private institutional
contact, or formal program of legal advice and assistance. A strik-
ing illustration of this phenomenon is the consideration of U.S.
court opinions in decisions by constitutional courts from Korea
to Hungary.96 Such "passive" export by the U.S., or "import
without export" from the U.S., is another possibly important
process of legal export that has coexisted with formal programs of
legal advice and assistance to promote economic markets, democ-
racy, and the rule of law abroad.
2.1.4. Devilish Details: An Illusion of Consistency and
Coherence?
There may be less than meets the eye in the seeming consis-
tency of U.S. legal aid and advice programs' goals and the appar-
ent consensus on law-related values among participants in formal
U.S. assistance programs and in other channels for the export of
U.S. legal ideas and ideals.
96 See Justice Imre Voros from The Constitutional Court of the Republic
of Hungary, Speech at the University of Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional
Law Symposium (Mar. 21, 1998); Justice Yong-Joon Kim, President of the
Constitutional Court of Korea, Address to the Faculty of the University of
Pennsylvania Law School (Mar. 1998).
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To the extent that aims and aspirations have been truly shared
in principle, problems of practice still seem inescapable. Espe-
cially in the P.R.C., neighboring reforming or post-socialist states,
and the former Soviet world, legal reforms compatible with eco-
nomic marketization, political democratization or liberalization,
and the rule of law have proceeded simultaneously and, at times,
been pursued relatively rapidly. In such contexts, trade-offs have
been inevitable (even if markets, democracy, liberalism, and the
rule of law are fully compatible and mutually reinforcing in the
long run). As a result, disagreements among U.S. providers of
advice and proponents of U.S. models have been unavoidable on
questions of sequencing, priorities, and responses to the costs of
transition, even if and when they have subscribed to a common
broad agenda. Thus, for example, many of the U.S. government
programs appear to have emphasized a "checklist" of democracy-
supporting legal institutional reform. Meanwhile, other U.S. ad-
visors have attached a much higher priority to the legal reforms
required for a rapid transition to economic markets. At the same
time, some foundations (including the Soros network) early on
gave a prominent place to legal assistance that strengthened civil
society and voluntary organizations.
In addition, there has been substantial variety in the underly-
ing motives and basic perspectives of some of the major U.S.
players who have embraced the package of markets, democracy,
liberalism, and "rule of law" values as the guiding principles of
their activities in support of legal reforms in the post-Soviet
world, China, and elsewhere. The philosophy of Karl Popper,
for example, has been a proclaimed inspiration for the law-related
and other work of the Soros Foundation-supported organizations.
The most broad-ranging U.S. government programs, in contrast,
have proceeded from the premise that legal reform to support
democracy and rights serves U.S. foreign policy and security in-
terests, a view typically based on some version of the theory of
the democratic peace (democracies do not go to war with one an-
other) and the theory of peace and prosperity through economic
interdependence (extensive trade and investment relations permit
the fuller exploitation of comparative advantage and economies of
scale, and also increase the cost and decrease the benefits to a
country of conflict with its economic partners). Human rights,
economic development, and the promotion of free markets also
seem to have been the core concerns that have led some organiza-
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tions and individuals to endorse agendas that seemingly have in-
cluded the full range of aims that have characterized contempo-
rary U.S. legal advice and export efforts. With such a diversity of
underlying perspectives, it would be remarkable if participants in
the process had not come to define and interpret their seemingly
shared goals in divergent and sometimes conflicting ways. The
accounts (provided in later sections) of the legal advice U.S.
sources have given and the aspects of U.S. legal models that have
been exported suggest that, in this respect at least, the unexpected
has not occurred.
Outside of the most wide-ranging foundation and public sec-
tor programs, there has been, at most, an incomplete overlapping
consensus among advice providers and other participants in the
enterprise of diffusing U.S. legal ideas and practices. For many,
the agenda has been to promote legal reforms and legal trans-
plants that are conducive to one- or some aspects of one- of the
constellation of values that have animated various elements of the
contemporary U.S. legal assistance and export drive. Such rela-
tively narrow foci (for example, the legal requisites of economic
markets) have sometimes meant indifference or even a degree of
hostility toward suggestions or models that have been offered in
service of other goals (such as the strengthening of legal mecha-
nisms for holding government authorities accountable to popular
will).
The degree to which U.S. providers of legal advice have not
shared identical or even overlapping agendas may have been
masked by the politics of funding for assistance programs. Dur-
ing the last decade or more, the "rule of law," and, to a degree,
"democracy" and "markets," have become what "development"
was in the 1960s and 1970s. They have become the magic words
that those seeking resources for law-related aid or exchange proj-
ects have invoked- routinely and sometimes disingenuously- to
enhance their chances of obtaining support from the federal gov-
ernment and major foundations.
Finally, recipient-country contexts often have proved inimical
to coherence and consistency in the concrete aims or perceived
agendas of U.S. assistance programs and other conduits for the
transmission of U.S. legal models. The many nations that have
been on the receiving end of these processes have varied dramati-
cally in the degree to which U.S. assistance has benign or malign
historical resonance; in the subsets of U.S. advice-providers or le-
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gal idea merchants that they have been able to attract or willing
to admit; in the character and aims of the local organizations with
which U.S. lawyers, legal experts, and legal advisors have forged
ties; and in the non-legal U.S. aid programs that have operated
alongside U.S. legal assistance projects and other media for trans-
mitting U.S. legal ideas. In such circumstances, even a pool of
U.S. providers of advice and purveyors of U.S. ideals that was
highly unified in its principles would look very differently at the
operational level in individual countries.
2.2. Some Cases: China and the Former Soviet Bloc
Formal programs of legal assistance and other modes of legal
export that have targeted two regions- China (and, to a lesser
degree, other reforming socialist or authoritarian states in the re-
gion) and the nations of the former Soviet Bloc- are an appropri-
ate focus for an assessment of the contemporary wave of U.S. le-
gal export and aid efforts. The abandonment of socialist
economic planning and orthodox Marxist-Leninist politics across
an area that runs from the eastern edge of Western Europe to the
western shores of the Pacific has triggered projects of legal reform
of immense scale and obvious significance and brought a new
openness to U.S. legal assistance and attempts to export U.S. legal
models. No serious U.S. legal advice effort could fail to devote
attention to these regions. Largely closed to earlier postwar at-
tempts to provide U.S. legal assistance or to spread U.S. legal
models abroad, these countries have become the most prominent
recipients and the sources of the most distinctive challenges in re-
cent years. To a considerable extent, the overall success or failure
of U.S. legal aid and exports in the 1980s and 1990s depends on
how well American advice and models meet the legal and law-
related demands of political and economic reform in these vast
"post-communist" systems.
Although countries in the former Soviet Bloc and the P.R.C.'s
region have many atypical characteristics and needs, the U.S. pro-
grams that have extended legal assistance and the varied channels
that have offered U.S. legal models for emulation in these regions
also provide a fairly typical sample of more general patterns.
They have addressed nearly the full range of substantive legal is-
sues, and have operated in almost every institutional format, in
the global repertoire of the U.S.-backed, and U.S.-based or
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American-staffed enterprise of exporting legal models and provid-
ing legal advice.
Moreover, China, some of its neighbors, and the countries of
the CEE/NIS region also differ considerably from one another in
ways that embody many of the contrasts in recipient-country
contexts that have confronted U.S. legal exporters and aid proj-
ects throughout the "non-Western" and "less developed" worlds.
They vary, for example, in the character and vitality of their in-
digenous legal traditions, their relative distance from U.S. and
other Western legal institutions and cultures, their degree of insu-
lation from and resistance to legal and other foreign influences,
and the pace and stage of their economic and political reforms.
Thus, a brief review of U.S. activities that have affected or
sought to affect these countries covers much that is important to a
general understanding of recent U.S. legal advice efforts and legal
export processes, while also affording a moderately detailed con-
sideration of program-specific, process-specific, or country-
specific details that may help to reveal what factors have been
conducive to success and failure in the recent overseas careers of
U.S. legal models and U.S. legal assistance ventures.
2.2.1. The People-s Republic of China and other Asian
Examples
The most dramatic and high-profile type of contemporary
U.S. efforts to export legal models or provide legal advice has
been assistance in the drafting of new national constitutions. This
form of U.S. advice and influence has not been a factor in China
or in most of the other Asian states that have been wrestling with
the problems of crafting legal and institutional arrangements for
economic development and political reform. Building upon its
1978 predecessor, China's current constitution was adopted (es-
sentially in its current form) in 1982, during the early years of the
post-Mao reform era and before U.S. legal advice projects and
other avenues for transmitting U.S. legal ideas had developed
much of a presence in the People's Republic. Consolidating the
reform-era leadership's repudiation of the radical late Cultural
Revolution decade Constitution of 1975, the 1982 document was
the product of a heavily domestic process that accorded no sub-
stantial role to U.S. or other outside providers of advice or exper-
tise on constitutional questions.
[Vol120:2
LEXAMERICA NA?
The same general pattern holds for constitutional change in
other reforming states in East and Southeast Asia. Cambodia has
presented a modest, limited exception. The country's extreme
political instability and extensive dependence on foreign eco-
nomic assistance have made Cambodia especially open to the in-
fluence of international organizations and programs. Thus, it has
been host, for example, to Asia Foundation seminars on constitu-
tionalism and the U.S. Constitution' and to a USAID-funded
ABA project providing technical advice on constitution drafting.9
U.S. programs of legal assistance and avenues for the export of
U.S. legal models have been more prominent at the "sub-
constitutional" level of efforts to build legal and law-making insti-
tutions. These institutions have seemed vital to the near-term
consolidation of legality and effective government and to the
longer term prospects for development of the rule of law or ac-
countable and democratic government. Much of this work has
focused on increasing the competence and autonomy of legisla-
tures and fostering administrative decentralization. In the P.R.C.,
the Ford Foundation, for example, has given grants for projects
designed to enhance the law-drafting competence of the Legisla-
tive Affairs Commission (the main law-drafting body under
China's parliament). The Ford Foundation also has supported ef-
forts to decentralize government through grants to aid in the
drafting of a local government law and through educating elected
officials on issues of administrative decentralization and effective
local government.? The Asia Foundation has provided assistance
to the State Council's Bureau of Legislative Affairs ("BLA") (an
executive organization that is the principal drafter or co-drafter of
most proposed legislation in the P.R.C.) in preparing anti-
corruption legislation and local government reform, and to the
See Stephen P. Marks, The New Cambodian Constitution: From Civil
War to a Fragile Democracy, 26 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 45, 60 (1994).
98 See ABA Website of International Law, supra note 22.
" See The Ford Foundation, 1996Annual Report: International Affairs (vis-
ited Mar. 17, 1999) <http://www.fordfound.org/AR.96/AR9660.html>
[hereinafter Ford Foundation 1996 Annual Report: International Affairs]; The
Ford Foundation, 1995 Annual Report. International Affairs (visited Mar. 17,
1999) <http://www.fordfound.org/AR.95/AR9514.htil> [hereinafter Ford
Foundation 1995 Annual Report: International Affairs]; The Ford Foundation,
1994 Annual Report: International Afairs (visited Mar. 17, 1999) <http://
www.fordfound.org/AR.94/AR9414.html> [hereinafterFord Foundation 1994
Annual Report: International Affairs].
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Ministry of Civil Affairs concerning methods for promoting law-
ful and orderly local-level elections."0 A substantial United Na-
tions Development Program ("UNDP") project, in which U.S.
legal academics played prominent roles, has provided the BLA
with extensive advice or training on topics including how to draft
technically sound legislation, how to factor institutional, policy,
and political environments into law-drafting, and how U.S. law
has addressed administrative procedure in ways that might be in-
structive (but not prescriptive) for drafters of loosely analogous
Chinese legislation. 1'
Broadly similar and sometimes more extensive programs have
operated in nearby nations. The Asia Foundation, for example,
has provided advice on establishing or reforming legislatures to
sixteen countries in the region. These efforts have included a
program for the National Assembly of Vietnam that offered
training in techniques relevant to law-drafting and instruction
about foreign models for structuring a legislature and its staff. 2
USAID's parliamentary programs have included support for Ne-
pal projects that have offered orientation programs for members
of parliament, advice concerning committee systems in legisla-
tures, and help in the creation of a professional legislative secretar-
iat staff.0 3
Much of the U.S. assistance directly concerned with the rule
of law and law-related institutions has focused on the quality and
autonomy of the bench and bar. Ford Foundation programs have
sought "to strengthen the rule of law by supporting professional
training.""°4 Supported activities in the P.R.C. have included a
100 The Asia Foundation, Programs in Asia: China (last modified Nov. 6,
1998) <http://www.asiafoundation.com/taf/programs/prog-asia-chin.html>
[hereinafter Programs in Asia: China].
101 For accounts of the UNDP program, see Seidman & Seidman,Drafting,
supra note 71, at 34; Ann Seidman & Robert B. Seidman, The UNDP/BLA Pro-
ject's Theoretical Foundation, in LEGISLATIVE DRAFTING FOR MARKET REFORM
33 (Ann Seidman et al. eds., 1997) [hereinafter Seidman & Seidman, The
UNDP/BLA Project].
'02 See The Asia Foundation, Programs in Asia: Vietnam (last modified
Nov. 6, 1998) http://www.asiafoundation.com/taf/programs/prog-asia-
viet.html [herein-after Programs in Asia: Vietnam].
103 See Parliamentary Assistance in Nepal, supra note 17.
"o Ford Foundation 1995 Annual Report" International Affairs, supra note
99; see also Ford Foundation 1994 Annual Report: International Affairs, supra
note 99 (describing grants to specialized Universities of Political Science and
Law, and the "major commitment to China's leading law schools and to the
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training center for senior judges,"5 university and government
ministry programs to train trial court judges,0 6 prosecutors and
other lawyers, and projects by basic-level courts to improve the
competence of judicial work.' The Foundation's grants have
also provided funds for compiling case reports in a legal system
that has lacked systematic reporters, 10 8 preparing and publishing
texts by Chinese scholars addressing basic legal issues from a
comparative perspective, and increasing the importance and effi-
cacy of the legal system and legal institutions by enhancing access
to legal services. 0 9 The U.S.-Asia Law Institute has provided
fairly informal advice through exchanges with the P.R.C. Su-
preme People's Court concerning the preparation of laws that ad-
dress the role of the judiciary and matters of judicial administra-
tion."0 That institute and the Asia Foundation also have sought
to strengthen the bar by working with the All China Lawyers'
Association. The Asia Foundation's express goal in this area has
been to promote the Chinese bar's insulation from domination
by the Ministry of Justice."' U.S. sources have also supported
work relating to the extensive reforms China has recently under-
taken in its codes of substantive and procedural criminal law, in-
cluding, for example, Ford Foundation funding for research on
criminal procedure reforms and related human rights
professional training of higher court judges and public prosecutors");The Ford
Foundation, 1993 Annual Report: International Affairs (visited Mar. 17, 1999)
< http://www.fordfound.org/AR.93/AR9312.htmiil > [hereinafter Ford Foun-
dation 1993 AnnualReport: International Affairs].
105 See id
106 See Ford Foundation 1995 Annual Report: International Affairs, supra
note 99.
107 See Ford Foundation 1996 Annual Report: International Affairs, supra
note 99; Ford Foundation 1993 Annual Report: International Affairs, supra note
104; see also The Ford Foundation, The Ford Foundation REPORT, Winter 1997
Volume 28 No.1 (visited Mar. 17, 1999) <http://www.fordfound.org/
QR.28.1/QR281toc.html>.
10 See The Ford Foundation, The Ford Foundation REPORT, Summer 1993
Volume 24, No. 2 (visited May 11, 1999) <http://www.fordfound.org/
QR.24.2/QR24211.html>.
109 See The Ford Foundation, The Ford Foundation REPORT, Summer-Fall
1995 Volume 26, No. 3 (visited May 11, 1999) < http://www.fordfound.org/
QR.26.3/QR263toc. html> [hereinafter Summer-Fall 1995 REPOR 71.
10 See Brown, supra note 24, at 24.
. See id.; Programs in Asia: China, supra note 100; ABA Website oflnterna-
tional Law, supra note 22.
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issues."2 Broadly similar programs supported by a variety of U.S.
organizations have operated in neighboring countries as well. For
example, the ABA's USAID-supported Cambodia Law and De-
mocracy Program has provided advice on implementing legal and
judicial reform in the project's eponymous country.
The roles of U.S. legal models and legal advice programs have
been more extensive and varied in China's efforts to build a legal
framework to support a market-oriented economy. In the late
1970s, China's turn to economic reform and an "open door" to-
ward international capital ushered in a new period of openness to
a variety of channels for the transmission of legal ideas from U.S.
sources. Since the early years of the Deng Xiaoping era, the U.S.
lawyers' roles in providing advice on drafting laws and establish-
ing legal institutions have gone, as one commentator put it, "hand
in hand" with their professional participation in China's eco-
nomic development program."' P.R.C. laws on foreign invest-
ment and trade have been a special focus of U.S. advice projects
and other forms of attempted influence. Even the P.R.C.'s basic
Law on Equity Joint Ventures, adopted at the dawn of the reform
era, was a product of extensive analyses of other countries' joint
venture laws and discussions with lawyers, government officials,
and experts from several foreign countries, including the United
States. During the 1980s, the U.S.-China Business Council, in-
dividual U.S. firms and the U.S. embassy lobbied in favor of
changes to make the P.R.C.'s foreign investment regime more
liberal, transparent, and law-governed.11 In recent years, U.S. ex-
perts have provided advice to Chinese officials on how to design a
taxation system for foreign investors that would be maximally
compatible with the legal treatment of foreign income under the
112 See The Ford Foundation, The Ford Foundation REPORT Summer/Fall
1996 Volume 27, No. 3, (visited May 11, 1999) <http://www.fordfound.org/
QR.27.3/QR273toc. html>; see also Summer-Fall 1995 REPORT, supra note
109.
113 Whitmore Gray, The Challenge of Asian Law, 19 FORDHAM INT'L L.J.
1, 6 (1995).
.14 See Walter Sterling Surry et al.,Joint Ventures in China: The First Water
Stop, 21 TEx. INT'L LJ. 221, 224 (1986) (describing western lawyers' involve-
ment).
115 See MARGARET PEARSON, JOINT VENTURES IN THE PEOPLE'S
REPUBLIC OF CHINA 70-76 (1990).
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tax laws of the U.S. and other major nations. " 6 The Asia Foun-
dation has supported a project in Shanghai to develop a commer-
cial arbitration system that U.S. and other foreign investors and
traders would find attractive.
117
U.S. offers of legal assistance and attempts to promote broadly
U.S.-style laws have addressed China's domestic economic laws as
well. For example, U.S. lawyers, along with other foreign experts
in Beijing, held discussions with the drafters of China's first bank-
ruptcy law during the final phases of preparing the legislation that
passed in 1986.'18 A proposed new bankruptcy law reportedly re-
flects a more thorough study of U.S. law." 9 Antitrust law has
been another area of some activity in the 1980s and 1990s, with
the Bush administration calling on China and other developing
countries to adopt U.S.-style competition law." In addition, the
U.S.-Asia Law Institute has provided advice on labor law to the
P.R.C.'s Ministry of Labor.2
Securities laws have been an increasingly important area for
U.S. legal advice and export efforts. In this field, the U.S. role be-
gan with invited visits to China by Wall Street experts to explain
the framework of U.S. capital markets." The process continued
and expanded through unofficial U.S. delegations (sometimes in-
cluding SEC regulators) that have traveled to the P.R.C. to pro-
vide informal advice on securities regulation.' U.S. advice on
'16 See Stephen C. Curley & Darren R. Fortunato, Tax Considerations for
Investors in China: A Preliminary Look, 20 N.C. J.INT'L L. & COM. REG. 531,
533 (1995).
117 See Programs in Asia: China, supra note 100.
118 See Ta-Kuang Chang, The Making of the Chinese Bankruptcy Law: A
Study in the Chinese Legislation Process, 28 HARV. INT'L UJ. 333, 335, 347 (1987)
(describing western lawyers' involvement).
"' See Shirley S. Cho, Continuing Economic Reform in the People's Republic
of China: Bankruptcy Legislation Leads the Way, 19 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP.
L. REv. 739, 755 (1996).
20 See A.E. Rodriguez & Mark D. Williams, The Effectiveness of Proposed
Antitrust Programsfor Developing Countries, 19 N.C. J. INT'LL. & COM. BEG.
209 (1994).
121 See Brown, supra note 24, at 22-24 (describing the role of the U.S.-Asia
Law Institute in providing a channel for U.S. experts to exchange drafts of the
1995 Labor Law with the Chinese Ministry of Labor).
122 See Nikos A. Stamos, China's Nascent Securities Market: Some Observa-
tions, 10 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 691, 691 (1987).
1"3 See generally Paul Gonson, What I Did on My Summer Vacation,
INSIGHTS, Dec. 1990, at 21, 21-22 (SEC solicitor describing trip under auspices
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P.R.C. securities laws has also included an undertaking set forth
in a MOU between the SEC and its P.R.C. counterpart to pro-
vide help in drafting a wide range of securities laws and regula-
tions, training for Chinese regulators in the P.R.C. or in the
United States, and various forms of technical assistance.124
Intellectual property law has been another significant- and
especially contentious- object of attempts to export U.S. models
or win acceptance of standards acceptable to the United States in
China's economic law. As early as the 1970s, P.R.C. delegations
traveled to the United States and elsewhere to study foreign intel-
lectual property laws in preparation for drafting new statutes for
the P.R.C. Early drafts of the P.R.C.'s copyright law, adopted in
1990, were provided to the U.S. government for possible com-
ment, and the drafting commission included an advisory role for
foreign legal scholars.i25 In the 1990s, the United States relied on
pressure, more than assistance, in its quest to influence the shape
of China's intellectual property law. During the 1990s, three bi-
lateral MOUs have emerged from a series of threatened sanctions
and counter-sanctions following the identification of China as a
serious violator of intellectual property rights under the "Special
of People-to-People International to Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Poland for
the purposes of legal and economic reform.
124 See Minkang Gu & Robert C. Art, Securitization of State Ownership:
Chinese Securities Law, 18 MICH. J. INT'L L. 115, 123-24 (1996) (describing the
cooperative relationship between the U.S. SEC and China as the first step in
developing more market mechanisms and securities markets in China); U.S.
SEC & P.R.C. Sec. Regulatory Comm'n, Memorandum of Understanding Be-
tween the United States Securities and Exchange Commission and the China Secu-
rities Re ulatory Commission Regarding Cooperation, Consultation, and the Pro-
vision of Technical Assistance, 3 THE SEC SPEAKS IN 1995 195, 196-200 (1995),
reprinted in CORPORATE LAW AND PRACTICE: COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES
NUMBER B-882 (Practicing Law Institute ed., 1995) [hereinafter Memorandum
of Understanding] (describing the United States-China MOU's goal of opening
fair, efficient securities markets in China for market integrity and investor pro-
tection).
12 See Chong Zheng Ren, Copyright Law of China: Can It Effectively Pro-
tect U.S. Works?, 16 LOY. L.A. ENT. L.J. 67, 70-71, 77-78 (1995) (describing the
Chinese research of both civil law and common law systems in drafting Chi-
nese copyright law); ZHENG CHENGSI & MICHAEL PENDLETON, COPYRIGHT
LAW IN CHINA 65-75 (1991) (describing the drafting process of Chinese copy-
right law, including Chinese adherence to the two Sino-American treaties in
the fields of science and foreign trade, as well as adherence to the two interna-
tional copyright conventions (Berne and UCC)).
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301" provision in the U.S. trade laws.'26 Under these accords,
China has undertaken to adopt and enforce intellectual property
laws that conform to the standards of the key international con-
ventions that China pledged to join and to establish a U.S.-style
customs-service to address some piracy problems.lV In return, the
U.S. agreed to provide training for some Chinese officers charged
with enforcing intellectual property laws."
In addition, the UNDP program on legislation, with many of
its consultant and leadership roles filled by U.S. nationals offering
some U.S. law-based advice and perspectives, assisted in the draft-
ing of nearly two dozen major pieces of economic reform-related
legislation.
Recent developments have pointed to the continuation and
probably the expansion of programs and projects to provide U.S.
advice and spread U.S. ideas to China. President Jiang Zemin's
1997 visit to the United States yielded a new initiative for U.S. le-
gal advice to China, especially in the field of commercial and eco-
nomic law. 29 Less high-profile undertakings also have indicated
that U.S. providers and funders have been considering agendas for
future advice. For example, the Asia Foundation held a major
conference of legal experts and P.R.C. economic policy-makers in
Beijing to define the agenda of legal and judicial reforms necessary
to continue progress in economic reform and foreign trade and
investment beyond the mid-1990s."0
126 See Paul C.B. Liu, U.S. Industry's Influence on Intellectual Property Nego-
tiations and Special 301 Actions, 13 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 87, 112-13 (1994)
(describing the 1992 China-U.S. MOU signifying a commitment to improved
protection for U.S. copyrighted works).
1 See Patrick H. Hu, "Mickey Mouse" in China: Legal and Cultural Implica-
tions in Protecting U.S Coprights, 14 B.U. INT'L L.J. 81, 100-02 (1996) (discuss-
ing China's unfulfilled pledge to create an effective intellectual property rights
regime to address problems of copyright piracy, enforcement of copyright, and
market access for those with copyright protection).
121 See id. at 110-12 (describing U.S. "special seminars, exchange programs,
mock proceedings, and other assistance to the Chinese media [which] result in
long-term benefits for U.S. investments in China").
129 See Jim Mann, U.S. and China Working to Get Beijing into WTO, L.A.
TIMES, Feb. 25, 1999, at C1.
'" See generally Hu, supra note 127 at 110-12 (noting that the 1995 U.S.-
China Intellectual Property Agreement calls for massive nationwide training of
Chinese legal enforcement personnel); see also Jeffrey W. Berkman, Intellectual
Property Rights in the P.R.C.: Impediments to Protection and the Need for the Rule
of Law, 15 UCLA PAC. BASIN LJ. 1, 26-34 (discussing the need for training of
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Less structured and purposeful transmission to China of U.S.
perspectives on economic law and information about U.S. eco-
nomic laws has also proceeded steadily through educational chan-
nels. U.S. academics, practitioners, and judges have provided a
good deal of instruction to Chinese lawyers and officials in as-
pects of U.S. and "international" economic law."' The fora have
included the annual four-week programs of CLEEC's Center for
American Law Study in China (which often included economic
law foci), numerous short-term special seminars in the P.R.C. on
trade, investment, and other subjects, and LL.M. or similar pro-
grams in China or in the U.S. with a business-law focus.
Like other types of U.S. legal aid and means for exporting
U.S. legal models, U.S.-provided advice and ideas on economic
law have extended to other nations in China's region as well. Ex-
amples of formal programs include the Asia Foundation's pro-
grams to provide Vietnamese institutions with materials on eco-
nomic law and to give Cambodians intensive instruction in
contract law.132 With support from official and unofficial U.S.
sources, those two countries and others in the region have also
sent law students, legal scholars, and officials with economic law
interests to the United States, albeit in numbers that do not rival
China's.
Finally, in addition to channels for providing economic, con-
stitutional, or "institutional" legal advice and pressing China to
emulate U.S. models and norms in these areas, several avenues
have developed for the export of general ideas about law and
broad "rule of law" values from the U.S. to the P.R.C. A few ini-
tiatives, such as the "rule of law" programs of the State Depart-
ment, USAID, the Ford Foundation, and the U.S.-Asia Law Insti-
tute/International Academy of Trial Lawyers, have included the
judicial personnel, administrative personnel, and lawyers as a result of "[t]he
legal nihilism of the Cultural Revolution").
131 See Whitmore Gray, The Challenge of Asian Law, 19 FORDHAM INT'L
L.J. 1, 5-8 (1995) (describing historically the migration of common law systems'
ideas to China through U.S. law schools and through projects funded by the
Ford Foundation, USAID, UN and the World Bank).
3 See Mark Sidel, Law Reform in Vietnam: The Complex Transition from
Socialism and Soviet Models in Legal Scholarship and Training, 11 UCLA PAC.
BASIN L.J. 221, 258 (1993); see also THE ASIA FOUNDATION, 1997 ANNUAL
REPORT 12 (1997), reprinted in The Asia Foundation, Reports and Publications
(visited Mar. 21, 1999) <http://www.asiafoundation.org/taf/reports/rpt-
annu.htmi> (describing the Foundation's legal and economic policy training
in Cambodia).
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direct, or indirect, pursuit of such goals as part of their agendas. 33
Less purely "aid-like" efforts have been part of the mix as well,
with the most notable example being the linkage, created by stat-
ute and briefly tightened by executive order, between China's en-
joyment of MFN privileges and performance on various human
rights indicia that have included aspects of the rule of law."'
More commonly, the process of exporting these vague but
fundamental values has been a side-effect (sometimes an intended
or expected one) of advice and assistance programs that have fo-
cused on more concrete laws and institutions. Thus, for example,
the American leader of the UNDP legislation-drafting assistance
program for the P.R.C. has argued that the program's "technical"
training in law-making methods also served to promote the rule
of law and democracy by requiring P.R.C. participants to con-
sider the impact of proposed substantive rules on all affected so-
cial groups and especially the least well off. 3' Extended educa-
tional and professional contacts have sometimes had a similar
effect without U.S. participants explicitly (or sometimes even
consciously) having sought to "export" rule of law values. As
U.S. law schools', legal academics' and law firms' interactions
with Chinese students, scholars, lawyers, and clients have grown
rapidly- albeit to still-modest levels- from near-zero baselines in
the 1970s, such ties have emerged as an additional channel for
conveying relatively diffuse legal values. Anecdotal evidence sug-
gests that much informal transmission of broad and general U.S.
legal ideas and ideals has taken place in such contexts, sometimes
through fairly self-conscious tutorials. In addition, U.S. founda-
tion grants that have focused on strengthening the quality of
Chinese law schools also have sometimes provided opportunities
to convey the perceived virtues of U.S. law schools and the basic
133 See Ford Foundation Regional Overviews, supra note 27 (describing the
Foundation's efforts to assist local Chinese governments in drafting law, to
train elected officials, and "to strengthen the rule of law by supporting the pro-
fessional training of lawyers, judges, and prosecutors").
134 See W. Gary Vause, Tibet to Tienanmen: Chinese Human Rights and
United States Foreign Policy, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1575, 1591-92 (1989) (inking,
for example, future American arms sales in China in October 1987, to rectifT-
ing Chinese human rights violations in Tibet); Lampton,supra note 4.
135 See Seidman & Seidman, Drafting, supra note 71, at 22-25 (written by
the Chief Technical Advisors to the United Nations Development Program
Project to assist China in drafting high priority law).
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norms and modes of the legal thinking taught there.136 Here, too,
the pattern has not been limited to China. Some elements of this
Chinese pattern have recurred to a lesser degree and on a smaller
scale in some other countries in the region.
2.2.2. Central and Eastern Europe and the Newly Independent
States
Offers of advice from U.S. providers and attempts to export
U.S. models have greeted the wave of constitution-making that
has swept Central Europe, Eastern Europe, and the Newly Inde-
pendent States in the wake of the Soviet empire's collapse. In
many countries in the region, framers of new constitutions (or of
sweeping amendments to nominally continuing charters) have
looked to elements of the U.S. model and have sought U.S. ex-
perts' input (or at least have appeared to welcome their sugges-
tions). Through a variety of organizations and channels, U.S. le-
gal academics and self-styled constitutional experts have offered
constitutional counseling at a distance and also have hop-scotched
across the fragments of the former Soviet empire to dispense ad-
vice on constitutions and constitution-making.
The single largest channel for such advice has been CEEL. 137
CEELI has arranged for U.S. lawyers and law professors to pro-
vide comments on one or more draft constitutions or sets of con-
stitutional amendments from Albania, Bulgaria, Poland, Roma-
nia, Russia, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. In several cases, CEELI
also has provided in-country workshops on constitution-
making.138 In a similar vein, participants in the Federal Bar Asso-
13 See Programs in Asia: China, supra note 100 (describing the Asia Foun-
dation's grant to aid Chinese legal reform, including sponsoring a Chinese
delegation's travel to the United States and Europe "for a comparative study of
administrative review procedures ... part of a series of laws.., being enacted
in China to protect the rights of citizens and promote the development of an
efficient and accountable bureaucracy").
137 See American Bar Association, Current Projects of the ABA: Section of
International Law (visited Mar. 1, 1999) <http://www.abanet.org/intlaw/
intlpro/current.html > (stating that CEELI is an ABA section founded in 1990
and[is devoted to developing free-trade and democratic legal infrastructure in
these nations).
138 See Rett R. Ludwikowski, Constitution Making in the Countries of For-
mer Soviet Dominance: Current Development, 23 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 155,
159 (1993); Ludwikowski, supra note 138, at 173-76 (concerning Lithuania);
Eric Stein, Post-Communist Constitution-Making: Confessions of a Comparativist,
1 NEW EUR. L. REv., 421, 423-24 (1993) (describing American and other West-
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ciation's Democracy Development Initiative have offered advice
to constitution-makers in Eastern Europe.139 The U.S. Chamber
of Commerce even prepared a draft constitution for Bulgarian
framers to consider."4  Among the public sector programs,
USAID, the State Department, and USIA have supported assis-
tance from U.S. providers to constitution-makers in several coun-
tries in the region, including Ukraine, Romania, and Lithuania.'
Building on personal or professional ties that predated the Soviet
collapse or that arose accidentally in its aftermath, a few U.S.
lawyers have played a visible, first-hand role in constitution-
shaping processes in the Czech Republic, Lithuania, and Po-
land.' A modest number of CEE and NIS lawmakers and insti-
tutional reformers have also traveled to Washington to receive
advice on constitutions, constitutionalism, and constitutional re-
form.
In these diverse formats, U.S. advisors have offered varied ad-
vice. Many have made specific prescriptions, including urging the
adoption of U.S.-style constitutional provisions such as decentral-
ized powers of judicial review, high barriers to constitutional
amendment, or citizens' rights provisions that do not include ex-
plicit exceptions, conditions, or susceptibility to lawful suspen-
sion by government."
Especially after the early wave of constitution-making when
U.S. advice to constitution-makers crested in the first years of the
post-Soviet era, U.S. programs to provide legal assistance and ef-
forts to export legal models to the CEE/NIS region have ad-
dressed sub-constitutional issues, including the development of
ern assistance to the Czech Republic and Slovakia in drafting of respective fed-
eral constitutions).
139 See Lawrence, supra note 16, at 678.
1 See Jon Elster, Constitutionalism in Eastern Europe: An Introduction, 58
U. CHI. L. REV. 447, 460 (1991) (concerning Bulgaria).
141 See CAROThiERS, ASSESSING DEMOCRACY ASSISTANCE, supra note 15,
at 51-57; Lawrence, supra note 16; 1998 Congressional Presentation, supra note 6.
142 See, e.g., Elster, supra note 140, at 460 (1991) (concerning Bulgaria);
Ludwikowski, supra note 138, at 173-76 (concerning Lithuania); Stein, supra
note 140, at 423-24.
143 See, e.g., Symposium, supra note 1, at 117-19 (concerning CEELI's role);
Ludwikowsld, supra note 138, at 179-84, 208-11 (concerning U.S. commentary
on judicial review provisions in Ukrainian and other draft constitutions, and
on rights provisions in the Albanian draft constitution); Stein,supra note 140,
at 438-47 (describing U.S. participants' emphasis on the importance of a sparse
and hard-to-amend constitution in the Czech drafting).
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the institutional requisites of democracy and legality. Several pro-
jects have focused on legislatures. These include programs oper-
ated by USAID and, on a more modest scale, the Ford Founda-
tion to provide or support technical assistance to legislators and
law drafters in a few CEE/NIS states, most notably Poland.'
Some U.S. government-funded parliamentary assistance flowed
through the Frost Committee program for relatively "advanced"
reformers in the region. In recent years, CEELI also has given
more emphasis to assistance that has aimed to improve legislation-
drafting and the legislative process. To this end, CEELI has sup-
ported training and technical assistance to CEE/NIS law-drafters.
The Ford Foundation and other U.S. participants have cooper-
ated with European Union sources in a CEE Parliamentary Prac-
tices Project that has supported technical training for regional
parliamentarians (some of it provided by or under the leadership
of U.S. experts). 4 There have been a number of more idiosyn-
cratic single-country projects as well. For example, the Interna-
tional Republican Institute, operating with NED money, has run
a program to instruct Romanians on the functions of a legislature
in a democratic polity, rules of legislative procedure, and the op-
eration of committee systems within a legislature. 4
CEELI and other U.S. sources also have arranged for U.S. ex-
perts' commentary or advice concerning laws on legislation, regu-
lation of lobbying and local government for countries in the re-
gion, especially Russia. 4 CEELI and USAID also have sought to
advance democratic electoral reforms through supporting and fa-
cilitating U.S. providers' advice on election laws and on mecha-
nisms for implementing and overseeing elections in several coun-
144 See Ford Foundation 1995 Annual Report, supra note 25; Legislative
Strengthening in Poland, supra note 17 (regarding program dating to 1989).
145 See QUIGLEY, supra note 31, at 74-78.
146 See generally CAROTHERS, ASSESSING DEMOCRACY ASSISTANCE, supra
note 15.
147 See Central and Eastern European Law Initiative, American Bar Asso-
ciation, CEELI's Activities in Romania (1991-98) (visited Mar. 29, 1999)
< http://www.abanet.org/ceeli/romania.html > [hereinafter CEELI in Roma-
nia] (regarding legal reform and education in Romania); Central and Eastern
European Law Initiative, American Bar Association, CEELI's Activities in Rus-
sia (1992-98) (visited Mar. 29, 1999) <http://www.abanet.org/ceeli/russia.
html> [hereinafter CEELI in Russia] (regarding lobbying and local govern-
ment law for Russia).
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tries in the CEE/NIS region, including Russia, Ukraine, and Cen-
tral Asian republics."
Many efforts to provide assistance or to export models have
also aimed at reforming and strengthening judicial systems in the
former Soviet areas. CEELI projects have provided advice or
workshops on restructuring courts and adopting ethical standards
and codes for judges and lawyers in several CEE and NIS states,
ranging from Albania to Ukraine." USAID has supported assis-
tance in drafting codes of judicial ethics and projects to foster ju-
dicial independence in countries throughout the region. I"'
CEELI, Ford Foundation grantees, the Judicial Conference of the
United States, Soros Foundation-supported programs, and
USAID-fimded private voluntary organizations have undertaken
projects to improve the quality of training for judges.' Such ef-
forts have included support for local non-governmental or judge-
run educational centers around the region (as well as, on occasion,
Ministry of Justice-run schools).I5 2 These undertakings also have
included direct provision of short-term training in judicial ad-
ministration techniques or in particular areas of the law undergo-
ing substantial reform including, for example, sessions on bank-
ruptcy law for CEE judges and programs on commercial law,
criminal law, and the jury system for Russian jurists.5 3
18 See 1998 Congressional Presentation, supra note 6 (describing Central
Asia program for training and technical assistance to electoral reform); USAID,
Democracy (visited Mar. 30, 1999) < http://www.info.usaid.gov/democracy >
(regarding the establishment of central election commission aid and the draft-
ing of electoral law for Russia); CEELI Website, supra note 21.
19 See Central and Eastern European Law Initiative, American Bar Asso-
ciation, CEELI Programs (visited Mar. 30, 1999) <http://www.abanet.org/
ceeli/programs.htnff> (regarding Albania, Bulgaria, the Ukraine, and Roma-
nia, among other countries) [hereinafter CEELI Programs]; Central and Eastern
European Law Initiative, American Bar Association, Judicial Reform (visited
Mar. 30, 1999) < http://www.abanet.org/ ceeli/judicial.html > [hereinafter
Judicial Reform].
" See 1998 Congressional Presentation, supra note 6.
151 See, e.g., Judicial Reform, supra note 149; Shullenberger, supra note 24, at
20 (describing the Vermont-Karelia Rule of Law Project, in which Associates
in Rural Development and the Vermont Bar Foundation were USAID contrac-
tors, providing [egal assistance to an entity within the Russian Federation).
152 See CAROTHERS, ASSESSING DEMOCRACY ASSISTANCE, supra note 15,
at 51-57 (regarding Romania).
153 See Lawrence, supra note 16, at 678 (discussing the reintroduction of the
jury system in Russia and the training of judges); Central and Eastern Euro-
pean Law Initiative, American Bar Association, CEELI's Activities in Latvia
(1992-98) (visited Mar. 29, 1999) <http://www.abanet.org/ceeli/latvia.html>
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In addition, some initiatives have established connections be-
tween U.S. courts and judges and their CEE counterparts. Exam-
ples include USIA's "sister court" and "professional in residence"
programs (the latter of which has sent U.S. jurists to CEE
states),"M and more ad hoc activities of U.S. federal judges who
have traveled (sometimes repeatedly) to the region or welcomed
CEE or NIS delegations on visits to their courts.15 Some of the
major providers, including CEELI and other USAID-backed pro-
grams, have also sought to foster the development of new or
strengthened and more autonomous judges' associations and bar
associations, with the goal of creating a more powerful and inde-
pendent voice for the legal profession and the judiciary, as well as
additional means for providing training to their members.156
Several projects have focused on other statutory and institu-
tional supports for the rule of law. A few have emphasized advice
on administrative law, including CEELI workshops for Hungary
and ACUS workshops for Ukraine."'7 Other U.S. programs and
providers have addressed efforts to reform criminal laws and
[hereinafter CEELI in Latvia](regarding support for a judicial training center);
Central and Eastern European Law Initiative, American Bar Association,
CEELI's Activities in Estonia (1992-95) (visited Mar. 29, 1999)
< http://www.abanet.org/ceeli/estonia. html > [hereinafter CEELI in Estonia]
(discussing the support for non-governmental judicial training centers in which
judges provide training and support for judges' associations); Central and East-
ern European Law Initiative, American Bar Association, CEELI's Activities in
Lithuania (1992-98) (visited Mar. 29, 1999) < http://www.abanet.org/ceeli/
lithuania.html> [hereinafter CEELI in Lithuania] (same); CEELI in Romania,
supra note 147 (regarding the support for education and training of magis-
trates); COLPI Website, supra note 30 (regarding COLPI's role in legal educa-
tion, court reform, and juclicial training); Buffoid,supra note 53, at 459 (regard-
ing bankruptcy training for CEE judges).
15 See Lawrence, supra note 16, at 675-76.
155 See Symposium, supra note 1, at 131-36.
156 See Lydia Brashear, A Year in the Balkans: Macedonia and the Rule of
Law, 24 WTR HUM. RTS. 18 (1997) (describing Rule of Law CEELI liaison
work in Macedonia); Moxley, supra note 59 (describing CEELI programs in
general); Symposium, supra note 1, at 118-21 (regarding judges' associations);
CEELI Website, supra note 21 (discussing bar associations in NIS/CEE gener-
ally and the Baltics specifically); Judicial Reform, supra note 151 (same); 1998
Congessional Presentation, supra note 6 (regarding USAID's role in establishing
CEE/NIS judges' associations).
157 See Central and Eastern European Law Initiative, American Bar Asso-
ciation, CEELI's Activities in Hungary (1992-98) (visited Mar. 29, 1999)
<http://www.abanet.org/ceeli/hungary.html> [hereinafter CEELI in Hun-
gary] (regarding CEELI Hungary workshop); see also Lawrence, supra note 16,
at 677 (describing the ACUS Ukraine workshop).
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prosecutorial institutions. These endeavors have included a col-
laborative CEELI-Department of Justice criminal law program
that has offered assistance in legislative reform, implementation
and enforcement techniques, and the training of prosecutors,
lawyers and judges."' 8 CEELI also has provided commentaries
and concept papers on criminal procedure and substantive crimi-
nal law to several states in the region, while USAID and USIA
have supported similar advice from U.S. providers.5 9
U.S. legal aid and export efforts targeting the former Soviet
Bloc, thus, have paid much attention to the "political" and "gov-
ernment-institutional" dimensions of law reform. U.S.-supported
and U.S.-provided advice and attempts to encourage the emula-
tion of U.S. laws also have sought to support the development of
legal frameworks for market-based economies in countries
throughout the region. Some of these efforts have focused on
commercial law, including much of the work of the Commerce
Department's Commercial Law Development Program, CEELI's
Commercial Law Program, and many discrete CEELI projects.
Specific CEELI projects have included multiple sponsored visits
by U.S. private and government lawyers specializing in commer-
cial law, assistance with drafting commercial legislation (such as
secured transactions laws for Latvia and Estonia), and advice to
drafters of new civil codes and civil code reforms in the NIS and
some Eastern European states.1" Other endeavors have focused
on business organizations law, including CEELI projects in Rus-
sia, Estonia, and Romania, and USAID-supported work on cor-
15
i See Central and Eastern European Law Initiative, American Bar Asso-
ciation, Criminal Law (visited Mar. 29, 1999) <http://www.abanet.org/ceeli/
crimlaw.html > [hereinafter Criminal Law] (regarding CEELI-Department of
Justice's program for reforming criminal law that includes support for drafting
and implementing criminal legislation and training lawyers, judges, and prose-
cutors).
159 See Lawrence, supra note 16, at 672 (regarding the 1992 CEELI pro-
gram); 1998 Congressional Presentation, supra note 6; CEELI Website, supra note
21.
16 See CLDP: Consulting and Training, supra note 46 (discussing seminars
in international trade law and policy, customs, intellectual property, joint ven-
tures, and government ethics); Moxley, supra note 59 (discussing CEELI
Commercial law program); Central and Eastern European Law Initiative,
American Bar Association, Commercial Law (visited Mar. 29, 1999)
<http://www. abanet.org/ceeli/commercial.html> [hereinafter Commercial
Law]; Gonson, supra note 123, at 21 (discussing delegations of private and gov-
ernment lawyers); CEELI Programs, supra note 149 (regarding code drafting);
1998 Congressional Presentation, supra note 6 (same).
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porate governance-related laws across the region.161 U.S. advice-
providers have addressed bankruptcy law and laws for the priva-
tization of public enterprises. In this field, CEELI has provided
advice and commentary on legislation in several countries, includ-
ing Albania, Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary, and Romania. Several
USAID contractors have offered assistance to drafters in Arme-
nia, Romania, and elsewhere in the CEE states. USIA has sup-
ported U.S. lawyers' and bankruptcy judges' visits and provided
commentary on Western laws and practices to Russian drafters
(particularly in the field of bankruptcy).162
Competition law and policy and capital markets-related laws
arguably have been the areas that U.S. advice and export efforts
have emphasized the most. Beginning in the early 1990s, the U.S.
government pushed for antitrust law as a key element in the for-
mer Soviet Bloc states' transition to private ownership-based
market-oriented economies. Primarily through programs oper-
ated jointly and separately by the Federal Trade Commission and
the Justice Department's Antitrust Division, the United States has
offered extensive advice favoring broad U.S.-style competition
law. Such programs have provided legislation-drafting assistance,
comments on existing local competition law, technical advice and
training for regulators, instruction on the structure and opera-
tions of U.S. competition-regulating institutions and key legal-
economic concepts in the field, and multipurpose advisory mis-
sions to many of the NIS and CEE states. 63 In addition, CEELI's
161 See CEELI Website, supra note 21 (discussing Russian business activity
law and state support for small business law as well as Romanian small business
law and laws on business enterprise and ownership reform); 1998 Congressional
Presentation, supra note 6.
16 See 1998 Congressional Presentation, supra note 6 (discussing Armenian
and Romanian bankruptcy law); Lawrence, supra note 16, at 676 (discussing the
role of the March 1993 USIA-backed U.S. lawyers' and bankruptcy judges' vis-
its to Russia and the provision of written commentary on Western practices to
Russian drafters); CEELI Website, supra note 21 (mentioning modification of
bankruptcy laws throughout the region).
163 See Roger W. Mastalir, Regulation of Competition in the "New" Free
Markets of Eastern Europe. A Comparative Study of Antitrust Laws in Poland,
Hungary, Czech and Slovak Republics, and Their Models, 19 N.C.J. 'L L. &
COM. REG. 61, 62 (1993) (arguing that antitrust policy in Poland should focus
on horizontal, not vertical mono olies); A.E. Rodriguez & Malcolm B. Coate,
Limits to Antitrust Policy for Reforming Economies, 18 Hous. J. INT'L L. 311,
328-37 (1996); Waller, Neo-Realism, supra note 24 (describing DOJ's competi-
tion policy technical assistance programs and FTC-DOJ Competition and
Consumer Protection Technical Assistance Program); Byrne & Schrag, supra
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experts have provided commentary- often reflecting the values
of U.S. antitrust law- on draft antitrust laws for Bulgaria, Ro-
mania and other states in the region.' An ABA task force and
the Association of the Bar of the City of New York have pro-
vided advice on harmonization of competition law to former So-
viet Bloc states. 6 '
USAID has supported numerous programs- including those
operated by the SEC- to establish or improve stock exchanges,
securities and exchange commissions, clearance and settlement or-
ganizations, and substantive laws and regulations essential for op-
erational capital markets.'66 The SEC has offered aid and advice
to drafters of securities laws and regulations and to stock ex-
changes, OTC systems, and a variety of SEC-like regulatory bod-
ies in Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, and other CEE countries."
Much of the SEC's work in these areas has been conducted
through the International Institute for Securities Market Devel-
opment. Several of its major efforts (in some cases in conjunction
with the Treasury and Commerce Departments) have focused on
Russia. 6 CEELI has arranged advice from U.S. private and gov-
ernment experts in securities law for several states in the region. 69
note 52, at 456-59 (discussing Convention on the International Sale of Goods
and antimonopoly law); McDermott, Competition Counseling to Eastern
Europe, supra note 42; see also Lawrence, supra note 16, at 678 (discussing FBA's
Democracy Development Initiative).
16 See generally CEELI Programs, supra note 149.
165 See Waller, Neo-Realism, supra note 24; James Langenfeld & Marsha W.
Blitzer, Is Competition Policy the Last Thing Central and Eastern Europe Need?, 6
AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 347, 34849 (1991).
16 See 1998 Congressional Presentation, supra note 6 (discussing the
CEE/NIS region gene-ally and Russia specifically).
167 See Doty, SEC Perspective, supra note 43, at 1247; see generally United
States Information Agency, News Releases, (visited Mar. 15, 1999)
<http://www.usia.gov/usiahome/releases/newrels.htm> (describing the in-
dependent foreign affairs agency's work in conducting legal educational ex-
changes abroad).
162 See Securities and Exchange Commission, Technical Assistance: Interna-
tional Affairs, SEC 1997 ANNUAL REPORT (visited Mar. 15, 1999) < http://
www.sec.gov/asec/annrep97/annrep97.htm#intl> (describing the SEC part-
nership with USAID in the former Soviet Union and Central and Eastern
Europe to provide technical assistance to newly forming regulatory agencies
and stock exchanges).
169 See Gonson, sup-a note 123, at 21-22 (describing a delegation of securi-
ties, corporate, and banking lawyers which gave advice and assistance to Hun-
gary, Czechoslovakia, and Poland); Moxley, supra note 59 (discussing CEEL);
Commercial Law, supra note 160 (noting particularly the establishment of
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USAID and CEELI also have undertaken or supported advice on
banking laws and other financial institutions laws for some of the
former Soviet Bloc states where economic reform efforts have
gone relatively far. 7°
U.S. providers of advice and funders of aid also have offered
support for CEE/NIS moves to create legal regimes attractive to
foreign investors and trading partners (although these areas of
substantive law have held a less central place than in U.S. efforts
to affect legal development in China). For example, many of the
seminars operated by the Commerce Department's Commercial
Law Development Program have focused on trade law and policy,
customs regulations, binational joint ventures, protection of intel-
lectual property, and prevention of corruption among govern-
ment officials.' For another example, CEELI has provided
background papers on international trade and foreign investment
law for some CEE states, including Poland and Bulgaria.172
Alongside programs that have addressed constitutions, eco-
nomic and other legislation, and the capacity of particular legal
and governmental institutions, the U.S. funders' and providers'
attempts to export legal models and provide legal advice also have
addressed more abstract and less immediately programmatic ideas
about law and the rule of law. Many of the major participants-
including the U.S. government's various "rule of law" initiatives,
the Ford Foundation's "rule of law" programs, CEELI's sprawl-
ing endeavors, and Soros' "Open Society Institutes"- have placed
such aims in program titles and mission statements that, at least in
principle and sometimes in practice, have informed and guided
their projects to offer concrete legal advice and assistance. Some
of these organizations' undertakings have focused explicitly and
Commercial law Centers, which are legal resource libraries, in Poland, Lithua-
nia, and Bulgaria).
170 See Commercial Law, supra note 160; U.S. AGENCY FOR
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, Regional Activities in Central Europe, avail-
able in 1998 Congressional Presentation, supra note 6 (discussing banking law
reform).
171 See Commercial Law Development Program, supra note 18.
" See Central and Eastern European Law Initiative, American Bar Asso-
ciation, CEELI's Activities in Poland (1991-98) (visited Mar. 29, 1999)
< http://www.abanet.org/ceeli/poland.html > [hereinafter CEELI in Poland];
Central and Eastern European Law Initiative, American Bar Association,
CEELI's Activities in Bulgaria (1991-98) (visited Mar. 29, 1999) <http://www.
abanet.org/ceeli/bulgaria.html > [hereinafter CEELI in Bulgaria].
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directly on the promotion of such values and principles. U.S.
government agencies, led by the State Department, and some-
times in collaboration with host-country institutions, have run
"rule of law" seminars and have sponsored trips by dozens of
U.S. lawyers and judges to the NIS and CEE states under the ru-
bric of "rule of law" programs. Additionally, USIA has provided
"seed money" for the preparation of books on the rule of law for
readers in the CEE region." 3
Major private foundations have run educational and broadly
education-related programs with a strong, sometimes explicit,
message favoring the rule of law and the revival or strengthening
of cultures of legality. The Ford Foundation has supported ef-
forts to revitalize legal studies and other social sciences in the
CEE and NIS region and sponsored a series of multiple-week
"Raising Rights Consciousness" programs held in Hungary and
organized jointly by a local foundation and a U.S. law school for
law professors from across the region. 4 Soros organizations have
been quite active as well, including the Central European Univer-
sity, which has provided legal education and supported legal re-
search, and COLPI, which has collaborated with local Open So-
ciety Institutes and Foundations to translate English language law
books and to provide enrichment programs for law students, pro-
fessors, librarians, and clinicians. COLPI also has supported pub-
lications that have monitored and reviewed constitutional and leg-
islative developments in the region.' Sometimes under the
banner of "civil society" programs that became prevalent in the
middle 1990s, Soros, other U.S.-based foundations, and, to a lesser
degree, USAID, have focused on supporting the development of
173 See, e.g., Bufford, supra note 53, at 465 n.29 (describing in detail the
USAID program in ten nations of Eastern Europe, including writing summa-ries of existing bankruptcy law, presenting the conclusions, and providing judi-
cial training seminars to facilitate improvement); U.S. Agency for International
Development, 1995 Annual Performance Report (visited Mar. 30, 1999)
<http:! www.dec.org/usaid eval/poatoc2.htm> [hereinafter USAID 1995
AR]; Lawrence, supra note 16, at 673 (noting that since 1990 the USIA has
earmarked over $60,000,000 in its Rule of Law program through its program in
SEED).
174 See Ford Foundation, Russia and Central Europe: Creating a New Gen-
eration ofProfessionals (visited Mar. 22, 1999) <http://fordfound.org/qr.24.2/
qr2428.html >.
"7 See COLPI Website, supra note 30 (stating that COLPI's book projects
have been especially active in Russia and COLPI's enrichment programs have
been especially active in Bulgaria).
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indigenous, recipient-country NGOs that have pursued "rule of
law"-related agendas (including, for example, human rights, mi-
nority rights, freedom of the press, and mechanisms of govern-
ment accountability)176
Although "rule of law"- and "legality"-focused programs have
been relatively numerous and prominent, much of the export
trade in U.S.-style notions of legality and the rule of law doubtless
has occurred as a side-effect of activities that have not explicitly or
consciously sought to instill such values or that have not defined
themselves as part of any effort to support law reform or legal
transplants. Examples of the former include the many projects to
provide advice on economic law, criminal law, judicial admini-
stration, and the like which either have operated under fairly nar-
row mandates or through specialized organizations that have not
articulated a broad democracy-markets-rule-of-law agenda or have
not been deeply imbued at an operational level with their um-
brella or parent organization's official ideologies.
Examples of the latter include many "non-aid" avenues for the
transmission of legal ideas. One such mode has been through the
interaction of CEE/NIS officials, business people, and lawyers
with U.S. government officials on issues ranging from access to
U.S. government-dispensed trade privileges and investment insur-
ance to NATO expansion. Often conducted in the shadow of
blunt "rule of law"-related conditions on U.S. cooperation and
support, such exchanges have given CEE/NIS participants re-
peated and sometimes intense exposure to U.S.-style legal analysis
and notions of legality. Another significant informal pathway for
the transmission of U.S. legal ideals has run through U.S. lawyers
and business people who have participated in the international
trade and investment deals that have become an important force
in CEE and NIS economic reform and development, and who
(consciously or not) have conveyed to their local counterparts
their own picture of the importance and the contours of a stable,
predictable, law-governed order. Another example of an informal
but potentially influential channel is the growing number of
CEE/NIS citizens who have been scholars, students, or visitors at
U.S. law schools.
176 See QUIGLEY, supra note 31, at 73; CAROTHERS, ASSESSING
DEMOCRACY ASSISTANCE, supra note 15, at 57-74.
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2.3. Processes and Providers: Evidence from China and the
Former Soviet Bloc
During the last decade or more, diverse "exporters" and advi-
sors have resorted to a wide variety of processes to transmit U.S.
legal ideas and extend U.S. legal assistance to China, the former
Soviet Union, and neighboring states. Some of this variety is evi-
dent in the many roles that transactional lawyers, government of-
ficials, business people, law school professors, and law students
have played in the informal dissemination and cultivation of U.S.
and U.S.-style laws and legal ideals outside the context of formal
aid and advice programs. The recent history of bilateral negotia-
tions and the largely unilateral implementation of U.S. laws that
address foreign states' laws and behavior (or that otherwise seek
extraterritorial effect) reflect a different type of "exporter" or
"advisor" employing different methods for influencing the laws
and legal systems of targeted countries.
Considerable diversity of processes and providers also has
characterized the narrower- but central- range of activities un-
dertaken by organized programs and projects that have focused
primarily and explicitly on providing legal aid and advice to the
countries of the CEE/NIS region, the P.R.C., and other states in
its region. Like the "non-aid" and "non-advice" channels for the
export of U.S. legal models, such U.S. programs and projects in-
volving U.S. participation have varied widely in format and dura-
tion, in the degree of detail and the distinctly "American" content
of their advice, and in the training and expertise of the individuals
and organizations that have been the immediate dispensers of as-
sistance.
2.3.1. Duration and Format
As the U.S. securities lawyers' journey to Mongolia illustrates,
much of the effort to export U.S. legal models and to extend U.S.
legal assistance to the P.R.C. and the ex-Soviet world has taken
the form of short-term visits by U.S. experts, whether drawn
from the bar, the legal academy, or federal agencies and courts.
The resumes, personal web pages, and semi-autobiographical arti-
cles of hundreds of law professors, think-tank scholars, govern-
ment attorneys, and private practitioners are dotted with refer-
ences to having provided advice (or even serving as a ghost-writer)
to lawmakers in countries that range from China and Russia to
the most obscure of former Soviet Republics. Organized and
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supported by a host of government entities, foundations, and vol-
untary organizations, these efforts to provide assistance typically
have taken the form of meetings, lectures, or seminars in recipient
countries.
A few examples suggest the range and variety of such under-
takings. Countless U.S. practicing lawyers, government officials,
and legal academics have journeyed individually and in small
groups to GEE and NIS states, sometimes under quite informal
and ad hoc arrangements, to provide a few days to a few weeks of
advice on everything from constitution-drafting, the rule of law,
and processes of constitutional and administrative adjudication to
securities, corporations, banking, and bankruptcy law.1" CEELI
has arranged hundreds of workshops, seminars, and short-term
placements that have brought U.S. and Western European experts
to NIS and CEE states for a few days to discuss topics that have
included constitution-making, legislative drafting, alternative dis-
pute resolution, judicial ethics, bankruptcy, secured transactions,
foreign-domestic joint ventures, and the Convention on the In-
ternational Sale of Goods."" U.S. law schools and foundations,
often in cooperation with Chinese institutions, have brought U.S.
lawyers and academics to China to provide short courses for gov-
ernment regulators and scholars on such subjects as foreign trade
and investment, the legal and judicial requisites of continued eco-
nomic reform, and other selected legal topics."" More informally,
U.S. and P.R.C. organizations also have arranged for U.S. schol-
177 See, e.., Ludwikowski, supra note 138, at 159-218 (describing work-
shops and other short-term modes of advice on constitutiondrafting provided
to CEE and NIS states); Belcuore, supra note 23, at 461 (describing FBA DDI's
"talent" bank for providing advice on a wide array of legal subjects); Gonson,
supra note 123, at 21 (describing a two-week advice-providing trip to Poland,
Hungary, and the Czech Republic by delegation of U.S. government and pri-
vate -awyers with expertise in securities, corporate, and bafiking law); Byrne &
Schrag, supra note 52, at 457 (describing a one-week course by a Georgetown
professor on constitutional adjudication for Estonian justices); John J.A.
Burke, The Economic Basis of Law as Demonstrated by the Reformation of NIS
Legal Systems, 18 LOY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 207 (1996); Lawrence, supra
note 16, at 678 (regarding FBA DDI's 1992 delegation to Russia and Ka-
zakhstan which included tie Solicitor General, the FBA Chairman, adminis-
trative law judges, lawyers, and academics).
17 See CEELI Website, supra note 21.
179 See Edwards, supra note 73, at 303; Programs in Asia: China, supra note
100 (regarding the 1995 Conference in Beijing on legal and judicial requisites of
continued economic reform and foreign trade and investment); see also infra
note 193 (discussing the AAX program).
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ars and lawyers, who have been in China for other purposes, to
present lectures on topics within their expertise to Chinese legal
and legal-academic audiences.
On the government side, the State Department's rule of law
program has brought together hundreds of officials each year
from the United States and recipient countries at one-week to
two-week conferences.180  USAID-sponsored parliament-
strengthening initiatives have supported two-to-three day meet-
ings of CEE and Western legislators at CEE sites."8' USIA and
ACUS have sent federal judges and other U.S. officials on short-
term visits to former Soviet Bloc states, China, and neighboring
Asian states to provide advice on the rule of law, judicial institu-
tions, and related topics."' USAID contractors have run seminars
and meetings on a variety of economic law topics in CEE states,
both unilaterally and in conjunction with local entities."8 3
USAID-supported collaborative efforts by the FTC and the Jus-
tice Department's Antitrust Division have dispatched staff law-
yers, economists, and more senior agency officers to provide
competition law and policy advice to former Soviet Bloc states. 84
The SEC and the Justice Department's Criminal Division (in
some cases in collaboration with CEELi) have used similar for-
mats to provide advice in their respective areas of expertise, prin-
180 See USIA International Exchange 1995, supra note 12; USIA Interna-
tional Exchange 1994, supra note 12.
.1 See Hal Lippman & Joel Jutkowitz, CDIE Impact Evaluation: Legislative
Strengthening in Poland (visited Mar. 1, 1999) <http://www.ec.org/
usaid eval/>.
18-2 See Lawrence, supra note 16, at 677 (describing ACUS officials' and fed-
eral judges' 1993 trip to China and the ACUS/USIA program that sends U.S.
judges to Southeast Asia).
183 See Bufford, supra note 53, at 460 & nn.6-7 (describing the USAID and
Romanian government co-sponsored seminars for Romanian bankers, gov-
ernment officials, and judges, and USAID's contract with Deloitte & Touche
to present more than 20 week-long seminars for East European judges on
bankruptcy).
14 See Spencer Weber Waller, Comparative Competition Law as a Form of
Empiricism, 23 BROOK. J. INT'LL. 455 (1997) [hereinafter Waller, Comparative
Competition Law]; Langenfeld & Blitzer, supra note 165, at 348; McDermott,
Competition Counseling to Eastern Europe, supra note 42, at 4 (describing how
the Department of Justice Antitrust Division and the FTC received a grant
from USAID to provide competition counseling over a three-year period to
Eastern European countries and how the Assistant Attorney General for the
Antitrust Division led a presidential delegation in 1990).
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cipally to the former Soviet areas. 8 ' The Commerce Depart-
ment's Commercial Law Development Program, the Justice De-
partment's criminal law reform programs for the CEE and NIS,
the Justice/FTC effort on competition law, and a UN-sponsored
project on legislative drafting for China all have arranged for rela-
tively short-term, several-week placements of U.S. lawyers as vis-
iting advisors in recipient countries. 86
As the American law professor's proposed constitution for
the post-Soviet Republic of illustrates, a second com-
mon mode for exporting U.S. legal ideas and offering U.S. legal
advice has been to provide assistance at a distance. Perhaps the
most prominent example of this format has been CEELI's ar-
rangement for U.S. experts in relevant fields of U.S. law to pro-
vide "comments" on draft laws and constitutions of NIS and CEE
states and "background papers" on general fields of law for indi-
vidual countries in the region."' U.S. government agencies have
employed similar formats, especially on questions of economic
law and regulation. The Department of Justice and the FTC
home offices have provided on-going advice on antitrust law and
the regulation of competition, through a process that appears not
to have relied primarily on extended or regular engagements in
the recipient countries.' 8 The SEC, advised by a panel of repre-
sentatives of leading financial market firms and organizations, has
offered similarly "remote" technical and law-drafting assistance to
securities- market regulators in the former Soviet Bloc and China
(pursuant to a bilateral MOU) and several other nations in the
developing world.8 9 Also, USIA has supported a number of in-
formational projects including, for example, a book on Western
bankruptcy laws, practices, and procedures for Russia."
185 See Doty, SEC Perspective, supra note 43, at 117 (describing SEC staff
visits to advise CEE counterparts on regulating emerging securities markets);
Criminal Law, supra note 158.
186 See Criminal Law, supra note 158; Waller, Comparative Competition
Law, supra note 184; Commercial Law Development Program, supra note 18;
Seidman & Seidman, Draftin supra note 71.
187 See, e.g., Ludwikowski, supra note 138, at 167 (describing CEELI com-
mentaries on CEE and NIS constitutions). See generally CEELI Website, supra
note 21.
188 See McDermott, Competition Counseling to Eastern Europe, supra note
42, at 4; Doty, SEC Perspective, supra note 43, at 126 (describing the Emerging
Markets Advisory Committee).
189 See Memorandum of Understanding, supra note 124, at 197.
190 See Lawrence, supra note 16, at 676.
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A third, widely used structure for providing U.S. legal advice
and exporting U.S. legal ideas has been relatively brief visits,
courses, and seminars hosted by U.S. providers for regulators,
judges, and lawyers from China, the NIS, and CEE countries.
These short-term programs have been quite varied, as a few ex-
amples illustrate. Since the early days of China's now twenty-
year-old reform era, P.R.C. drafters of key economic laws (and
especially those addressing foreign investment-related issues such
as intellectual property law) have undertaken occasional, brief
missions to the United States and elsewhere in the West to gather
information and informal advice.191 In the 1990s, ad hoc ex-
changes and training in the United States for Chinese visitors
have expanded to include several-day sessions on topics ranging
from judicial administration to labor law."
More formally, the ABA's ILEX exchange program (which
dates to 1968), the Ford Foundation, the Asia Foundation (partly
through its Asian American Exchange Program), a UN-funded
U.S. law-school administered project, and others have arranged
for lawyers and officials from the CEE/NIS region and from
China and neighboring developing and reforming states to come
to the United States for programs (sometimes individually tai-
lored ones) in which American (and other) experts have offered
advice on such topics as human rights, training for legislators and
judges, and securities laws. 93 Especially through its sister law
schools programs and related visits by CEE law deans, CEELI has
provided for U.S.-based exposure to, and training in, the organ-
izational structure and educational methods of U.S. law schools;
Recently, law deans from the P.R.C. have been provided with
similar advice and exposure during group visits to a series of U.S.
law schools. 194
191 See Edwards, supra note 73; Maria C.H. Lin, The Patent Law of the Peo-
ple's Republic of China, 405 PLI/COMM 149, 153 (1986) (concerning the delega-
tions sent abroad in the 1970s); Ren,supra note 125.
192 See Brown, supra note 24, at 22.
193 See Sidel, supra note 132, at 258 (discussing the Asia Foundation's sup-
port of Vietnam's economic law development and the Ford Foundation's sup-
port for human rights programs; Asia Foundation, Asian-American Exchange
(visited Feb. 22, 1999) <http:/rwww.asiafoundation.com/taf/programs/prog-
us.html> (discussing the AAX Program); ABA Website of International Law,
supra note 22 (regarding ILEX exchange programs, briefing trips, and seminar
programs for legal professionals around the world).
194 See Central and Eastern European Law Initiative, American Bar Asso-
ciation, Legal Education (visited Mar. 30, 1999) < http://www.abanet.org/ceeli
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This mode of short-term assistance and training in the United
States has been a common format for U.S. government programs
as well. For example, USAID's parliament-strengthening initia-
tive has included two-to-three week training courses by congres-
sional and agency staff for professional legislative staffers from
Poland. 95 Delegations of P.R.C. officials have come to the
United States to meet with U.S. administrative law academics.' 96
U.S. federal courts have run programs in Washington for CEE
judges and administrators, and the National Judicial Center's
training facility for judges has brought in as many as a hundred
foreign jurists per year (including a significant number from Rus-
sia) as students or observers. The Commerce Department's
CLDP program has run a Washington-based, week-long or multi-
week series of seminars that have provided instruction in a variety
of trade and investment-related legal fields to lawyers from the
CEE/NIS region, and the FTC has hosted visits by CEE officials
to discuss draft competition laws and competition policy more
generally.197 The SEC has operated a series of one-to-two week
seminars providing technical assistance and instruction in the de-
velopment and oversight of securities markets to a hundred or
more regulators who have come to Washington each year from
the former Soviet world, East Asia and other emerging market
countries.198 The SEC has undertaken to provide U.S.-based
training for Chinese securities regulators.'" The U.S. government
also has established a similar technical assistance arrangement for
Chinese intellectual property administrators.
U.S.-provided advice and the promotion of U.S. legal models
have not been limited to singnle-iteration, or short-term endeav-
ors. Several more sustained formats for offering assistance and
/legaled.html > [hereinafter Legal Education]; LAW QUADRANGLE NOTES, su-
pra note 76, at 33.
195 See Lippman & Jutkowitz, supra note 181, at 10.
196 See Lawrence, supra note 16, at 677.
197 See Commercial Law Development Program, supra note 18. See e.g., Lan-
genfeld & Blitzer, supra note 165, at 391 (regarding Bilgarian competition poli-
ticians' visit to the U.S. FTC).
198 See Doty, SEC Perspective, supra note 43, at 126; The U.S. Agency for
International Development, Welcome to USAID (visited Mar. 30, 1999)
<http://www.info.usaid.gov> [hereinafter USAID Website]; Securities and
Exchange Commission, SEC 1996 Annual Report (visited Mar. 30, 1999)
< http:/www.sec.gov/asec/annrep96/cont96.htm >.
199 See Memorandum of Understanding, supra note 124, at 197-98.
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transmitting legal ideas have been in the repertoire as well. Many
of the academics, practitioners, officials, and judges who have
made brief trips to the former Soviet region or to China and its
neighbors have undertaken numerous, frequent advice-providing
missions to the same places." ° CEELI's processes of providing
comments on draft legislation, the U.S. government's programs
offering competition law and policy assistance, and other U.S.-
based efforts to render aid at a distance often have involved fairly
sustained engagement, with advice being given either on an on-
going basis or in sequential reviews of multiple draft laws address-
ing the same subject. Some U.S.-based training programs for
CEE/NIS and P.R.C. lawyers, judges, law-drafters, and other of-
ficials have been fairly long-term. Examples include a CEELI fac-
ulty training program that has brought academics from the for-
mer Soviet world to the United States for extended periods and a
similar program for Chinese scholars operated by CLEEC. A
UNDP program for China also included a one-semester stint at
Boston University for Chinese law-drafters as part of a longer-
term P.R.C.-based training and consulting program that sought,
among other things, to "train trainers" who would be able to
perpetuate the influence of the U.S. instructors' initial direct
teachings. Under a bilateral MOU, the U.S. Patent Office has re-
ceived staffers from its P.R.C. counterpart for several-month
training programs.2"'
Some of the major institutional participants in U.S. legal assis-
tance and export efforts have attempted to give greater continuity
and coherence to the projects they support by posting program
officers or staff coordinators in recipient countries for a year or
more. In the P.R.C., for example, the Ford Foundation's resident
office has long included a legal program officer who has typically
held the post for two or more years, overseeing Foundation-
funded programs, and assisting recipients of Foundation grants.
In the former Soviet world, CEELI has been sending young law-
yers to approximately twenty countries to serve for one to two
years as "resident liaisons" who work with governments, bench
200 See Symposium, supra note 1, at 131 (quoting statements of Judge
Patricia Wald regarding her numerous trips abroad); Barbara A. Perry, Consti-
tutional Johnny Appleseeds: American Consultants and the Drafting of Foreign
Constitutions, 55 ALB. L. REV. 767, 777, 779 (1992) (citing trips made by Judge
Alex Kozinski, Professor Albert Blaustein, and Professor A.E. Dick Howard).
201 See Edwards, supra note 73, at 308-09.
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and bar organizations, and educational institutions to coordinate
requests for CEELI assistance and in-country aspects of CEELI
projects. The Soros Foundation-supported, national-level Open
Society Institutes, which have included some law-related activities
on their agendas, typically have begun with a representative sent
out from the United States who remained in residence during a
local OSI's early phases. USAID-funded programs- including,
for example, parliamentary/legislative advice programs in Poland
and Nepal- have been coordinated by officers who are posted in
the recipient country and work with the local U.S. embassies (al-
though some critics have derided USAID offices as "bubble colo-
nies" that have been fatally isolated from the hostcountry envi-
ronment). 2 Some assistance efforts, particularly those supported
by the Ford Foundation (and to a degree USAID) have achieved
greater programmatic continuity and consistency through policies
of sustained cooperation with specific legal educational institu-
tions and law-related NGOs in recipient countries.
In addition, several programs regularly have sent individual
U.S. providers of legal advice and assistance to recipient countries
for periods of several months or longer. USIA's professional-in-
residence program, for example, has placed judges and others with
legal expertise in the countries of the former Soviet Bloc and the
developing world for up to a year. A USAID-funded program of
the FTC and the Justice Department's Antitrust Division has as-
signed lawyers and economists for six months or more to provide
on-site advice to CEE states on competition law and policy."3
The Justice Department has operated a similar program in the
field of criminal law. CEELI has dispatched legal specialists (who
have had more experience as lawyers and more expertise in a par-
ticular subject than CEELI resident liaisons have had) to NIS and
CEE states for up to one year.
202 See QUIGLEY, supra note 31, at 87-102; 1998 Congressional Presentation,
supra note 6; Parliamentary Assistance in Nepal, supra note 17; CAROTHERS,
ASSESSING DEMOCRACY ASSISTANCE, supra note 15, at 107-12.
203 See Kovacic, Competition Policy Entrepreneur, supra note 2, at 470-73;
Langenfeld & Blitzer, supra note 165, at 34849; McDermott, Competition
Counseling to Eastern Europe, supra note 42, at 6 (discussing USAID-funded, six-
month postings of one-lawyer-one-economist teams from the Department of
Justice and the FTC); Waller, Comparative Competition Law, supra note 184;
USAID Website, supra note 198 (discussing postings including Latin America,
the Caribbean, and CEE lasting from one week to one year).
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Some of the most sustained formats for transmitting U.S. ide-
als and ideas about law to China and the ex-Soviet regions have
existed outside of formal programs to provide legal assistance or
to promote emulation of U.S. models. Students and faculty from
China, NIS and CEE states have absorbed U.S.-style legal think-
ing through year-long to three-year long immersion in U.S. law
schools as LL.M. or J.D. candidates or visiting scholars. This
channel (and the reverse flow of U.S. law faculty and students
abroad) is long-established and has grown steadily in the Chinese
case, and has, in recent years, become increasingly available to
CEE and NIS nationals. 4 Perhaps equally important, many U.S.
lawyers in private practice have been posted for multi-year tours
in U.S. firms' offices in Beijing, Shanghai, Budapest, Prague, Mos-
cow, Warsaw and elsewhere, where they have interacted regularly
and repeatedly with locally hired lawyers and consultants in their
offices as well as with other local lawyers, regulators and cli-
ents."' This channel also (and the more modest reverse flow of
foreign lawyers to work in U.S. law firms) has a longer history in
the P.R.C., but has been on a sharp upward trajectory in the NIS
and CEE states and in reforming and developing nations on
China's borders.06
2.3.2. Types" ofAdvice
U.S. legal assistance programs and other media for exporting
U.S. legal ideas have offered widely varying "types" of advice or
204 See Edwards, supra note 73, at 305 (discussing University of Indiana's
relationship with East China Institute of Policy & Law and Duquesne Univer-
sity's relationship with CUPSL).
205 See, e.g., Timothy A. Gelatt, Lawyers in China: The Past Decade and Be-
yond, 23 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 751, 772 (1991) (describing the U.S. law
firms' presence in several major Chinese cities).
206 See id. at 784-87 (noting P.R.C. emphasis on having P.R.C. lawyers
learn international economic law in order to protect Chinese interests while
stating that involvement of foreign lawyers in P.R.C. transactions has now be-
come routinely accepted); American Bar Association, International Legal
Placement Progam (visited Mar. 3, 1999) <http://www.abanet.org/intlaw/
ilex/placement.html> (explaining the International Legal Exchange Program,
which allows U.S. lawyers to work at foreign firms and foreign lawyers to
work at U.S. firms). For a treatment of a similar trend of U.S. firms involved
in China in the investment banking sector, see Ann P. Vandevelde, Realizing
the Re-emergence of the Chinese Stock Market Fact or Fiction?, 30 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 579, 596 (1997) (discussing Morgan Stanley's entrance into a
joint venture with a Chinese bank, thus becoming the first U.S. investment
bank allowed to participate in China's domestic capital market).
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"prescriptions" to the P.R.C., the former USSR, and neighboring
states. At one end of the spectrum, U.S. aid providers have made
available detailed, full-text prescriptions that have followed U.S.
models and have taken little account of local circumstances, atti-
tudes and preferences. The tale of the instant, one-size-fits-all
constitution for the new, unnamed CEE republic is but one of
many similar derisively told anecdotes about American lawyers
and law professors who have claimed to have "written" the con-
stitution of a former Soviet Bloc nation, and to have done so
with, at best, minimal familiarity with the country and after, at
most, a few short visits."7 Even when they have not boldly
claimed to have been "founding fathers" and "constitutional
framers," U.S. advisors sometimes have urged strikingly Ameri-
can-style arrangements on constitution-drafters in ex-Soviet states,
particularly on such issues as the separation of powers, courts'
powers of constitutional review, and provisions addressing indi-
vidual liberties. 8
The pattern of urging (or at least appearing to urge) highly de-
tailed U.S. models has extended to the sub-constitutional level as
well. The American securities law experts' unintended mitigation
of the Mongolians' paper shortage illustrates one version of this
phenomenon. Antitrust law has provided a less amusing but
more significant example. Taking a position that has triggered
significant disagreement among their peers, some U.S. advice-
providers and commentators have argued that it is important to
push NIS and CEE countries to adopt U.S.-style competition law,
sometimes asserting that nothing else would suffice to secure
competition law's indispensable contribution to the establishment
and protection of market-oriented, law-governed economies. As
some adherents to this view have bluntly put it, solving CEE
states' problems of creating or restoring competitive markets re-
quired exporting the Sherman Act." 9
207 See, e.g., Symposium, supra note 1, at 133 (containing Judge Wald's
comment that "I think one out of every two lawyers I've talked to in the
Washington metropolitan area helped draft the Czechoslovakian Constitu-
tion.").
208 See Ludwikowski, supra note 138, at 167-91 (discussing examples of con-
stitution drafting in several former Soviet republics); Perr,supra note 200, at
780-88 (providifig descriptions by U.S. advisors of their roles in shaping
CEE/NIS constitutions).
209 See Waller, Comparative Competition Law, supra note 184, at 569-71; cf
Langenfeld & Blitzer, supra note 165.
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U.S. advisors' presentations of detailed and unadapted U.S.
models have not always, or necessarily, indicated an intent to
provide the legal equivalent of a "turn-key plant" or an "off-the-
shelf" set of laws. Proponents of U.S.-style solutions have some-
times made thoughtful arguments about why significant elements
of U.S. models have been appropriate to the needs and circum-
stances of the CEE/NIS countries, the P.R.C., or other recipients
in its region. For example, advocates of U.S.-style antitrust law
have argued that U.S. law's focus on enhancing consumer welfare
through promoting competition and its emphasis on hard eco-
nomic analysis of anti-competitive effects offer advantages over
European-style competition law's emphasis on protecting firms
from unfair competition and its subjective standard of abuse of
monopoly power. On this view, the argument for U.S.-style law
has been that it would be less likely to result in a regime that, in
practice, would impede market reforms by according excessive
protection to the incompletely privatized, politically well-
connected or only partially reformed state enterprises that have
continued to be major, market-threatening actors in many ex-
socialist economies. More generally, some prominent advocates
of exporting the U.S. model of antitrust have argued that former
Soviet Bloc states' adoption of EU-style competition law risked
replicating the European error of doing "too much to protect in-
dividual competitors rather than the competitive process. ""' In
the same general spirit, some of those who have urged U.S.-style
bankruptcy law for the P.R.C. and former Soviet Bloc countries
have argued that something approaching the American model is
necessary to make creditors' rights clear and secure, to impose
market discipline on enterprises and, thereby, to establish essen-
tial conditions for a well-functioning market and for attracting
foreign investors.
Similar types of arguments have characterized constitutional
advice and prescriptions, particularly with respect to separation of
powers questions. On one hand, proponents of U.S. models and
purveyors of American-style advice have maintained that
CEE/NIS states and nascent Asian democracies along China's pe-
riphery need broad, U.S. Congress-like parliaments because a
strong and well-staffed legislature is necessary to check the dis-
210 Waller, Comparative Competition Law, supra note 184, at 570; cf Lan-
genfeld & Blitzer, supra note 165.
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proportionate power that the executive otherwise might wield in
such systems. On the other hand, U.S. advisors and advocates for
U.S.-style solutions for ex-Soviet Bloc countries also have argued
that a presidential system, at least partly inspired by the American
model, would be more suitable than a European-style parliamen-
tary structure. On this view, a strong, centralized executive
would improve the chances of avoiding chaos and paralysis in
countries where a relatively large number of parties, some of
them opposed to democratic and market reforms or a liberal rule
of law, are likely to control relatively small blocks of seats in the
legislature.2 '
In many cases, however, advisors who have provided highly
detailed information on U.S. laws have not sought or expected to
encourage emulation. Often, they have offered such elaborate
materials merely for reference, illustration, or inspiration- as in-
deed may have been the case with the securities law experts' dele-
gation to Mongolia. In one striking and rather extreme example,
the U.S. consultants working on a UNDP project have provided
Chinese law-drafters with extensive primary materials in several
fields of U.S. law. But one of that program's central messages,
carefully and extensively articulated by its American leaders and
regularly and forcefully repeated to Chinese participants, stressed
that copying U.S. laws or borrowing extensively from U.S. mod-
els simply could not have provided a viable solution for China's
law-making needs."'
Many recent U.S. legal assistance projects have been "reac-
tive" and offered less elaborate, model-like legal advice. Common
methods for issuing this type of advice have included U.S. ex-
perts, providing fairly extensive commentaries on draft laws or
preparing general primers or seminars on fields of U.S. law in re-
sponse to requests from governments in the CEE/NIS or P.R.C.
regions. Though often presented as legal analyses or overviews
without a particularly American content, such advice still gener-
ally has reflected- sometimes quite explicitly and self-
consciously- its providers' expertise, which has been overwhelm-
21 See Ludwikowski, supra note 138, at 170, 181-82, 251-55 (concerning the
appeals of presidentialism to some post-Soviet constitution drafters); Stein,su-
pra note 140, at 438-52 (regarding comments of a U.S. advisor to CEE constitu-
tion drafters).
212 See Seidman & Seidman, Drafting, supra note 71, at 34-36; see also Seid-
man & Seidman, The UNDP/BLA Project supra note 103.
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ingly in U.S. law. Much of CEELI's work has been in these
modes. Its formal "comments" and "analyses" have addressed
draft legislation in such varied fields as antitrust, bankruptcy,
business enterprises, constitutional amendments, criminal law and
procedure, foreign investment, intellectual property, the judici-
ary, lobbying, privatization, secured transactions, and securities
regulation- for countries ranging from Albania to Uzbekistan."'
CEELI's "concept papers" (which CEELI describes as "dis-
cuss[ing] major issues that a law on a particular topic must ad-
dress, provid[ing] guidance and foster[ing] discussion among
drafters") have focused on topics including money-laundering,
consumer protection, antitrust, securities regulation, and foreign
exchange controls- for Bulgaria alone. Additional examples of
CEELI concept papers include those that have addressed criminal
punishment for Moldova, criminal law and procedure for the
Czech Republic, trade regulation for Poland and election law for
Ukraine.2"4 The American-led UNDP program for economic leg-
islation-drafting in the P.R.C. also defined its consultants' princi-
pal roles to include providing counsel on draft legislation pre-
pared by the Chinese participants to address topics that ranged
from government budgets to environmental protection."'
Other organizations have pursued a similar course of provid-
ing fairly general advice and information about U.S. law and of-
fering assistance primarily in response to requests and proposals
from recipient countries. Some foundation-backed projects, in-
cluding those sponsored by the Soros organizations' COLPI and
Open Society Foundations in the CEE/NIS regions and by the
213 See Central and Eastern European Law Initiative, American Bar Asso-
ciation, Legal Assessments and Concept Papers (visited Mar. 29, 1999)
<http://www.abanet.org/ceeli/assessments.htinl>; Central and Eastern
European Law Initiative, American Bar Association, CEELI Legislative Assess-
ments and Concept Papers (visited Mar. 30, 1999) <www.abanet.org/ceeli/
pricelst.html>.
214 See, e.g., Eleanor M. Fox, American Bar Association Selection ofAntitrust
Law Comments on Draft Bulgarian Antitrust Law, 60 ANTITRUST LJ. 245
(1991-92) [hereinafter Fox, Selection ofAntitrust]; CEELI, Concept Paper, Con-
sumer Protection Laws in Bulgaria, 5 PACE INT'L L. REV. 25 (1993); CEELI,
Money Laundering: A Concept Paper Prepared for the Government of Bulgaria, 28
INT'L LJ. 835 (1994); CEELI, Currency Exchange Controls: A Concept Paper for
the Bulgarian Government, 29 INT'L LJ. 257 (1995); CEELI Website, supra note
21.
215 See generally Seidman & Seidman, The UNDP/BLA Project, supra note
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Ford Foundation in China and elsewhere, have prepared and dis-
tributed translations of English-language legal text books or have
commissioned new works (including writings by American
authors) that have sought to introduce "basic concepts" or general
fields of law (as they are understood in the United States or the
West more generally). 16 In the public sector, specific U.S. legal
assistance programs often have been "reactive" in the sense that
the first step in the process has occurred when a recipient-country
official or organization has approached the local U.S. embassy to
request law-related aid. Also, a significant portion of the advice
on competition law, capital markets, trade-related laws, and other
issues that official U.S. sources have provided to CEE/NIS and
P.R.C. recipients has been cast in fairly general terms. While the
frame of reference for such general advice often has clearly been
American law, such assistance projects, at least sometimes, have
eschewed specific and detailed prescriptions for legal reform in re-
cipient countries.
Some U.S. programs and providers consciously have sought to
provide types of substantive advice that have not been distinctly
"American" in content. They have focused their assistance on is-
sues with respect to which it has appeared possible to articulate
legal principles that have won common international acceptance
or that plausibly can be claimed to have general or universal valid-
ity." CEELI and other non-profit U.S. providers have often
stressed areas where U.S. laws and practices closely track UN or
other international standards (for example, on questions of judi-
cial independence), or simply have provided advice that has in-
cluded at least as much Western European law as American law
216 See Soros Foundations Network National Foundations (visited Mar. 1,
1999) <http://www.soros.org/natfound.html> (including sites for COLPI
and Open Society Foundations); Ford Foundation (visited Mar. 1, 1999)
<http:7/www.fordfound.org>.
217 One example is the CLDP, which has conducted seminars that typi-
cally focus on areas in which international standards tend to predominate (such
as project finance or foreign investment law). Similarly, U.S. advice and de-
mands concerning reforms to China's copyright regime typically have empha-
sized conformity to the Berne Convention standards and not to the sometimes
idiosyncratic content of U.S. law. Moreover, some U.S. government pro-
grammatic commitment to, or at least, tolerance for, "generalist" approaches is
suggested by the generic rhetoric of the "rule of law" agenda and by the exten-
sive support USAID has given to CEELI, which often has advocated advice
that does not narrowly follow U.S. models.
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(for example, on issues of competition law).218 COLPI's "basic
concepts" series, and other text projects, and the Ford Founda-
tion-sponsored series of lectures on "raising rights consciousness"
in the former Soviet world have emphasized general rule of law
values, adaptable to a variety of local circumstances, rather than
detailed accounts of U.S. models.219 The same approach of stress-
ing general or universal norms and playing down elements of
"Americanness" also has characterized U.S. efforts to provide le-
gal advice in the P.R.C. and countries in its region. Examples in-
clude international seminars and conferences on law and eco-
nomic development and legal reform that have been supported by
the Ford Foundation, CLEEC, and the Asia Foundation, a series
of summer law institutes on selected legal topics that has brought
U.S. legal academics and jurists to Beijing, and courses on con-
tracts and human rights that the Asia Foundation has organized
in Southeast Asia.' 0
This trend of steering clear of U.S. models in favor of advice
cast in terms of general or common principles, has been less evi-
dent in U.S. government aid programs. Still, it has occurred, for
example, in competition policy advice (which has to a degree ac-
cepted European models), commercial law advice (which has
sometimes stressed broadly international standards), and general
"rule of law" assistance (which has sometimes emphasized fairly
generic ideas-and ideals).
Other U.S. and U.S.-backed advice efforts have offered an-
other type of guidance that also has not been obviously U.S.
model-exporting. These efforts have focused on assistance in at
218 See Symposium, supra note 1, at 118-21, 140; see also Byrne & Schrag,
supra note 52, at 452 (stating that the European model was used by the George-
town Project on Legal Assistance in advising the Estonian government on law
reform); Sarah Wright Sheive, Central and Eastern European Constitutional
Courts and the Antimajoritarian Objection to Judicial Review, 26 LAW & POL'Y
INT'L Bus. 1201, 1207 (1995) (discussing how in requesting evaluation of draft
legislation, Central and Eastern European parliamentarians and legislative assis-
tants often ask CEELI to compare it to Western European legislation);Judicial
Reform, supra note 149 (regarding UN principle of independent judiciary).
219 See COLP Website, supra note 30; The Ford Foundation, supra note 57.
22 See Edward J. Epstein, Law and Legitimation in Post-Mao China, in
DoMEsTIc LAW REFORMS IN POST-MAO CHINA 19, 19-22 (Pitman B. Potter
ed., 1994); Asia Foundation, Programs in Asia: China, supra note 100; Asia
Foundation, Programs in Asia: Cambodia (visited Mar. 2, 1999) <http://
www.asisafoundation.org/taf/programs/prog-asia-camb.html>; Ford Founda-
tion Regional Overviews, supra note 27.
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least ostensibly "neutral," "scientific," or context-appropriate
techniques for making, implementing and applying law. On the
parliamentary side, examples have included training in legislative
drafting, procedures and research as well as instruction in the op-
eration of committee systems that USAID has provided in Poland
and Nepal and that the Ford Foundation and a largely U.S.-
staffed UN program have provided in China. 1 On the adminis-
trative or executive side, U.S. government aid efforts have in-
cluded programs to train CEE agency staffs and leaders in the
"how's" and "why's" of antitrust investigation and enforcement,
securities market oversight, and the education of P.R.C. officials
in methods of intellectual property protection and regulation.'m
For judiciaries, U.S. and U.S.-based projects have included
USAID-backed efforts to promote the enforceability of judg-
ments, the bench's familiarity with new legislation, and judges'
ability to conduct alternative dispute resolution in Russia. They
have also included CEELI, Ford Foundation, and foundation-
supported programs to improve the training and professional ca-
pacity of judges in China, some of its reforming neighbors, and
throughout the former Soviet areas.' More broadly, a myriad of
public and private U.S. programs have sought to raise the general
competence of lawyers, lawmakers, regulators, and jurists by im-
p' See Seidman & Seidman, Drafting supra note 71; USAID, supra note 7
(referring to legislative strengthening in Poland and parliamentary assistance in
Nepal); Ford Foundation 1995 Annual Report, supra note 25.
22 See Mastalir, supra note 165; Kathleen E. McDermott, Targeting Profes-
sions for Antitrust Prosecution- Perception or Reality?, 5 WTR-ANTTRUST 30
(1990); Doty, SEC Perspective, supra note 43, at 123; Celia R. Taylor, Capital
Market Development in Emerging Markets: Time to Teach an Old Dog New
Tricks, 45 AM. J. COMP. L. 71, 103 (1997) (regarding USAID-UK help in struc-
turing IPO in Russia); Memorandum of Understanding, supra note 124 (discuss-
ing the training that the U.S. Patent Office is to provide under the MOU in-
volving the U.S. Patent Office and its P.R.C. counterpart).
m See 1998 Congressional Presentation, supra note 6 (regarding USAID and
Russia); Judicial Reform, supra note 149 (stating that the Georgetown project
for Estonia moved quickly from very general legislative drafting to training
lawyers, judges, and legal professionals for sophisticated specialties as the legis-
lative needs changed); Byrne & Schrag, supra note 52, at 449; Asian-American
Exchange, supra note 193 (noting the 1995 "neutral" conference in Beijing re-
garding the legal and judicial requisites of economic reform, trade, and invest-
ment).
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proving the quality of legal education and training in China, some
nearby nations, CEE countries and the NIS.' 4
Some of the least concretely detailed, distinctively American,
and highly prescriptive types of U.S. legal advice and modes of
U.S. legal export have been characteristic of many U.S. programs
that have sought primarily to provide access to legal materials and
ideas or methods of legal education (albeit, in practice, often U.S.
ones). Several examples suggest the range of such programs.
CEELI's sister law school program has linked dozens of U.S. in-
stitutions with well over a hundred CEE/NIS counterparts, and
has included a substantial library program as well as curriculum
and planning assistance. The Ford Foundation and USAID proj-
ects have supported broadly similar work to improve libraries
and legal education in China and Russia. CEELI's Commercial
Law Program has established a commercial law library and re-
source centers in a few former Soviet Bloc states. A U.S. law
school-based project has worked to establish a research program
linking academics, government officials, and jurists from the
United States and China. ABA's ILEX program has placed U.S.
lawyers abroad (and foreign lawyers in the United States), in part
of an effort to facilitate transmission of ideas and information
about law and lawyering.
Also at the less aggressively or conspicuously "model-
exporting" end of the U.S. legal assistance spectrum, several pro-
grams have supported locally run or locally staffed projects in re-
cipient countries. Much of the support that the Ford Founda-
tion, the Soros-backed Open Society organs and COLPI, CEELI,
USAID and others have provided to legal education in China and
the CEE/NIS region, has been sufficiently unrestricted or col-
laborative to fit this pattern. Specific efforts have included Ford
Foundation grants to support Chinese universities' research and
conferences on criminal justice reform, development of new law
teaching methods and materials, and compilation of opinions is-
224 See, e.g., Whitmore Gray, The Challenge of Asian Law, 19 FORDHAM
INT'L LJ. 1 (1995) (concerning CLEEC programs and Ford funding for
CLEEG); Edwards, supra note 73 (same); 1998 Congressional Presentation, supra
note 6 (describing programs to support legal education and training of the Rus-
sian judiciary).
' See Lawrence, supra note 16, at 675; Harold C. Wegner, Introduction to
Symposium: Intellectual Property, 16 Hous. J. INT'L L. 1 (1994); 1998 Congres-
sional Presentation, supra note 6; CEELI Website, supra note 21; ABA Website of
International Law, supra note 22.
1999]
U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L.
sued by Chinese courts. Efforts have also included funding gov-
ernment training programs for basic-level state personnel."6 So-
ros-funded projects have pursued similar ends through similarly
responsive and collaborative channels, with much decision-
making delegated to local participants in several countries in the
CEE/NIS region.'m Equally broad openings for local or regional
involvement and for non-American content appear to have char-
acterized projects funded by the Asia Foundation and USAID to
arrange trips for legislators from Nepal and other nations on
China's periphery to interact with their counterparts elsewhere in
the region.' The same can be said about the partly Ford Foun-
dation-supported CEE Parliamentary Practices Project, which has
afforded similar networking opportunities for reformist legisla-
tors from around the relevant region, and Soros-backed short
courses or degree programs for CEE/NIS scholars and students,
which have allowed participants to study nearby foreign nations'
experiences and to forge connections with one another. 
9
There also have been signs of movement toward this general
type of advice and assistance over time. Indications of this pat-
tern include the move to using local lecturers in the Ford-
supported program on "raising rights consciousness" in CEE,
USAID's policy of "weaning" relatively long-term CEE recipi-
ents from U.S. and other foreign experts in favor of locally devel-
oped expertise, and USAID's shift (and private foundations' simi-
lar moves from a more established base) toward greater support
for programs that collaborate with host-country NGOsY0
Outside of formal assistance programs and beyond the activi-
ties of those who have seen themselves as broadly pro bono pro-
moters of legal reform in the P.R.C., the former Soviet Union,
and adjacent states, other mechanisms for disseminating or pro-
moting U.S. legal models or U.S.-supported legal change in those
countries have been quite varied in the specificity and the
226 See The Ford Foundation, Annual Reports, 1994-97 (visited Mar. 17,
1999) < http://fordfound.org/about/ar.html >.
' See Carothers, Aiding Post-Communist Societies, supra note 31.
22' See USABD, supra note 7 (referring to parliamentary assistance in Ne-
pal); Programs in Asia: China, supra note 100; Programs in Asia: Vietnam, supra
note 102.
-9 See Ford Foundation 1995 Annual Report, supra note 25; QUIGLEY, supra
note 31, at 74, 78.
o See id.; 1998 Congressional Presentation, supra note 6; see also
CAROTHERS, ASSESSING DEMOCRACY ASSISTANCE, supra note 15.
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"Americanness" of what they have transmitted or sought to in-
still. Thus, the U.S. government demands for reforms in Chinese
or CEE/NIS laws and law-related practices have ranged from, on
one hand, calls for a loose, general conformity to international
standards for human rights, intellectual property protection or
level playing fields in trade and investment relations to, on the
other hand, the kinds of highly specific undertakings for revising
national laws and enforcement practices that have been embodied
in some bilateral MOUs on securities and intellectual property or
in the legal requirements imposed on Chinese or CEE/NIS issu-
ers seeking listings on U.S. equities exchanges.
Depending on their own views, the nature of the transaction,
the concerns of the client, and, no doubt, a host of other, some-
times idiosyncratic factors, U.S. lawyers representing American
investors, joint-venturers or traders in dealings with P.R.C. and
CEE/NIS regulators and companies sometimes have pressed for
arrangements that conform to U.S. legal norms and standards
(while, on occasion, seeking to educate their counterparts on the
importance of accepting or adopting those terms more generally).
At other times, they have been far more accommodating of local
differences and preferences. Finally, U.S. legal education for law-
yers from the former Soviet world, China, and environs has ex-
posed these foreign students to courses with widely varying con-
tent. At one end of this wide spectrum, highly specialized and
doctrinal courses, particularly in business law fields, may have
provided (or at least seem to have been perceived by some stu-
dents as providing) a set of highly detailed prescriptions for im-
proving their own countries' analogous laws. At the other end of
the spectrum, the legal theory and comparative law courses that
have attracted a smaller, but growing, share of graduate law stu-
dents from the P.R.C. and CEE/NIS region appear to have con-
veyed a much more general, flexible, and, at times, highly skepti-
cal message about U.S. legal ideas, ideals, and their possible
implications and relevance for students from former and reform-
ing socialist states in Europe and Asia.
3. EVALUATING U.S. LEGAL ADVICE PROGRAMS AND THE
EXPORT OF U.S. LEGAL MODELS
Recent U.S. efforts to provide legal assistance abroad, and
other channels for spreading U.S. legal ideas internationally, have
produced relatively few and rather modest instances of implemen-
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tation of U.S. prescriptions or effective exports of U.S. legal mod-
els, although such outcomes neither definitively establish a cur-
rent or permanent lack of significant influence and impact, nor
reliably confirm that apparent successes to date will prove real
and lasting. Experiences from China and its neighbors, Central
and Eastern Europe, and the states of the former Soviet Union
provide illustrations, and some of the most important instances,
of these patterns and problems. They also suggest several conclu-
sions about what factors are conducive to success- and failure-
in the pursuit of an agenda that includes promoting market
economies, electoral democracy or the rule of law. Some of these
lessons concern issues of process or format for extending assis-
tance or exporting models. Others address questions of the sub-
ject matter of the advice or ideas and the economic or political
contexts in which the prescriptions or models are offered and re-
ceived. While these lessons are not fundamentally inconsistent
(and in some instances overlap) with one another, the "substan-
tive" lessons are perhaps best understood as caveats or supple-
ments to the lessons about "process."
3.1. "Process" Lessons: Responsive and Collaborative Programs,
Durable Commitments, Local Knowledge, and "General"
or "Neutral" Prescriptions
U.S. programs to provide legal assistance and efforts to propa-
gate U.S. legal models seem to fare better when they respond to
what relevant groups in recipient countries see as their needs, and
when they work reasonably closely with key institutions and
elites in recipient countries.
A failure to follow this precept is among the many shortcom-
ings that arguably doomed the efforts of the American academic
who printed out and sent off- through an intermediary- a pro-
posed constitution for a post-Soviet republic whose citizens and
circumstances appear to have been unknown, and of no special
concern, to the drafter. The same can be said of our other open-
ing parable- that of the U.S. securities law experts whose notion
of providing assistance was to leaflet their briefly encountered
Mongolian beneficiary with xeroxes of U.S. laws assembled be-
fore the delegation left the United States. In the same vein, U.S.-
based or U.S.-backed efforts to provide China with advice on
constitutional reform have been ineffective and almost non-
existent because there has been no official P.R.C. support for, or
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tolerance of, such undertakings. Similarly, a publicly funded U.S.
program to improve judicial competence and autonomy in Ro-
mania foundered, on one credible account, because the program
lacked a skilled, supported partner on the host-country side."
Perhaps responding to or anticipating such patterns of failure,
some of the largest and most well-established non-government
programs clearly have taken some version of the lesson as part of
their official philosophies. The relative success that some of these
programs or some of their individual projects appear to have en-
joyed seems partly attributable to their having at least occasion-
ally implemented these creeds. One example is the Ford Founda-
tion's China program, which has followed a policy of
maintaining a resident officer in China for its law programs, to
serve as an involved coordinator of Foundation-funded projects
and as a liaison with local legal educators, researchers, and offi-
cials who have often played a leading role in developing (as well
as implementing) project ideas. The approach has given Ford's ef-
forts a particularly high profile in China (especially among law-
yers, legal educators and sympathetic officials) and has won gen-
erally favorable reviews from participants and observers. When
Ford moved to establish a legal assistance program in Vietnam, it
sought to replicate what it believed to be the successful China
model, beginning with an investigation of Vietnam's legal and le-
gal-educational needs, along with an inventory of government and
academic institutions and various groups that might serve as local
collaborators. 2 For another example, the largely American-
staffed UNDP project, aimed at raising the quality of legislation-
drafting and of several key pieces of legislation in the P.R.C.,
stressed the importance of team-efforts among foreign consultants
and Chinese law-drafters and Chinese law drafting trainers. And
the internal and external reviews of that UN program attributed
its success in significant part to this collaborative strategy. s3
Among programs targeting the CEE/NIS region, CEELI has
declared that responding to locally articulated requests is one of
21 See CAROTHERS, ASSESSING DEMOCRACY ASSISTANCE, supra note 15.
232 See Sidel, supra note 132, at 222. Indeed, one of the principal partici-
pants in the early stages of the Vietnam project was a former legal program of-
ficer in the Bein fice.
" See Seidman & Seidman, Draftin supra note 71; see also Seidman &
Seidman, The UNDP/BLA Project, supra note 101.
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its three core principles. 4 CEELI has also defined its in-country
liaisons' primary roles to include working closely with local
lawmakers and law reformers and acting as clearinghouses or go-
betweens for locals' requests to CEELI for advice. In recent
years, CEELI's sister law school program has shifted its focus to-
ward clinical and professional skills components in response to
CEE participants' expressed interests. Background papers and
commentaries on proposed legislation, which comprise a large
share of CEELI-supported work, have been prepared in response
to recipient countries' requests, and are supposed to be tailored to
local needs and concerns. Critics have complained, often justifia-
bly, that too often such CEELI advice has not taken local needs
and circumstances adequately into account. Nonetheless, various
observers have found particular CEELI's ventures (including, for
example, its workshops on constitution-drafting) to be relatively
effective and influential. And they have attributed such efforts'
success to CEELI's close coordination with recipient nations'
leaders and lawyers (including, for example, members and staff of
constitutional drafting committees)."
Imperatives of collaboration with local participants and re-
sponsiveness to local needs and requests also have characterized
some of COLPI's principal mandates. Examples include its role
as coordinator of law-related programs run primarily through the
largely locally staffed Open Society Foundations and Open Soci-
ety Institutes in NIS and CEE countries, and its role as operator
of programs to adapt manuscripts on basic legal concepts to suit
the needs, interests and circumstances of individual countries.
Like the Ford Foundation's China projects, the Soros network's
CEE/NIS programs have been among the most highly regarded
in their region. Favorable reviews often have linked their success
to their patterns of extensive involvement with host-country law-
yers and academics and intensive cooperation with indigenous
educational and non-governmental organizations."'
Legal advice and assistance programs operated and supported
by the U.S. government have sometimes endorsed and imple-
4 The other two central elements are an approach that abjures a narrow
focus on American models and an insistence on providers' commitment to
public service and avoidance of conflicts of interest.
, See Ludwikowski, supra note 138, at 159.
For examples of such accounts, see generally Carothers, Aiding Post-
Communist Societies, supra note 31 and QuIGLEY, supra note 31.
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mented similarly responsive and cooperative approaches. Thus,
the process that has typically led to help from USIA's law pro-
grams has begun with a foreign government's approaching the lo-
cal U.S. embassy with a request for support or advice in improv-
ing its judicial system, preparing revisions to its constitution, or
providing information about U.S. law, legal education, or access
to U.S. jurists. In addition, USAID's standards for approving le-
gal assistance proposals have incorporated criteria that assume re-
liance on a degree of effective cooperation with recipient country
governments. One key official USAID criterion, for example, is
that the recipient state have established (or have solid prospects
for creating) adequate domestic support for the rule of law.=7
USAID-funded programs and American-staffed UN projects to
strengthen parliaments or legislative processes in the former So-
viet regions, China, and along China's periphery have all
preached, and sometimes seemed to have practiced, strategies of
fairly close coordination with aid-receiving institutions and exten-
sive adaptation to national political circumstances and institu-
tional conditions. These features seem to have contributed sig-
nificantly to the relatively high marks these programs have
received from at least partly objective observers. '
Those U.S. programs and advisors who have acted in accor-
dance with the lesson of reacting to locally articulated imperatives
and cooperating with local elites and groups have had to grapple
with questions of to whom they should respond and with whom
they should cooperate in recipient nations. These are common-
place issues in legal transplants, but they have had peculiar and
especially problematic features in the context of U.S. legal exports
to China, the former Soviet Union, and neighboring states. Al-
though U.S. programs and purveyors of U.S. legal models often
seem to have adopted a practice of dealing fairly indiscriminately
with office-holders and staffs of government or educational insti-
tutions who have sought advice or assistance, even such relatively
"neutral" approaches inevitably have involved U.S. programs and
providers in recipient countries' internecine institutional or parti-
san rivalries. The government-to-government approach of signifi-
cant official U.S. assistance and some private assistance (including
a good deal of CEELI's work, for example) has sometimes created
See Bankson, supra note 5.
23 See USAID, supra note 7; Seidman & Seidman, Drafting supra note 71.
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an impression of "taking sides" against local critics of the gov-
ernment. This issue appears to have been especially serious and
controversial in some former Soviet Bloc states where political in-
stability has been relatively high and where critics of the govern-
ment often have seen themselves as the true allies of reform, de-
mocracy and the "rule of law."
The concern appears to have been increasing recently with re-
spect to U.S. programs in the P.R.C. as well. Top-level bilateral
accords have led to new State Department-led "rule of law" initia-
tives that critics in the U.S. and in China have seen as favoring a
coordinating and mediating role for central P.R.C. government
authorities, and some view the initiatives as posing a threat to the
promising dispersed efforts to promote law reform and legal de-
velopment that had begun to emerge with some help from decen-
tralized U.S. programs and channels for providing advice on U.S.
legal ideas.
In some cases, involvement in recipient nation's intranational
divisions seems to have been part of a more striking and, argua-
bly, a more conscious policy of selective collaboration to enhance
the impact and efficacy of assistance efforts. This has been rela-
tively obvious in the case of U.S. programs (such as those sup-
ported by Ford and Soros, as well as some government-funded
ones) that seem to have sought out and cultivated alliances with
Chinese or post-Soviet reform-minded lawyers or legal academics
who have had connections to their countries' policy-makers (par-
ticularly in the Chinese case) or to emerging political pressure
groups and other autonomous organizations (especially in the
CEE states).
Somewhat less conspicuously, a similar pattern appears to
have characterized programs that have sought to improve the ca-
pacity of legislatures, which (if effective) have obvious potential
to affect the balance between reasonably democratic or pro-"rule
of law" parliaments and more authoritarian-leaning executive
branches and bureaucracies in much of the former Soviet world
and, to a degree, in China and other reforming states in East and
Southeast Asia. Certainly, U.S. government-funded, democracy-
promotion assistance sometimes has been openly partisan, sup-
porting indigenous political parties that U.S. officials or their
agents and grantees have seen as more favorably disposed toward
democratic values and the rule of law, particularly in parts of the
former Soviet Bloc. It would be remarkable if a more subtle ver-
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sion of that attitude has not characterized some, more narrowly
law-focused programs.
On more specific and concrete issues of legal reform as well,
some U.S. participants and commentators have suggested that ef-
forts to provide U.S. legal advice or to export U.S. legal ideas gen-
erally enhance their prospects for success when they treat divi-
sions within recipient countries as strategic considerations. On
this view, a key to effectiveness for efforts to promote a particular
agenda of legal change has lain in seeking out host-country insti-
tutional and organizational constituencies that, first, have had in-
clinations or interests (either ex ante or because of incentives
structured by U.S. actors) favoring their countries' implementa-
tion of U.S. advice or emulation of U.S. models, and that, second,
appear to have had the ability to press effectively for following
such prescriptions. In this vein, U.S. participants in efforts to
promote U.S.-style or U.S.-acceptable, uniform or harmonized
transnational commercial or financing laws have argued that it
has been important to make sure that the lawyers and lawyer-
bureaucrats who would have to implement the proposed rules,
and the ministry officials or representatives of political leaders
who would have to secure the acceptance of the proposed rules
have been involved in the multilateral process, have publicly
committed themselves to support those rules, and have been made
to understand the economic costs of not conforming to the pro-
posed rules.
U.S. government actions- often outside of assistance pro-
grams- suggest a similar perspective at work. For example, the
bilateral MOUs on intellectual property, securities, trade, and
other law reforms in China often have been structured primarily
as almost contract-like agreements between the relevant special-
ized regulatory and administrative organs, and typically have
been backed by the threat of U.S. government-imposed economic
sanctions in the event that the P.R.C. side failed to perform the
stated undertakings. Such experiences do suggest some support
for the view that identifying potentially influential groups of bu-
reaucrats, lawyers, or policy-makers, and then tailoring the pack-
age of proposed legal changes and bundling those proposed
changes with the proper array of carrots and sticks, sometimes
has been a key to improving the prospects for securing the im-
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plementation U.S. or U.S.-favored legal rules, ideas, and practices
in targeted countries."'
The development of a host of relatively informal channels for
transmitting U.S. legal models and information about U.S. law to
China and the post-Soviet world also appears to confirm the ad-
vantages of collaboration with recipient-country actors and re-
sponsiveness to their concerns. Anecdotally, at least, it seems that
the flow of legal knowledge and norms from U.S. lawyers to
CEE, NIS, and P.R.C. counterparts, or from American law pro-
fessors and legal experts to students and others from China and
the former Soviet Bloc, seems to have been most extensive and ef-
fective when the U.S. participants have conveyed a sense of colle-
giality or equality with their counterparts, and when they have
listened to, and, to a degree, responded to, recipient-country law-
yers' concerns, questions, or insistence on a degree of accommo-
dation to local laws and practices.
Sometimes the roots of informal cooperation and collabora-
tion have run deep, and have created a foundation of trust that
has supported qualitatively greater influence of transmitted ideas.
For example, as one close observer has seen it, U.S. constitutional
ideas and ideals had a relatively significant impact in the Czech
Republic because its leaders were former dissidents who had
worked cooperatively with U.S. lawyers and academics through
Helsinki Watch and, therefore, welcomed Americans as advisors
in the post-Velvet Revolution constitution-making.24 Less dra-
matically, some of the U.S. lawyers and legal scholars who, early
on, established themselves as "friends of China" (through their
willingness to assist in the early, not strongly U.S.-emulating,
post-Mao law reforms, and to explain and defend- albeit some-
times critically- the progress of law reform in China) seem to
have remained among the more acceptable and influential sources
" See Kathryn Hendley, The Spillover Effects of Privatization on Russian
Legal Culture, 5 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 39 (1995); Rodriguez &
Coate, supra note 163, at 333-37 (discussing the structure of demand and sup-
port for antitrust-law reform and development in reforming economies); Inter-
view with Charles W. Mooney, Jr., Professor at University of Pennsylvania
Law School, in Philadelphia, PA. (May 5, 1998) (regarding his experience in
international commercial law reform, uniform law, and harmonization. The
utility of such alliance-focused or collaborative approaches is commonplace in
dealing with legal assistance for China. See, e.g., Seidman & Seidman, The
UNDP/BLA Project, supra note 101.
240 See Stein, supra note 140, at 423-25.
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of U.S. and other foreign legal ideas in official and unofficial Chi-
nese legal circles.241
Such relatively modest informal channels aside, U.S. legal as-
sistance programs and proponents of the U.S. legal models for the
P.R.C., the former U.S.S.R. and nearby states have not been able
to rely very much on one commonplace mechanism of effectuat-
ing legal transplants. They have not been able to count on the ac-
tive collaboration or general support of an autonomous and influ-
ential cadre of legal professionals in recipient countries.242 China,
like neighboring nations in East Asia, has not had a centuries-old
tradition of laws and lawyering similar to that found in the West.
The emerging legal profession took a severe pounding under
communist rule, especially during China's Cultural Revolution
decade. While the current era of economic and political reform
has led to the rapid rehabilitation and expansion of the legal pro-
fession, the old guard of lawyers trained before the heyday of
Maoism is tiny and relatively elderly. The rapidly expanding
group of lawyers trained during the reform era has remained
comparatively small, uneven in quality and rather weak in its
sense of professional identity and autonomy. Moreover, party
and state organs (which, however, increasingly include people
with legal training) have remained firmly ensconced both as gate-
keepers for most foreign legal advice and assistance programs, and
as a source of constraint on the development of the domestic legal
profession. The Chinese pattern has been broadly characteristic
of other reforming countries in the region, including Vietnam. 43
The history of the legal profession is a bit different in some of
the NIS and CEE countries, but the effect on local lawyers' roles
241 Among the U.S. lawyers who pioneered in providing legal advice and
services to U.S. investors in reform-era China were long-established leading
scholars of Chinese law. They included Jerome Cohen (a professor at Harvard
Law School and later a lawyer with Coudert Brothers, Paul Weiss Rifkind
Wharton and Garrison, and a member of the NYU law faculty). Cohen also
played a significant role in offering informal advice on reforming Chinese law.
242 See Alan Watson, Aspects of Reception of Law, 44 AM. J. COMP. L. 335
(1996).
243 See generally Shen Zongling, The Role of Lawyers in Social Change:
China, 25 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 163 (1993) (detailing recent developments
in the legal profession in China); William P. Alford, Tasseled Loafers for Bare-
foot Lawyers: Transformation and Tension in the World of Chinese Legal Workers,
141 CHINA Q. 22 (1995); LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS,
LAWYERS IN CHINA: OBSTACLES TO INDEPENDENCE AND THE DEFENSE OF
RIGHTS (1998); Sidel, supra note 132 (regarding law reform in Vietnam).
1999]
U. Pa. J Int'l Econ. L.
as facilitators of legal transplants and loosely U.S.-style legal
change has been broadly similar. In some parts of the former So-
viet world, there is, of course, a much stronger, pre-communist
precedent for a broadly Western-style role for lawyers. Still,
communist rule in much of the NIS/CEE region has taken a seri-
ous, if complex, toll on the scale, stature, and autonomy of the
bar and bench. The experiences of the Soviet or Soviet-
dominated era in many ways reduced radically the role of law-
yers, dissuaded many talented people form pursuing legal careers,
and left the legal profession with a legacy of low status or a taint
of collaboration with now-discredited regimes.'
If, as seems very plausible, the relative weakness of lawyers-as-
collaborators and lawyers-as-recipients has been a factor in limit-
ing the impact of U.S. legal assistance and the influence of U.S.
legal models in the P.R.C. and CEE/NIS regions, then the pat-
tern offers further support for the lesson that cooperating with
appropriate local participants and responding to discernible and
articulated local needs and desires are keys to success for U.S. le-
gal advice efforts and for the export of U.S. legal ideas, institu-
tions, and practices.
A second and, in practice, closely related "process lesson" is
that U.S. programs to provide legal assistance and other efforts to
export U.S. legal models are more likely to have an impact when
they involve relatively sustained commitments by advice-
providers and export-promoters. This lesson that durable com-
mitments are important is a plausible piece of conventional wis-
dom. It also has been something of an article of faith among
some major and, by most accounts, relatively successful U.S. aid
programs. Among efforts targeting China, the Ford Foundation's
structure of having a resident mission in Beijing, with a series of
law program officers serving for a few years each, has reflected ac-
ceptance of this lesson. A similar view seems to have held sway
among U.S. participants in a UN-sponsored project to build
China's legislation-drafting capacity who thought it vital that
244 See Symposium, supra note 1, at 138-39 (regarding the collaboration of
lawyers with regimes in Communist Eastern Europe); Kovacic, Competition
Policy Entreeneur, supra note 2, at 452 (indicating that the Soviet emphasis on
technical fields and the stigma placed on legal training resulted in a limited se-
lection of lawyers with experience in commercial law).
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their program have a sustained and reiterative multi-year for-
mat.
24
Among assistance efforts focusing on the CEE/NIS region,
CEELI's resident liaisons, who have been posted for one or two
years in a country in the region, have been- according to CEELI
leaders and some outside observers- the linchpins of the organi-
zation's programs. CEELI also has favored the method of rela-
tively long-term postings of "legal specialists" (who have been
more experienced attorneys with expertise in a particular field).
Both official CEELI sources and critics of CEELI's work have
expressed skepticism about the efficacy of short-term seminars
and other unsustained modes of advice that CEELI has sometimes
orchestrated. 46
Much the same perspective appears to have informed U.S.
government programs for the CEE region that have dispatched
government attorneys for several-month or year-long stints, or
repeated shorter term visits, to provide advice in such fields as
criminal law and procedure, and competition law and regulatory
process. Patterns of reiterative, on-going legal advice from U.S.
agencies' home offices to their P.R.C. and CEE/NIS counterparts
indicate an additional dimension of official U.S. programs' appre-
ciation of the importance of continuous and long-term (if remote)
engagement. The same can be said of USAID's and USIA's prac-
tices of working with, and through, U.S. embassy-based staffers
on relatively long-term assignments in recipient countries. Some
sense at higher levels in the U.S. government that sustained and
structured engagement is an important factor in effective pro-
grams of official U.S. legal assistance also seems to have been re-
flected in recent efforts to establish formal institutional structures
within the Department of State. These structures have sought to
coordinate implementation of a "rule of law" initiative for China
(undertaken in the wake of P.R.C. President Jiang Zemin's U.S.
visit) and to provide coordination and oversight of the many U.S.
government programs that have sought to support law reform
s See Seidman & Seidman, Drafting, supra note 71, at 34-36.
246 See Symposium, supra note 1, at 118-21 (regarding liaison programs and
stating that short-term workshops and seminars can work if they are part of a
long-term, on-the-ground commitment); see also id. at 140 (praising the United
States for long-term in-country placement of advisors and for bringing people
to the United States for education rather than using the seminar model).
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and legal development abroad, especially in the former Sovietworld.'4
Moreover, a vague but widespread sense that repeat-
participants in the process of providing advice abroad have been
relatively successful, and advisors' self-reports of the steep learn-
ing curve that they encountered on early missions, further sup-
port the idea that durable commitments make for more effective
advice-mongering.248
Scattered evidence concerning informal channels for the
transmission of U.S. legal ideas and the non-aid side of U.S. gov-
ernment efforts provide some further support for this lesson.
The U.S. lawyers who seem to have had the most influence are
those who have had long-standing relationships with recipient
countries and their legal-political elites, whether as old "friends of
China" from the earliest days of reform and before, or as foreign
allies of former dissidents who became lawmakers and constitu-
tion-drafters in post-Soviet Central and Eastern Europe. Less
dramatically but in the same vein, U.S. lawyers who have been
resident in CEE/NIS or P.R.C. offices of American and other
Western firms have been relatively effective conduits for the
transmission of U.S. legal ideas, at least in comparison to their
colleagues who have participated only in isolated transactions.
Somewhat similarly, U.S. government efforts to secure U.S.-style
or U.S.-favored domestic legal reforms in China or the former
Soviet world appear to have been somewhat more effective when
they have pursued such change through protracted, reiterative ne-
gotiations. Progress on legal problems concerning fair trade,
openness to U.S. investment, or protection for U.S. intellectual
property often seems to have occurred, if at all, after several
rounds of threats, counter-threats, and MOUs hammered out
among repeat players representing each side.
The adverse consequences of a lack of sustained engagement
arguably were also on display in the tale of the ready-made post-
247 Examples of this coordination or centralization effort include the ap-
pointment of a senior State Department official, Ambassador Richard Morn-
ingstar, to coordinate the substantially CEE/NIS-related rule of law efforts in
the State Department and beyond, as well as the creation of a post, initially oc-
cupied by Yale Law School Professor Paul Gewirtz, to oversee the implemen-
tation of new rule of law initiatives, including those targeting the P.R.C.
248 See generally Barbara A. Perry, Constitutional Johnny Appleseeds: Amei-
can Consultants and the Drafting of Foreign Constitutions, 55 ALB. L. REV. 767
(1992).
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Soviet constitution that the U.S. law professor sent, effectively
without return address, in response to a single inquiry through an
intermediary, and the story of the thick stack of U.S. securities
law materials that the lawyer-tourists distributed during their sin-
gle brief visit to Mongolia. The same basic conclusion also draws
general support from the many tales- endlessly retold among
participants and observers involved in contemporary U.S. legal
export and assistance efforts- about jet-setting, hit-and-run ex-
perts who have offered irrelevant, ineffective, widely ignored, or
broadly resented advice.249
Another related, and more disputed, process lesson is that
U.S. programs to provide legal assistance and efforts to export
U.S. legal models are more likely to be effective if providers are
familiar with the language, culture, laws and other conditions and
traditions of recipient countries. This precept about the value of
"local knowledge" appears to have been incorporated in the
methods of some of the more venerable and well-regarded U.S.-
based and U.S.-supported programs. Examples include the Ford
Foundation's China programs and the Soros Foundation's
COLPI, which have had policies or practices of employing as
field officers U.S. citizens (or foreign nationals) who have been
fluent in host-country languages and have had formal training or
experience in the affairs of the host country or region. Another,
more modest example is CEELI's preference for resident liaisons
who have been competent in the local language (a preference that
has been reflected in a somewhat controversial lowering of the
relatively meager "practical legal experience" requirement for
candidates with language skills). More generally, the same basic
view of the importance of host-country-relevant skills seems to
have been reflected in U.S. advice-providers' relatively frequent
reliance on expatriates or immigrants from recipient countries,
locally hired staff and advisors, and U.S. legal academics with ex-
pertise in the law of the recipient country. Particularly in the
case of law professors, such expertise almost inevitably has meant
some sacrifice in the level of expertise in the substantive fields of
U.S. law in which advice has been offered- a trade-off that sug-
249 See, e.g., Symposium, supra note 1, at 119 (noting the criticisms from
recipient-country sources directed at foreign lawyer and law professor consult-
ants who flit in and out in bubbles of affluence); Seidman & Seidman, Draft-
ing, supra note 71, at 34-36 (arguing that in studying how to draft new law, ad-
visors must be attuned to loca institutional and social structures).
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gests a perception that such "area specialist" abilities matter a lot
in the enterprise of extending effective legal advice.
The widely perceived link between the Ford and Soros pro-
grams' "localism" and their apparent success, and the especially
prominent roles and, by their own accounts, the unusually exten-
sive influence of expatriate academic advisors in the legal reforms
undertaken by their home countries (primarily in the CEE re-
gion) suggest points of empirical support for this third lesson.
This third process lesson perhaps comes through most clearly
in accounts of the deleterious effects that have followed from a
lack of local knowledge. The need to understand and to be able
to work with local counterparts, conditions, and needs is yet an-
other of the many morals that seem to emerge from the star-
crossed visit of the photocopy-toting U.S. securities law experts to
Mongolia and the ill-fated production of an English-language, one-
size-fits-all constitution for a new European republic, the identity
of which had barely registered with the would-be framer of its
fundamental law. Self-deprecating retrospective accounts by U.S.
legal experts of their naivete concerning local legal needs and cir-
cumstances during their initial trips to Central and Eastern
Europe suggest that there has been a widespread problem of
poorly aimed, irrelevant or even unintentionally perverse ad-
vice.' 0 Such accounts also provide reasons to think that the prob-
lem likely has been going uncorrected and, indeed, unrecognized
among less introspective and sensitive participants in the booming
American legal advice-giving industry.
The conclusion that local knowledge is vital has been implicit
in many of the criticisms leveled at CEELI for its reliance on
lawyers with little country-specific knowledge or country-
relevant skills to act as intermediaries between recipient govern-
ments and a pool of U.S.-based experts who have had even less
familiarity with recipient countries and their laws. These points
are echoed in criticisms of USAID missions in the CEE/NIS re-
gion as "bubble colonies" unable or unwilling to understand their
environments, and in indictments of funding entities for giving
grants or awarding contracts to intermediary organizations that
250 See, e.g., Symposium, supra note 1, at 132 (stating that Judge Wald was
impressed by the high number of women judges in Eastern Europe, only to be
told that this was because it was considered a low-status job, and citing other
examples of American surprise at different judicial norms and customs in East-
ern Europe).
[Vol120:2
LEXAMERICANA?
have known too little about host country conditions to be effec-
tive. 1  The same view comes through even more strongly in
scathing accounts, by observers and from participants in other
modes of U.S. legal assistance, of the impracticality or offensive-
ness of much of the advice offered in one-off lectures and short-
term seminars given by providers who had been chosen solely on
the basis of their expertise in particular fields of U.S. law or their
prominence in the academic, private practice, or government sec-
tors of U.S. legal circles.
A final "process" lesson teaches that U.S. legal assistance pro-
grams and efforts to export U.S. legal models are more likely to
succeed if they eschew detailed, distinctively U.S.-derived pre-
scriptions in favor of presenting advice or exemplars in terms of
more "general" standards, "international" norms, "universal"
principles, or in some contexts, specific solutions that are not pe-
culiarly American. This lesson too has been a subject of consid-
erable agreement among U.S. providers of legal advice and assis-
tance. In China, for example, the Ford Foundation, Asia
Foundation and other efforts have construed their "rule of law"
agendas broadly, to include support for locally run- and some-
times locally designed- programs of legal training and research
that have held forth no special promise of promoting emulation
of U.S. models. Ford Foundation-supported efforts to publish
and distribute books on general and comparative legal subjects
and to compile collections of Chinese cases have, as a matter of
policy or practice, steered away from narrowly American-style
content. The largely American-staffed UN program to improve
legislation-drafting capacity in the P.R.C. presented U.S. models
as appropriate fodder for a comparative, social-scientific inquiry
into suitable approaches to law-making, but not as paragons suit-
able for copying. The Asia Foundation's parliamentary projects
in the surrounding region have reflected a similar perspective in
their emphasis on intra-regional exchanges and training, rather
than visits to the United States or visits by U.S. experts on legisla-
tive processes. These projects that, in effect, have followed the
fourth process lesson are among the U.S. legal assistance under-
takings that generally have received substantially above average
marks from participants and observers.
251 See CARoTHERs, ASSESSING DEMocRAcY ASSISTANCE, supra note 15,
at 107-12.
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Among efforts that have targeted the CEE/NIS region, semi-
nars introducing general international standards and practices in
foreign investment law have been especially popular and have
been regarded as among the most successful of the Commerce
Department's many programs promoting economic law reform in
the region. Some U.S. participants in, and commentators on, the
controversial field of antitrust law assistance have argued that
U.S. public sector advice should contain a substantial mixture of
European-style competition law if it is to be relevant and influen-
tial.252 CEELI has included a commitment to providing "neutral"
or "comparative" (rather than narrowly American model-based)
advice among its core principles. 3  In many cases, CEELI has
supported the offering of advice that has been based on Western
European models that CEELI leaders and spokespersons have de-
clared more suited to recipients' needs and inherited systems.
Also, the Soros network's legal "text" projects have shared many
of the "generalist" traits of the similar Ford Foundation-
supported efforts in China, and seem to have enjoyed similarly
favorable reputations and results.
Individual American participants in, and observers of, U.S.
public and private sector efforts to provide legal assistance and to,
support law reform in, the former Soviet world and the P.R.C.
have expressed similar views. Many of them have argued strongly
in favor of broad and fairly generic legal standards over detailed
or U.S.-style rules in fields as varied as the regulation of economic
competition in CEE and NIS and intellectual property protection
in China.' In addition, the apparent and reported relative suc-
cess of programs that have responded to local initiatives or agen-
das that have focused on technical legal assistance and techniques
of legislation, offer further indications that assistance and export
232 See Fox, ABA, supra note 214.
2 See, e.g., Symposium, supra note 1.
4 See Fox, Toward World Antitrust, supra note 86, at 19-25 (arguing for
neutrally-defined market access standards which would be monitored by the
WTO); Paul H. Brietzke, Designing the Legal Frameworks for Markets in Eastern
Europe, 7 TRANsNAT'L LAW. 35, 36-51 (1994) (arguing that partly privatized
socia democracies are more suitable for developmg markets in Eastern Europe
rather than neoclassical, wholly privatized liberal democracies).
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efforts can be more successful when they avoid narrowly and ob-
viously American prescriptions."5
The virtues of offering actually or apparently "generalist" pre-
scriptions seems to be born out by phenomena beyond the sphere
of formal U.S. advice and assistance programs. Anecdotal evi-
dence suggests that, other things being equal, transactional con-
tacts between U.S. lawyers and P.R.C., CEE or NIS lawyers and
officials, and educational interactions between U.S. law teachers
and Chinese or post-Soviet students have been more effective
means for the transmission of broadly U.S.-style legal ideals when
they have not taken the form of dictating obviously and specifi-
cally U.S. norms that "must" be followed if a deal is to go
through, or if recipient country legal reform is to be effective.
Also, even when threatening sanctions to pressure post-Soviet or
P.R.C. leaders to alter their domestic laws in ways demanded by
the U.S., the U.S. government appears to have acted at least
partly in accordance with this final process lesson. For example,
in the highly contentious and confrontational case of U.S.-P.R.C.
negotiations over intellectual property protection, the U.S. usu-
ally has pressed China to meet the general, international- and
certainly not distinctively American- standards of the Berne
Convention.
Whatever the affirmative merits of "generalist" approaches,
U.S. advice-providing and model-exporting efforts that have not
adhered to this fourth process lesson appear to have run into
greater difficulties, and to have drawn widespread and vehement
criticism. Perceived attempts to provide the legal equivalent of
U.S.-produced "turn-key" plants have been routinely attacked as
hopelessly ineffective, as well as objectionably imperialistic. 6
The tale of how copies of U.S. securities laws and regulations may
have eased the Mongolian paper shortage, but accomplished little
else, and the story of how the elaborate draft constitution for the
"Republic of " somehow failed to be enacted, make the
point in especially colorful ways. In the same general vein, a lead-
" These issues are addressed in the discussion of the first "process" lesson
above, and the discussion of seemingly "apolitical" "technical" legal advice in
the third "substantive" lesson below.
25 Cf JAMES A. GARDNER, LEGAL IMPERIALISM: AMERICAN LAWYERS &
FOREIGN AID iN LATIN AMERICA (1980) (arguing that a process of "indirect
infused transfer" of legal values would be more effective than attempts to trans-
fer specific legal institutions, instruments, concepts or models, attempts to im-
pose models, or attempts to respond passively to requests).
1999]
U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L.
ing U.S. participant in the program to improve legislation-
drafting in China has roundly denounced as ineffective and, at
times, perverse the approach to assistance that assumes that
American and other foreign legal consultants provide a "treasure
chest" of specific solutions to recipient countries' legal needs."7
Similarly, CEELI's critics have stressed that the organization's
background papers and commentaries on draft legislation often
have read like primers on American law."5 And the critics have
argued that it is these traits that have made such advice irrelevant
and ineffective. Frequently, assessments of U.S. government ef-
forts to export U.S. antitrust law and detailed U.S. models in
other legal fields (especially to the former Soviet Bloc) have con-
cluded that the narrow American focus of the prescriptions made
the advice ill-suited to recipients' needs and circumstances, and ul-
timately ineffective." In the same vein, critiques of the United
States' relatively disappointing efforts to press the P.R.C. to adopt
reforms to intellectual property law or trade law have traced the
difficulty partly to the U.S.'s insistence that Beijing implement
fairly specific standards that are familiar to the United States and
alien to China.2"
This process lesson seems more convincing in light of three
plausible explanations of why U.S. legal assistance programs and
other endeavors to export U.S. legal models might be more effec-
tive when they forego, or at least appear to avoid, highly detailed
and specifically U.S.-modeled prescriptions. First, more general
standards are more likely to be implemented by China,
CEE/NIS, and other "post-communist" or "non-Western" states.
Almost tautologically, implementation is a less complicated and
less involved task where the advice is less elaborate. More subtly,
advice and models that mandate only general goals or principles
s See Seidman & Seidman, Drafting, supra note 71, at 34-36, 40.
2s For an example of how similar these are to U.S. laws, see American Bar
Association Central and East European Law Initiative, Money Laundering: A
Concept Paperfor the Government of Bulgaria, 28 INT'L LAW. 835 (1994); Pox,
Selection of Antitrust, supra note 214 (setting forth comments that include ex-
tensive background discussions and comparisons to the U.S.'s Sherman Act).
2' See Wailer, Comparative Comnpetition Law, supra note 184, at 455 (argu:
ing that the United States is out of step with the rest of the world's competi-
tion commu~lnity and calling for a comparative approach to the formulation of
competition policy); cf Fox, Toward World Antitrust, supra note 86, at 19-25
(arguing for internationalization of a general market access principle).
260 See Alford, supra note 243.
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are relatively agnostic about detailed rules, and thus give recipi-
ents greater room to find and to choose the least disruptive and
most easily implemented specific options among those that are
consistent with the general standard. Second, advice and models
that are openly and obviously rooted in U.S. principles and prac-
tices are more likely to face resistance in recipient or importing
countries. Such prescriptions for law reform are apt to encounter
debilitating charges that they are manifestations of U.S. legal im-
perialism, or means for pursuing U.S. interests at the expense of
local needs and interests. Third, the U.S. common law system
and other aspects of American legal exceptionalism mean that ad-
vice and export efforts that push for distinctively U.S.-based solu-
tions are more likely to be dismissed as irrelevant in the over-
whelmingly "civil law" recipients of U.S. legal aid and assistance.
Although the extent of the relevant differences between the two
great legal families often is overstated, the perception that com-
mon law-based prescriptions are problematic appears to be fairly
strongly held in Central and Eastern Europe (where, according to
some critics, Western European aid programs have done much to
encourage the view). Some version of this view also appears to
have significant support- and arguments in its favor seem likely
to be persuasive- in China and much of Asia (including parts of
the former U.S.S.R.), where civil law systems predominate and
legacies of direct and indirect continental European legal influ-
ence linger.
The persuasive power of these four "process lessons" depends,
in part, on one's notion of what counts as "success" or "efficacy"
in U.S. legal advice programs and in the export of U.S. legal mod-
els. In some cases, legal advice and export-promotion efforts that
fail to respond to local preferences, eschew collaboration with lo-
cal elites and institutions, seek quick fixes, ignore questions of
how to present advice in terms (and even languages) that will be
welcomed and understood, and seem to insist upon fidelity to
U.S. exemplars and prescriptions will appear thoroughly inap-
propriate, incomprehensible, uninspiring, or offensive. Where
they do, they will clearly be doomed to abject failure, and ap-
proaches that do more to follow the four process lessons will of-
fer clearly superior alternatives.
Often, however, heeding these lessons is likely to entail a
trade-off. Legal assistance and export strategies that are respon-
sive and collaborative, that are the product of lengthy experience
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and effort, that incorporate insights drawn from an understanding
of recipient-country languages, contexts and legal traditions, and
that cast prescriptions and suggestions for legal change in generic
or universal terms may be more likely to move the recipient sys-
tem in generally "favorable" or desired directions. But such
heightened prospects for "success" of some sort can come at a sig-
nificant cost in terms of the "type" or "quality" of the results be-
cause the influence or impact of such efforts, when successful,
generally will not produce states that closely resemble U.S. proto-
types or the specific, concrete aims of contemporary U.S. legal as-
sistance programs and other U.S. efforts to secure legal change
abroad. In such seemingly commonplace circumstances, the
"thicker" one's conception of the legal and institutional requisites
of the broadly shared U.S. goals of market economies, political
democracy, and the rule of law, the more often one is likely to
perceive a negative expected value in following the process lessons
described above, and accepting the costs they exact in return for
the promise of a potentially hollow victory.
Moreover, in some contexts and with respect to some issues
and types of advice, U.S. legal assistance programs and U.S. legal
models have had significant impact abroad despite a failure or re-
fusal to heed some or all these process lessons. This pattern sug-
gests that the four lessons about process do not exhaust the gen-
eral teachings of the recent experience of U.S. legal assistance
programs and other channels for exporting U.S. legal ideas to the
former Soviet world, the P.R.C. and elsewhere. Many of these
other teachings are reflected in four "substantive" lessons that
variously overlap with, complement, and set forth caveats to the
"process" lessons.
3.2. "Substantive"Lessons: Of Power, Prestige, Politicization
and Parallelism
U.S. legal models and the advice offered by U.S. legal assis-
tance programs appear to have a greater impact when any of four
conditions exist with respect to the legal or institutional questions
at issue: the United States can and does exercise power to press
the recipient or importing country to conform to U.S. advice or
U.S. standards; the ideals embodied in U.S. models or advice en-
261 See Gianmaria Ajani, By Chance and Prestige: Legal Transplants in Russia
and Eastern Europe, 43 AM. J. COMP. L. 93, 94-95.
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joy especially high prestige in the recipient or importing country;
following U.S. advice or emulating U.S. models does not appear
to be a highly political or politically controversial move in the re-
cipient or importing country; or relatively small gaps separate
U.S. advice or models, on one side, and the recipient or importing
country's prior laws and practices or its current goals, on the
other side.
Several features of recent U.S. legal interaction with the
P.R.C. and the countries of the former Soviet Bloc teach, or seek
to implement, the lesson of the importance of U.S. "power"- in
the broad sense of the capacity, whether by purposive action or
through the relatively automatic operation of "structural" forces,
to make a country that rejects U.S. advice or U.S. standards sig-
nificantly worse off by imposing a sanction or denying a benefit.
Outside of legal assistance programs, the U.S. government of-
ten has used its legal and constitutional authority to deny foreign
states and their nationals access to U.S. capital markets, products
markets, and various forms of economic assistance. In dealing
with China, for example, the United States has used the threat of
economic sanctions or continuing to block China's entry into the
WTO to extract commitments from the P.R.C. to bring its intel-
lectual property regime and its trade laws and practices into line
with international standards. The threat of withdrawing MFN
status, opposing multilateral economic assistance, or legislating
codes of conduct for U.S. multinational corporations arguably has
induced China at least to engage in a discussion of issues of re-
forming laws and practices that affect human rights. In a similar
fashion, U.S. efforts to promote a variety of legal reforms in the
CEE/NIS arguably have made greater headway because of U.S.
laws that have conditioned economic assistance and trading op-
portunities for some former Soviet Bloc countries on, among
other things, their progress toward market economies, democ-
racy, and observance of human rights standards. The U.S. gov-
ernment's move to extend the reach of U.S. securities and anti-
trust laws to cover activities and parties abroad appears to have
reflected a similar, but somewhat more subtle and less region-
specific, exercise of U.S. power to push other countries' laws to-
ward conformity with U.S. standards. More broadly, the shadow
of possible U.S. "sanctions" (broadly defined) very well may have
led some CEE/NIS or P.R.C. officials to take more seriously
some of the law reform prescriptions offered by U.S. legal advi-
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sors, especially when such advice has been offered through official
assistance programs and when it has concerned issues that have
been important to the U.S. government or its leaders' key con-
stituencies.
As this last point suggests, much of the impact of U.S. power
in promoting U.S.-style or U.S.-favored legal changes in the
P.R.C. and CEE/NIS regions seems to have come without U.S.
actors' taking openly and obviously assertive measures. In China
and in the former Soviet world, countries' and companies' quests
for access to U.S. investment capital and U.S. capital markets
have been a significant force for legal change. Chinese and Rus-
sian enterprises, plus some companies from other CEE/NIS and
East Asian countries, seeking to list on the New York Stock Ex-
change have been willing to bring some of their practices into at
least apparent conformity with the exchange's rules and the appli-
cable requirements of U.S. securities laws. Such developments
have created the basis for a mild ripple effect, with the actions of
such pioneer companies having some impact on other aspects of
the same companies' behavior, on the practices and standards of
other companies that have wished to follow the rush for U.S.
capital, and even on the attitudes and orientations of securities
regulators at home.
Lawmakers and regulators in the P.R.C. and the NIS and CEE
countries also have moved, albeit incompletely and sometimes
grudgingly, to accommodate U.S. investors' demands for rela-
tively familiar and broadly U.S.-like laws, apparently because
governments in those external capital-seeking countries have seen
such changes as a necessary condition for attracting U.S. invest-
ment. Thus, for example, accounts of foreigner-friendly reforms
in China's joint-venture and other foreign investment laws sug-
gest that advocacy by the U.S. China-Business Council and U.S.
firms, as well as the U.S. embassy, may have made a difference.262
Tellingly, some of the legal advice efforts that U.S. government
providers have regarded as most successful are those which have
held out the prospect of helping recipient countries to improve
their access to U.S. capital and other sources of international in-
vestment. Examples, primarily from among projects targeting
CEE/NIS governments, include seminars on foreign investment
law operated by the Commerce Department's CLDP, and a vari-
262 See PEARSON, supra note 115.
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ety of economic law advice projects on subjects ranging from
bankruptcy to securities disclosure that have presented proposed
reforms in terms of the appeal to, or demands of, foreign inves-
tors.
263
Variation by subject matter in the impact of U.S. legal models
and U.S. legal advice on developments in the CEE/NIS and
P.R.C. further suggest the importance of "power"- in particular,
the "passive" or "structural" forms of power often at issue in
questions of access to U.S. capital and markets. One would ex-
pect the power of U.S. exemplars or prescriptions to effect (or at
least affect) such change abroad to be highest where the laws at is-
sue regulate objects that are relatively mobile (such that a choice
of a particular set of legal rules would be likely to affect their lo-
cation and allocation), where there appear to be large network ex-
ternalities to a mode regulation (such that a national legal regime's
failure to conform to a standard model will be potentially isolat-
ing and costly with respect to attracting or retaining mobile fac-
tors) and where U.S. sources and regulators control an exception-
ally large share of the object being regulated or the field of
regulation (such that the U.S.'s legal approach has market power
and/or provides a superior coordination point for initially ineffi-
ciently disparate national approaches). On each of these indices,
capital/equities markets, product markets and business regulation,
and workers/citizens' rights and political-governmental structure
arguably are arrayed consistently along a spectrum of declining
U.S. "power."
263 See Bufford, supra note 53, at 463-65 (indicating that developments in
bankruptcy law in CEE countries, which have to a significant degree followed
U.S. models, are helping raise capital by privatizing insolvent state-owned en-
terprises); Anna M. Han, China's Company Law: Practicing Capitalism in a
Transitional Economy, 5 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 457 1996; Legislative
Strengthening in Poland, supra note 17; Commercial Law Development Program,
supra note 18 (describing a seminar on project finance); Andrew Xuenfeng
Qian, Why Does Not the Rising Water Liff the Boat? Internationalization of the
Stock Markets and the Securities Regulatory Regime in China, 29 INT'L LAW. 615,
625-28 (1995) (comparing Chinese regulations and the Western securities regu-
lations upon which they were modeled); Belcuore,supra note 23, at 462-65 (cs-
cussing how reform in Kazahkstan encourages U.S. companies to invest in that
country). See generally William C. Philbrick, The Paving of Wall Street in East-
ern Europe: Establishing the Legal Infrastructure
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Accounts of recent legal changes in the P.R.C., the former So-
viet Bloc and other countries in transition are consistent with a
conclusion that the impact of U.S. advice, demands, and models
have tracked this same spectrum. As the relative paucity of iden-
tifiably American-inspired provisions in P.R.C. and post-Soviet
constitutions' structural and rights-enumerating provisions (as
well as the dead-on-arrival status of the American-drafted, fill-in-
the-blank constitution for a post-Soviet republic) and the more
numerous, if scattered, instances of broadly U.S.-style provisions
in laws on foreign investment, corporate governance, equities,
bankruptcy, and antitrust all suggest, U.S. paradigms and pre-
scriptions appear to have had more of an impact with respect to
economic law" than "political law." Inflated claims from some
U.S. consultants aside, credible assertions of American paternity
for constitutional developments in these countries have been few,
while commentators and participants have concluded, plausibly,
that there has been a better record of success among economic
law-focused efforts operated by CLDP, USAID, the SEC, the De-
partment of Justice with the FTC, and other private sector aid-
providers.2"
Within the broad field of "economic law," U.S. exemplars and
advice appear to have been relatively influential in the P.R.C. and
CEE/NIS regions with respect to some aspects of securities regu-
lation and capital markets law, somewhat less influential in fields
such as intellectual property, insolvency, and competition law
(with some of their effect in these fields being attributable to their
close connection with international investment and trade), and
much less influential in areas more closely connected to such less
tradable factors as "people" and domestic governance (with im-
portant examples including issues of labor law and provisions
governing individual economic liberties).26 The conclusion that
there has been a relatively high level of influence in laws relating
to capital is complex, potentially controversial, and requires a ca-
264 See Bufford, supra note 53 (regarding bankruptcy laws).
265 See Taylor, supra note 222 (regarding securities laws); Mastalir, supra
note 163, at 61 (regarding the likely impact of U.S. and E.C. antitrust law on
the transition to market economies in Eastern Europe); Hu,supra note 127 (re-
garding the modest impact of MOUs on P.R.C. copyright law). See generally
Paul Edward Geller, Legal Transplants in International Copyright: Some Prob-
lems ofMethod, 13 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 199, 221-23 (1994) (arguing that ideas
about copyright espoused by the Berne Convention should be left open-ended
in developing copyright law in China).
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veat in light of persisting U.S. and other Western investors' criti-
cisms of the lack of transparency, stability, and fairness of stock
markets in China and the former Soviet world. The move toward
U.S.-style law and regulation in these areas has been significantly
compartmentalized, with relatively extensive changes occurring
in semi-segregated markets for foreigners or in those aspects of
regulation that have been of greatest immediate concern to for-
eign investors.
Given that U.S. legal assistance programs seem to have spread
their resources relatively evenly across these different types of
economic and non-economic legal fields, it appears likely that
U.S. "power" (in particular, "passive or "structural" power)-
and not the level of effort expended by aid-providers and model-
exporters- can account for some of the variation in effectiveness
of U.S. advice and the influence of U.S. models. Quite plausibly,
U.S. government and foundation-supported advisors may have
been taken more seriously in the reform-era P.R.C. and in the
post-Soviet world when their advice and ideals have appeared to
provide guidance on how to gain access to valuable economic re-
sources that the providers' government or fellow nationals con-
trolled. Indeed, U.S. participants sometimes have played the
"power" card fairly explicitly. Even beyond the obvious contexts
in which official government actions to impose sanctions or deny
benefits have been at issue, U.S. officials, American lawyers, and
legal academics who have urged the adoption of American-style
commercial law and other economic laws, or conformity to
broadly U.S.-like international practices in these fields, routinely
have invoked the point that the U.S. and international markets
for investment can be expected to respond unfavorably to post-
socialist or reforming socialist states' failure to heed such advice.
Cross-national variations in the adoption of U.S.-style eco-
nomic laws also suggest the importance of power, broadly de-
fined. While areas with relatively open and/or developed
economies, including the nations on the Western fringe of the
CEE region and the P.R.C. (especially its coastal regions) have
moved relatively far in this direction, other parts of the post-
Soviet or reforming socialist world have not, as the Mongolian se-
curities law reformer's reaction to the U.S. lawyers' offer of assis-
tance poignantly illustrates. It seems probable that the differences
may stem at least in part from the "power"-related fact that those
nations and regions which have been more ready to adapt to U.S.-
1999]
U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L.
style rules would have faced more obvious, and severe immediate
economic costs of exclusion from world markets if they had re-
fused to do so.
Patterns in informal channels for the transmission of U.S. le-
gal models to the P.R.C., CEE, NIS and elsewhere appear to offer
additional support for the same general lesson. Typically not hay-
ing presented themselves principally as providers of aid or advice
on law reform, practicing U.S. lawyers likely have won the atten-
tion and influenced the thoughts and actions of their foreign
counterparts and law-making officials- to the extent they have
done so- because they have been perceived as gatekeepers to
capital, export markets or (more diffusely) respectability in the
U.S. and around the world. More subtly and possibly more in-
sidiously, lawyers from China and from the former Soviet Bloc
who have spent extended periods in U.S. law schools (or in U.S.
law firms) have had to think, to some degree, like American law-
yers (or at least like American legal academics think American
law students should think). The power of the U.S. parties to
these relationships to grant or withhold degrees, good grades and
other elements or indicia of academic and professional success no
doubt has been a significant factor in pressing the visiting lawyers
from these systems to analyze and to understand legal questions
in terms of U.S. laws and legal ideas, perhaps sometimes with last-
ing effects.
A second substantive lesson teaches that U.S. legal assistance
programs and U.S. legal models are more likely to have an impact
where the ideas they urge and embody enjoy especially high
"prestige" among recipients of advice and potential emulators of
U.S. examples. While the meaning and sources of the prestige of
legal models and ideals can be elusive, prestige does seem to mat-
ter in the process of legal export or transplantation generally.266
266 For discussion of the role and importance in legal borrowing of a do-
nor's "authority" in the recipient system, seeAspects of Reception of Law, supra
note 242. See also ALAN WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS, 57, 90 (1994) [here-
inafter WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS]. Watson also argues that, where law-
yers are involved, the professional habit of not wanting to be obviously inno-
vative and wanting to claim external authority for statements makes available
prestigious foreign models especially appealing. See id. at 95-101. Watson's ar-
gument, which suggests that the "accessibility" of knowledge about the donor
provides a better predictor than the "fit" between the donor and recipient sys-
tem of whether Borrowing will occur, suggests the importance of prestige in
enhancing visibility which, in effect, makes the prestigious exporting system
more accessible. See id. See generally, Joan Davison, America's Impact on Con-
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The recent experiences of U.S. legal advice, assistance and export
efforts in China and the former Soviet Union and neighboring
nations do not seem to be exceptions to the broader pattern.
Some assessments of constitutional change in the CEE/NIS re-
gion, for example, have suggested that local perceptions of the
United States as a paragon of constitutional rule and limited gov-
ernment have been important factors in making U.S.-style no-
tions of checks and balances, separation of powers, and enumer-
ated individual rights attractive to post-Soviet constitution-
makers, despite the apparent foreignness and seeming irrelevance
of U.S. legal traditions and current circumstances." The close as-
sociation that some legal and reformist elites in China and the
former Soviet world have perceived between the U.S. legal system
and ideals of the rule of law and judicial independence- and per-
haps a more general perception of the United States as the "intel-
lectual leader" in Western law during the late twentieth cen-
tury- may have contributed to the relatively warm welcome and
favorable evaluations received by U.S. legal assistance efforts that
have focused on increasing the autonomy and competence of
bench and bar and cultivating rule of law values in the P.R.C. and
CEE/NIS regions.268
The United States' position as the largest and, in recent years,
the most dynamic of the advanced market-capitalist economies
stitutional Change in Eastern Europe, 55 ALB. L. REV. 793 (1992) (describing
how Eastern European countries study Western democratic systems m order to
draft new constitutions).
267 See Ajani, suprq note 261, at 94-97 (suggesting that developing laws
within CEE countries have been shaped initially by the wholesale adoption of
Western law and more recently by a critical analysis of Western laws); Lud-
wikowski, supra note 138, at 159.
268 On at least one account, it is precisely at this level of exporting ways
of thinking about law" as a "phenomenon of social organization that the U.S.
exercises its role of "intellectual leadership" in law. See Ugo Mattei, Why the
Wind Changed: Intellectual Leadership in Western Law, 42 AM. J. COMP. L. 195
(1994) (reviewing THE RECEPTION OF CONTINENTAL IDEAS IN THE COMMON
LAW WORLD, 1820-1920 (Mathias Reimann ed., 1993) and DER EINFLuss
DEUTSCHER EMIGRANTEN AUF DIE RECHTSENTWICKLUNG IN DEN USA
UND IN DEUTSCHLAND (Marcus Lutter et al. eds., 1993)) [hereinafter Mattei,
Intellectual Leadership] (arguing that the U.S. has replaced Germany, which had
replaced France, as the intellectual leader in Western law); Symposium, supra
note 1, at 122-27 (statement of Dimitrina Petrova) (praising Western Lawyers
for bringing CEE lawyers an appreciation of judicial independence and a sense
of socia[ responsibility to their work and for positively influencing Eastern
European legal systems).
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appears to have generated analogous- and perhaps stronger-
"prestige" effects in fields of economic law. The international
status that this prominence and dominance has given American
advice or models arguably has been a significant factor in pushing
the P.R.C. and former Soviet Bloc nations to look to some
aspects of U.S. securities, competition, and bankruptcy law
despite the presence of formidable economic incentives and
political pressures to emulate and to seek integration with
neighboring market economies that have legal systems which
differ from the U.S. model in significant and relevant ways.269 As
some prominent participants and commentators have seen it, the
relatively high degree of Chinese or post-Soviet interest in U.S.
economic law has reflected, in part, a variety of prestige effects.
These include a perception in some relevant circles in these
recipient countries that U.S. models constitute the original
source- and therefore, probably the superior version- of the
European or industrial East Asian systems of market-oriented
economic law that have been more close-at-hand and familiar for
Chinese and ex-Soviet Bloc law-reformers.?
The lesson about the significance of prestige also provides a
plausible, partial explanation for the apparent efficacy of some
less narrowly advice-mongering and other relatively informal
mechanisms for exporting U.S. legal ideas and ideals. A substan-
tial prestige effect seems evident in the numerous anecdotal re-
ports, especially from CEE lawyers and scholars, of how their in-
volvement in a variety of programs and exchanges- including
U.S. foundation-sponsored academic programs, U.S. government-
sponsored or foundation-arranged visits to U.S. judicial and legis-
lative institutions, and briefer exchanges with locally posted U.S.
aid officers or visiting U.S. experts- contributed to a favorable
transformation of their sense of professional role and prospects
for autonomy and influence. On these accounts, such experiences
made the participants feel "connected" or "a part of" a powerful
269 The most relevant neighboring systems are Japan and East Asia's newly
industrialized countries for China, and the European Union for the CEE
states.
o See Symposium, supra note 1, at 140 (suggesting that since Western
Europeans look to the United States in some instances, the CEE should receive
legal principles straight from U.S. lawyers). But see Ugo Mattei, Efficiency in
Legal Transplants: An Essay in Comparative Law and Economics, 14 INT'L REV.
L. & ECON. 3, 16 (1994) [hereinafter Mattei, Legal Transplants] (identifying pa-
rochialism and ignorance of the available alternatives as impediments to the
adoption of efficient foreign models).
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and appealing Western or international legal tradition in which
the U.S. model has represented an important paradigm?'
To the extent that U.S. lawyers with P.R.C. or CEE/NIS-
focused practices and U.S. law professors with P.R.C. or
CEE/NIS students have been effective avenues for transmitting
U.S. legal ideas and ideals to those countries, their ability to do so
seems likely to have been, in part, a matter of the perceived pres-
tige of U.S. models. That much, at least, is strongly suggested by
the apparently widespread tendency, particularly among reform-
oriented P.R.C. lawyers and officials with law-related portfolios,
to regard U.S. (and other Western) laws as providing ideal proto-
types that can be copied to achieve the desired results in the re-
cipient country. The presence of a pronounced prestige effect
seems to be confirmed by the persistence of this phenomenon de-
spite the sometimes considerable efforts by U.S. consultants and
professors to convince their recipient-country audiences that the
U.S. models they have presented do not constitute a "treasure
chest" or a "template" of ready-made solutions.2
A third lesson about the substance of U.S.-provided legal ad-
vice and U.S. legal models is that they appear to have more of an
impact when their prescriptions for legal change are not highly
"political"- in the sense of seeming either to advance a self-
interested U.S. agenda, or to displace a recipient country's sover-
eign discretion in making constitutional, legislative, or basic pol-
icy choices.
Much of the behavior that supported the "process" lesson
concerning the wisdom of avoiding a too-obvious "made in
America" label suggests that this "substantive" lesson is plausible
and fairly widely accepted among U.S. participants and programs.
That is, the importance of being, or appearing to be, "apolitical"
seems to be borne out in the alacrity and apparent success with
which U.S. providers of legal assistance and promoters of U.S.
models have carefully selected or cleverly packaged their law re-
form prescriptions or their presentations of legal options to em-
phasize generic, international or universal principles, and thereby
to minimize the risk that recipients will perceive the advice or ex-
. See Symposium, supra note 1, at 122-31, 140 (arguing that such effects are
important at a psychological level); CARoTHERS, ASSESSING DEMOCRACY
ASSISTANCE, supra note 15, at 89-97; Paula R. Newberg & Thomas Carothers,
Aiding- andD-efining- Democracy, WORLD POL'YJ., Spring 1996, at 97.
'2 See Seidman & Seidman, Drafting supra note 71.
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amples as politically offensive calls for replicating American
choices or following American dictates.
The lesson about the virtues of avoiding "political" advice or
models arguably also lies behind the tendency of USAID, the
NED or other U.S. government agencies (and major U.S. non-
profit organizations, such as the Ford Foundation or the Asia
Foundation, that foreign recipients of legal advice have sometimes
seen as closely associated with the U.S. government) to operate
through a variety of indirect means. Common examples of this
approach include making grants to private U.S. foundations, us-
ing private U.S. contractors or intermediary organizations, mak-
ing grants to recipient-country NGOs, educational institutions,
and other organizations, or crafting ad hoc arrangements for gov-
ernment-private collaboration. Among other advantages, such
methods of operation have promised to keep the role of the U.S.
government (or other controversial U.S. actors) in the back-
ground and thus to dampen recipient country suspicions that os-
tensibly benevolent assistance has been a vehicle for U.S. inter-
ests.
To the extent that informal channels for transmitting U.S. le-
gal ideas and ideals have been relatively effective, they may have
succeeded in part because they have appeared to be "apolitical."
U.S. lawyers who have assisted in dealings between U.S. or other
foreign parties and P.R.C. or ex-Soviet Bloc counterparts (and
sometimes have supplemented transactional work with mini-
tutorials in the law-related expectations of the Western party) of-
ten have not seemed to be promoting a "political" U.S. agenda,
even though they typically have been representing American cli-
ents. At least in the P.R.C. case, the status of some of the more
prominent U.S. lawyers as established scholars of Chinese law or
"friends of China" has reinforced this impression of, at worst, the
political neutrality of their motivation in offering access to U.S.
models or providing advice on legal reform. Among the some-
what self-selected group of CEE, NIS, and Chinese lawyers who
have come to U.S. law schools and who often seem to have ab-
sorbed a good deal of U.S. legal ideas and ideals, an apparently
widespread perception that their teachers have not been agents of
a quasi-official or orchestrated U.S. agenda very well may have
contributed substantially to the efficacy of U.S.-based and Ameri-
can-run educational programs as a medium for disseminating U.S.
legal models.
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The notion that apparently non-political prescriptions and ex-
emplars fare better also draws support from the relatively exten-
sive resources, and generally favorable reviews, accorded to U.S.
legal assistance programs that have offered advice on highly tech-
nical matters of economic regulation, or have provided training in
techniques of legislation, regulation or adjudication. Examples of
the former approach in programs targeting the CEE/NIS region
include the Commerce Department's CLDP seminars on project
finance and other aspects of foreign investment law, the Justice
Department Antitrust Division and FTC programs on competi-
tion law, and some of CEELI's background papers and draft legis-
lation reviews. Among programs focusing on China, examples of
this approach include SEC technical assistance efforts, PTO train-
ing programs, and private foundation-supported programs on a
variety of economic and regulatory topics. These and other
"technical" economic law programs generally have been regarded
by participants and observers as among the more successful of
U.S. advice efforts in both regions.
Examples of the latter, "technique-teaching" type of approach
include the many government and foundation-supported projects
(with participants ranging from USAID and USAID-contractors
to an American-led and American-staffed UNDP program to
CEELI to the Asia Foundation and the Ford Foundation to
smaller private-sector organizations to U.S. courts and Congress
to numerous federal regulatory agencies) that have sought to
strengthen and increase the competence of legislatures, legislative
staffs, and legislation-drafters, and to provide technical compe-
tence-centered formal training, visiting, and exchange programs
for judges, lawyers, and occasionally economic law-related regula-
tors and enforcement officers from across the former Soviet
world, China, and some of China's neighboring states. In recent
years, programs to increase the technical competence and capacity
of local government in China and the CEE region have been
added to the mix, with the Ford Foundation and a number of
smaller U.S. foundations taking the lead. Like "technical" eco-
nomic law advice projects, these programs too have received rela-
tively high marks from participants and commentators. Exam-
ples from the legislative sector suggest the broader pattern. The
UNDP program for China has been credited with breaking the
"legislative log-jam" that prevented the enactment of much cru-
cial economic legislation and with markedly improving the
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P.R.C.'s law-drafting processes. 3  The Ford Foundation-
supported Parliamentary Practices Project for the CEE region has
also garnered a favorable reputation for legislative-
strengthening. 4 CEELI's devotion of greater resources to proj-
ects targeting legislation-drafting and legislative processes suggests
that CEELI shares the view that such "technical" advice is espe-
cially effective.
It seems quite plausible that U.S. assistance programs or ex-
port efforts that have emphasized such "technical" or "tech-
nique" -focused advice have received warm welcomes (and thus en-
joyed better prospects for success) in part because they have
benefited significantly from the perception- accurate or not-
that technical matters of economic regulation are dictated by iron
economic laws or the impersonal forces of international markets,
and that techniques of effective law-making, regulation, adjudica-
tion, and lawyering are neutral tools or reflect generally applica-
ble lessons drawn from social-scientific insights. Anecdotal evi-
dence- including, first, the views embraced by some reformist
lawyers and U.S.-educated students from CEE/NIS and the
P.R.C. that U.S. and other Western laws reveal a straightfor-
wardly applicable formula for adequate and effective laws on any
number of topics, and second, the frustrations experienced by
U.S. advisors and educators who have sought to convince lawyers
and officials from post-communist or reforming socialist states of
the error of such views- suggests that this phenomenon has been
fairly widespread."
Where such perceptions hold sway, accepting U.S.-provided
or U.S.-supported advice or imitating U.S. models on technical
matters and matters of technique can be relatively unobjection-
able. Emulating U.S. examples or following U.S. prescriptions
can seem to involve either making no choice at all or making the
only instrumentally rational choice. The content of the advice
followed or the model imported does not appear, in any meaning-
ful sense, distinctively "American." The relatively narrow and
specialized questions addressed in "technical" assistance, and the
See Ann Seidman & Robert B. Seidman, Not a Treasure Chest, a Tool
Box. Lessons from a Chinese Legislative Drafting Project, in LEGISLATIVE
DRAFTING FOR MARKET REFORM 33 (Ann Seidman et al eds., 1997) [hereinaf-
ter Seidman & Seidman, Tool Box].
274 See QUIGLEY, supra note 31.
27 See Seidman & Seidman, Tool Box, supra note 273.
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apparently indirect and indeterminate impact on substantive legal
rules of law-making or law-interpreting "techniques," suggest that
importers of such types of U.S. legal models and recipients of
such types of U.S. legal assistance may be able to incorporate sug-
gested reforms without having to challenge or to question openly
many of the basic features or the broad characters of their existing
legal systems.
The lesson seems to have resonated with many U.S. advisors
and aspiring model-exporters, who seem to have taken it to heart.
Notably, the effort to "sell" CEE, NIS, and P.R.C. audiences on
U.S.-style competition law or U.S.-style constitutional provisions
has been cast in quasi-scientific or social-scientific terms. Fre-
quently the argument has been that the proposed reforms, which
happen to track U.S. models, should be accepted because they
will be best- or uniquely- able to achieve the goals of maintain-
ing competition in an emerging market economy or political ac-
countability and checks on tyranny in a democratizing or liberal-
izing polity.
The lesson about the advantages of "apolitical" advice and
models draws additional force from the relatively great difficulties
and resistance encountered by U.S. legal examples and U.S. legal
assistance efforts that have been nearer the other end of the spec-
trum of perceived politicization. A significant problem for U.S.-
provided or U.S.-derived prescriptions even in such "scientific"
fields as economic regulation or techniques of law-making has
been that they sometimes have been so highly detailed and obvi-
ously American that they have sacrificed the aura of neutrality
and necessity and have appeared to demand that recipient states
make a particular- and political- choice among a number of po-
tentially feasible options.
Many examples could illustrate this phenomenon, but the ef-
fort to export U.S-style antitrust law may provide the most dra-
matic instance. The zeal with which some U.S. officials and their
supporters pushed for wholesale emulation of the Sherman Act
and rejection of alternative, European style approaches very well
many have accounted for some of the difficulties that their rec-
ommendations ultimately encountered, particularly in the CEE
and NIS region. Where pretensions to technocratic truth are thus
undermined, the choice to follow U.S. advice or an American ex-
ample can easily appear to be a broadly "political" one which is
properly the province of the recipient nation's political processes,
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and which, if ceded to U.S. providers or models, risks being de-
cided in a way that serves U.S. government or U.S. private sector
interests rather than recipient country needs. Tellingly, this
problem seems to have been more serious when Western Euro-
pean or East Asian sources have presented target countries in the
CEE/NIS or P.R.C. regions with alternative models or advice, as
arguably has occurred in such fields as trade and investment regu-
lation, securities regulation, intellectual property law, intra-
parliamentary structures, and formal processes, and perhaps most
clearly, competition law (where some U.S. advice-providers, in
battling the "export zealots," have joined a chorus of European
colleagues in urging CEE states to harmonize their regimes with
EU standards).
Moreover, one of the most intractable obstacles facing distinc-
tively American models or U.S. programs of advice on specific
constitutional principles, laws governing citizens' rights and the
like seems to have been a perception in recipient countries that
such models and programs have threatened to usurp or distort
core exercises of the recipient government's discretion or the na-
tion's sovereign or popular will. Here too the availability of al-
ternative models of effective constitutionalism in nearby nations
may have reinforced such views. Sometimes the concern appears
to have contributed to moments of serious tension and confronta-
tion. One notable example has been official P.R.C. sources' de-
nunciation of various U.S. calls for human rights-protecting
changes in Chinese laws as impermissible attempts to interfere in
China's exercise of its domestic sovereignty. Another specific in-
cident has been the reaction in Romania to a NED-sponsored
program that purported to offer general parliament-strengthening
and pro-democracy assistance, but that was seen as taking sides
with an opposition party and against the ruling party. 6 A more
widespread and diffuse, but broadly similar, phenomenon has
been the emergence in many parts of the former Soviet Bloc and
East Asia of "cultural relativist" arguments (whether Slavophile
or Sinical) against the relevance of U.S. and other Western-style
notions of constitutions, rights, and the rule of law.
Understood in such terms, the relatively unhappy fate of the
most "political" of U.S. legal models and advice to the Chinese
and former Soviet worlds replays a venerable thesis of compari-
276 See CAROTHERS, ASSESSING DEMOCRACY ASSISTANCE, supra note 15.
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son that parallels the third substantive lesson of the recent experi-
ence of U.S. legal assistance efforts and the export of U.S. legal
ideals: compared to "private" or "economic" law, constitutions
and "public" or "political" laws are more frequently home-grown
and less readily transplanted or borrowed across legal systems.'
Finally, there is the seemingly banal, but important, lesson of
"parallelism": U.S. legal models are more likely to be emulated
and U.S. providers' legal advice is more likely to be followed
when the substance of the U.S. prescriptions or American tem-
plates is relatively compatible with the recipient nation's preexist-
ing system or its agenda for legal reform.
One simple idea behind this lesson is that legal borrowing or
following foreign instructions can be efficient because it saves the
recipient system the cost of having to design a set of legal rules or
a legal regime. The costs of independent invention (including the
"trial and error" of pursuing blind alleys already explored by oth-
ers or the expenses of devising genuinely new laws and institu-
tions) can easily outweigh the expected marginal gains to be
reaped from a fully indigenously crafted arrangement that might
better suit local needs and circumstances. Borrowing tends to be-
come inefficient or impossible, however, when the salient differ-
ences between donor and recipient system are so great that trans-
planting a particular legal rule or institution would require radical
changes in the recipient legal system. In such contexts, the proj-
ect often can become unbearably disruptive and/or predictably
not worth the costY
277 Watson generally endorses this view, quoting with approval the princi-
ple that societies invent their own constitutions and political systems but that
their private law is "nearly always" taken from others. See WATSON, LEGAL
TRANSPLANTS, supra note 266, at 8 (quoting S.F.C. MILSOM, HISTORiCAL
FOUNDATIONS OF THE COMMON LAW, at ix (1969)). See also Otto Kahn-
Freund, On Uses and Misuses of Comparative Law, 37 Mod. L. Rev. 1 (1974)
(expressing skepticism about the possibility of "borrowing" public/political
law compared to the relative ease of borrowing/harmonizing economic law).
In the same general vein, Watson argues that borrowing in the legal history of
the West has been greatest in the private law realm and less in the public law
realm, in part because governments thought the field sufficiently politically un-
imorant to leave the former realm to evelopment by suborinate or unoffi-
cial lawmakers who were more open to, or more inclined toward, borrowing.
See WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS, supra note 266.
278 See WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS, supra note 266; Mattei, Legal
Transplants, supra note 270, at 16.
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When powerfui or persuasive groups in the recipient country
seek extensive or fundamental legal change, the calculus is some-
what different: if a legal rule, concept, or structure that might be
borrowed fits well with the goals reformers seek to achieve, even
transplants that would require radical change can be feasible and
worthwhile. Radical reformers are, of course, already willing to
accept the costs associated with wrenching systemic change, but
they still could or (rationally) should welcome the modest savings
that can flow from adopting and adapting solutions pioneered or
proposed by outsiders, rather than "starting from scratch" or "re-
inventing the wheel."
Several aspects of the recent career of exporting U.S. legal
models or extending U.S. legal assistance to the P.R.C. and the
CEE/NIS region seem to teach or to confirm the lesson of the
advantages of congruity between U.S. models or U.S. advice, on
one side, and the traditions or aims of recipients and potential
importers, on the other. At the level of constitutional reform and
other types of basic legal-institutional change, "parallelism" pro-
vides a plausible and fairly commonplace explanation of why such
relatively distinctive American features as a tripartite separation
of powers, federalism, extensive reliance on courts and lawyers,
common law adjudication, and notions of transcendent individual
rights have not been much imitated in the P.R.C., the former So-
viet Union and neighboring states: compared to American ap-
proaches, the French and Westminster models of a strong central
government, primarily parliamentary checks on the government,
protection of rights principally or solely through positive law and
legislation, and a more modest political and social role for lawyers
have been more in step with the prior constitutional histories, as
well as the post-socialist or reform-era aspirations, of those coun-
tries."9
Tellingly, when U.S. advisors have argued, often ineffectively,
that CEE/NIS and other constitutional reformers should adopt
U.S-style provisions, they have cast their arguments partly in
terms of parallelism. Examples include the assertion that an
279 Cf Thomas M. Franck, The New Development: Can American Law and
Legal Instruction Help Developing Countries?, in LAW & DEV. 3, 18-24 (An-
thony Carty, ed. 1992); Ludvwikowski, supra note 138, at 155; Jon Elster, Con-
stitutionalism in Eastern Europe, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 447, 465-70 (1991); Rudi G.
Teitel, Transitional Jurisprudence: The Role of Law in Political Transformation,
106 Yale L.J. 2009, 2067-70 (1997).
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American-style presidential system would serve post-socialist or
reforming socialist recipient countries' goal of avoiding the pa-
ralysis of a fragmented parliament in a fractious multi-party sys-
tem, and the rather different claim that a constitutional order
with a strong U.S. Congress-style legislature would serve such
countries' goals of preventing a relapse into tyranny at the hands
of an overweening executive. '0
"Parallelism" finds additional support in the appeal and effect
of constitutional or sub-constitutional U.S. examples and U.S.
advice concerning the rule of law generally, limits to government
powers, an independent judiciary, and an independent legislature
with power-enhancing internal organizational structures, such as
a strong committee system or a large professional staff."' As
much of the evidence for the "process" lesson concerning the vir-
tues of eschewing parochially U.S. style advice suggests, these less
distinctively American elements in U.S. models and U.S. legal ad-
vice on constitutional and basic institutional matters may have
appealed, in part, because they have seemed less alien to
CEE/NIS and even P.R.C. traditions.
Similar aspects of U.S. models and advice also appear to have
resonated strongly with the goals of many of these countries' re-
formers. Numerous anecdotal examples suggest the pattern: one
reformer-lawyer from Central Europe stressed the invigorating
and transforming effect on lawyers from her region of brief visits
to the United States which provided exposure to a legal culture of
lawyers as independent professionals and agents of social
change.2"2 Eastern European participants in COLPI programs for
legal academics from across the region have offered similar praise
for the access the program provided to a variety of rule of law
ideas and like-minded colleagues." 3 Visits to the United States by
delegations of CEE/NIS judges and legal educators have
prompted similar assessments. In general, the numerous pro-
280 See Ludwikowski, supra note 138, at 170, 181-182, 251-255 (describing
the appeal of U.S.-style presidential systems in CEE/NIS); Stein, supra note
140, at 438452 (same).
2" SeeJudicial Reform, supra note 149 (focusin on aspects of judicial inde-
pendence with respect to which the common law civil law divide is minimal);
Parliamentary Assistance in Nepal, supra note 17; Legislative Strengthening in Po-
land, sup-a note 17. For accounts suggesting the U.S. impact on CEE/NIS
constitutions in these areas, see HOWARD, supra note 3.
282 See Symposium, supra note 1, at 122-27.
283 See id.; COLPI Website, supra note 30 (concerning "Legal Education").
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grams to strengthen the bench and bar seem to have won favor-
able receptions, or at least to have avoided the resistance that has
greeted some U.S. efforts to encourage changes in substantive law.
At least from the parochial and perhaps self-interested perspective
of these potentially key legal reform elites, the U.S. advice being
offered and the models being displayed in these programs and
projects appear to have resonated strongly with the recipients' as-
pirations for legal change in their home system- a factor which
doubtless has contributed to the U.S. advice and models' positive
image and apparent efficacy.
Widely praised and highly-rated projects (operated by official,
unofficial, and multilateral organization-based U.S. providers)
that have sought to improve the quality of legislation and legisla-
tive processes in several GEE states, China, and some of China's
neighbors point to the same basic lesson. Such programs- rang-
ing from the UNDP project in China to USAID-sponsored work
in Poland and Nepal, to the Frost Committee, Ford Foundation,
and CEELI projects in the CEE/NIS region- appear to owe
some of their favorable reception and their apparent success to
the high degree of "fit" that recipient-country participants have
perceived between their goals of strengthening their own law-
making institutions and reforming their legal systems, and the
skills taught or the values transmitted through the programs'
training sessions, visits to the United States, and intra-regional
tours and exchanges.284 Here, too, as with efforts addressing issues
of lawyers and the judiciary, the favorable reaction and seeming
success doubtless stems in part from the sense of parallelism be-
tween the advice and models offered and the self-interest (enhanc-
ing one's own roles and powers) and parochial perspective (think-
ing that maximizing one's own roles or power would be a good
thing) of the key segment of recipient country elites parliamen-
tarians and their staff) that has participated most directly in the
programs.
In some cases, both the "forward-looking" and "backward-
looking" (as well as the parochial) aspects of the power of parallel-
28 See Seidman & Seidman, Drafting, supra note 71; Legislative Strengthen-
ing in Poland, supra note 17; Parliamentary Assistance in Nepal, supra note 17;
Programs in Asia: China, supra note 100; Programs in Asia: Vietnam, supra note
102; see also CAROTHERS, ASSESSING DEMOCRACY ASSISTANCE, supra note 15
(regarding Frost); QUIGLEY, supra note 31 (regarding Ford's Parliamentary
Pracice Project).
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ism appear to have been at work, with U.S. advice or U.S. models
dovetailing with the aims of recipient-country reformers who
have cast their agendas of sweeping legal and institutional change
as, in part, restorations of a legal profession or democratic institu-
tions or a constitutional tradition that had been tarnished or
trampled under socialist rule. The phenomenon is most pro-
nounced in Hungary and other nations on the western fringes of
the former Soviet world, where post-Soviet era leaders' claim to
be recovering prior ways seems most plausible. More modest ver-
sions have sprung up elsewhere, however, even in China where
the argument has been cast more in terms of what might have
grown from the seeds that had begun to sprout during an earlier
phase of openness to U.S. and other Western legal ideas and ideals
at the turn of the last century.
The apparent success of "technique"-focused efforts to pro-
vide legal advice also arguably teach and confirm the parallelism
lesson. U.S.-provided and U.S.-supported programs that have fo-
cused on transmitting and fostering seemingly neutral and adapt-
able professional skills to lawmakers, law-drafters, judges, law-
yers, regulators, enforcement officials, and local government
functionaries have addressed directly the needs and interests of
key legal elites in recipient countries. These programs also have
raised relatively few concerns about poor "fit" with the more ob-
viously and immediately substantive elements of existing legal
systems or with the basic laws and constitutional or quasi-
constitutional institutions that reformers have sought to establish,
modify, or preserve.
More broadly, the "social scientific" or "policy-instrumental"
understanding of law that looms large in contemporary U.S. legal
thinking may have made U.S. models relatively appealing to Cen-
tral and Eastern Europeans, former Soviets, Chinese, and other
East Asians who have sought to craft legal arrangements compati-
ble with economic and political reform. To a significant degree,
leaders and lawyers in those countries often share this understand-
ing of the nature of law, occasionally to the consternation of
those U.S. advisors and aspiring exporters of U.S. models who
have argued either for a more autonomous or more variegated no-
tion of law. Whether or not relevant recipient country elites sub-
scribe to such a "theory of law," that conception's prominence in
American legal analysis probably has increased the likelihood that
U.S. legal ideas and U.S. legal advice have seemed relatively palat-
1999]
U. Pa. J Int'l Econ. L.
able. This palatability stems from the fact that they have not ex-
plicitly or obviously demanded a rethinking of the substantive
ideas and ideals that animate the recipient country's existing legal
system or its reform agenda."'
Interregional contrasts in the aims and impacts of U.S. legal
assistance programs and legal models on constitutional design,
law-making and law-interpreting institutions and other core rule
of law concerns also suggest the virtues of a relatively high degree
of fit with recipients' or importers' traditions or aspirations. Ef-
forts to export elements of the American constitutional model
have been conducted on a larger scale and have enjoyed greater
success in the CEE/NIS region than in China and its region. This
distribution of effort and apparent success may well reflect the ex-
istence, or the perception among U.S. advisors and potential ex-
porters, of significant cross-national differences in the extent of
parallelism. Compared to much of the former Soviet Bloc, China
and many other East Asian nations have seemed farther removed
from Western (and especially U.S.-style) constitutionalism and le-
gal-institutional traditions. The level of interest in fundamental
(and especially Western or U.S.-style) constitutional and "rule of
law"-supporting reform has seemed higher among powerful po-
litical leaders or relevant social groups in many parts of the for-
mer Soviet world than in the P.R.C. or some of its neighbors
(where the formal rejection of communist rule has not occurred).
'Whether a product of good history or of shrewd politics, the par-
allelist claim that the project of legal-institutional, public law or
constitutional reform involves reconnecting with an interrupted
tradition of Western (and therefore broadly U.S.-style) legality
seems to have been held more widely and asserted more forcefully
in the western reaches of the former Soviet Bloc than in much of
Central Asia, China, or East and Southeast Asia, where ideas and
ideals consistent with American models and U.S. advice on mat-
ters of constitutional democracy, citizens' rights, and legal and ju-
dicial professionalism appear to have had less of an impact.
Moreover, in CEE countries, more than in much of the NIS,
the P.R.C. or other Asian states, U.S.-based emigres and others
with ethnic ties to the recipient states have played a role in ex-
285 Cf Aspects of Reception of Law, supra note 266 (regarding instrumental-
ism of borrowing); Mattei, Intellectual Ledership, supra note 268 (discussing the
U.S.'s assumption of intellectual leadership in law as rooted in U.S. preemi-
nence in thinking about law as a method of social organization).
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tending constitutional advice. To the extent that these individuals
have been relatively effective transmitters, their influence also
may reflect the importance of a type of parallelism, for they
likely have appeared to be (and very well may have been) rela-
tively "in touch" with the aims of reformers and the traditions of
the countries to which they have offered counsel.
Developments in the highly active field of U.S. efforts to en-
courage economic law reform also point to the importance of
parallelism. The relatively limited influence of U.S. models and
the modest success of programs offering distinctly U.S.-style
models in Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Un-
ion arguably have reflected recipient countries' inheritances of
French and German style code-based civil law systems, their tra-
ditional and renewed political preferences for social democracy,
and their new goal of joining Europe. These differences may have
helped to make U.S.-style laws- and much U.S. legal advice- in
such fields as the law of corporations, antitrust, and other eco-
nomic fields seem too tightly bound up with an elaborate struc-
ture of common law doctrine and interpretation, too focused on
free-market solutions, or simply too different from EU standards
(whatever the relative merits of American and Western European
approaches might have been in the abstract).286
A similar story can be told about problems of poor parallel-
ism with respect to China. The P.R.C. has a broadly civil law-
26 See Brietzke, supra note 254; Richard M. Buxbaum, New Owners and
Old Managers: Lessons from the Socialist Camp, 18 DEL. J. CORP. L. 867, 871-72
(1993) (arguing that Rhenish capitalism stressing relationships between finan-
cial and corporate sectors is a better fit for post-socialist states with their weak
economies than is the "casino capitalism" of the U.S. with its emphasis on the
brutal force of markets); Ronald Daniels & Robert Howse,Reforming the Re-
form Process: A Critique of Proposals for Privatization in Central and Eastern
Europe, 25 N.Y.U. J. INT'LL. & POL. 27 (1992); Fox, Toward World Antitrust,
supra note 86, at 10-12 (describing U.S. antitrust law as an outlier); Mitsuo Mat-
sushita, A Japanese View of United States Trade Laws, 8 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus.
29, 56-57 (1987) (noting that the United States has trade laws that are out of
line with other nations' in their legislative detail, their emphasis on legal proc-
ess, and their reliance on judicial enforcement); Waller, Comparative Competi-
tion Law, supra note 184 (addressing whether U.S. antitrust law is an outlier
due to its narrow focus on microeconomic theory application over broad goals
of economic regulation and policy). For a discussion of the dominance of EU
standards in CEE competition law, see Fox, Toward World Antitrust, supra
note 86; Mastalir, supra note 163, McDermott, Competition Counseling to East-
ern Europe, supra note 42, Danny E. Reed, Creating Competitive Markets in Po-
land & Hungary, 48 ADMiN. L. REV. 515, 523-24 (1996), and Rodriquez &
Coate, supra note 163.
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style system, rooted in the Franco-German tradition received via
Japan and the Soviet Union. Arguably much more than many of
their post-Soviet counterparts, and despite the P.R.C.'s recent
moves toward more radical economic reform, the Chinese leader-
ship has remained committed to a competition policy that in-
cludes a series of market-limiting, state-role-protecting and, in
some respects, social-welfarist economic policies, and has sought
to protect weak state enterprises or to pursue mergers of troubled
state enterprises into larger, competition-threatening conglomer-
ates.287 To the extent that harmonization with foreign systems
has mattered in China (where it has mattered a good deal less than
in the Western reaches of the former Soviet Bloc), East Asian civil
law systems have been at least as relevant as Anglo-American
common law systems (with the notable exception of Hong
Kong). 288
To the considerable extent that reformers in China and the
former Soviet world have sought to create antimonopoly laws
that pursue broadly U.S.-style antitrust goals of protecting com-
petition, differences in U.S. and CEE/NIS or P.R.C. contexts
have been significant issues and again suggest the adverse effect of
poor parallelism on the apparent relevance and influence of U.S.
models and advice. Specifically, it has been suggested that the re-
form-era P.R.C.'s quest to create elements of a competitive market
is so fundamentally different from the market-preserving concerns
of U.S. antitrust law that the gap may explain why U.S. models
and U.S. advice could not have been expected to have much im-
pact in contemporary China.29  The point applies with equal
force to some CEE and NIS countries.
Problems of parallelism also may explain the frustrations en-
countered by proponents of U.S.-style trade and investment law
despite the apparent opportunities for influence inherent in their
evident power to help compliant states gain access to
American and other Western capital and markets. The widely
287 See Fang Liufang, China's Corporatization Experiment, 5 DUKE J. COMP.
& INT'L L. 149 (1995); Bing Song, Competition Policy in a Transitional Econ-
omy: The Case of China, 31 STAN. J. INT'L L. 387 (1995); Henry Zheng, Business
Organizations and Securities Laws of the People's Republic of China, 43 BUS.
LAW. 549 (1988).
288 See Jacques deLisle, Political Alchemy, The Long Transition, and Law's
Promised Empzre: How July 1, 1997 Matters - and Doesn't Matter - in Hong
Kong's Return to China, 18 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 69 (1997).
289 See Bing Song, supra note 287, at 395-96.
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perceived divergences of aims and interests between the designers
of foreign investment laws in China and some post-Soviet states,
on one side, and U.S. and other foreign investors, on the other,
seems necessarily to have cast a cloud of recipient-country suspi-
cion over advice offered by legal assistance programs that have
shared the views of U.S. investors. Where designers of some
CEE, NIS, and P.R.C. laws have sought to promote capital in-
flows, foreign exchange earnings, transfers of technology and
knowledge, and "laboratories" in which to test ideas for domestic
economic reform, many U.S. advisors and exporters of U.S. legal
models have been more concerned with encouraging legal regimes
in "recipient" or "borrowing" countries that promote the full re-
alization of comparative advantage (which in practice has meant
capitalizing on low production costs in many post-Soviet or re-
forming socialist states), gains from trade (which in practice has
meant access to CEE/NIS or P.R.C. domestic markets), protec-
tion of intellectual property, and a stable political and legal envi-
ronment.
On the other hand, U.S. models and advice appear to have at-
tracted greater support and to have had more of an effect in some
aspects of economic law where the problem of poor congruence
with recipient countries' aims has been less serious (sometimes
because of the impact of U.S. power in shaping the legal options
facing post-communist and reforming socialist states). Although
there clearly have been limits to influence that may have stemmed
from problems of poor parallelism, foreign investment law has
been an area of relatively great success for U.S. models and U.S.
advice programs. It seems plausible to attribute such success, in
part, to the relatively high degree of fit between CEE/NIS and
P.R.C. reformers' goals of gaining access to U.S. and other West-
ern investors, and the U.S. legal models and legal advice that U.S.
providers have presented, credibly, as describing a legal regime
that would be appealing to those investors. The lack of profound
differences between U.S. and international/European regulatory
regimes may have helped as well, avoiding one common impedi-
ment to perceived or actual parallels between recipient-country
aims and U.S. prescriptions.
Similarly, parallelism may explain what some commentators
have seen as possible U.S. influence on aspects of China's com-
pany law, Chinese contract law, post-Soviet competition law,
P.R.C. and CEE bankruptcy law, and CEE/NIS securities and
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exchange laws.2' Basic features of U.S. legal models- and U.S.
legal advice urging their adoption- fit well with the general goals
of promoting markets and openness to foreign investment that
CEE/NIS and P.R.C. law reformers have embraced. On many of
these issues, U.S. law and U.S. advisors' recommendations have
paralleled European or international standards (so much so that it
sometimes has been difficult to attribute the influence to U.S. as
opposed to other foreign, sources). This feature could be ex-
pected to reinforce recipients' sense of parallelism and means-end
fit by suggesting to recipient-country law-designers that they have
had few alternative legal means to those presented in U.S. models
and advice.
The lesson of the advantages of parallelism also seems to have
been appreciated by some U.S. economic law advisors and pro-
ponents of the export of U.S. economic law models. When urg-
ing the adoption of distinctly U.S.-style laws, they often have as-
serted a special fit between the proposed means and the potential
importer's goals. One example of this may be the claim by U.S.
proponents of Sherman Act-like antitrust law that imitation of
the European model would lead to inadequate protection of com-
petition, excessive protection of weak competitors, and thus seri-
ous compromises in CEE reformers' pursuit of their proclaimed
goal of achieving efficient markets. Another example is suggested
by the argument that U.S. bankruptcy law has been widely imi-
tated in post-socialist and reforming socialist countries because its
approach to reorganization (and its emphasis on reorganization
over liquidation) has offered a superior method for addressing the
290 Possibly U.S.-influenced elements of Chinese company law includes the
principles of limited liability, shareholders' rights, and duties of directors.
Elements of Chinese contract law paralleling U.S. norms include a contract's
essential elements, damages, and dispute resolutions. In post-Soviet competi-
tion law, most accounts lind only a partial emulation, but a few less plausible
accounts find extensive emulation, including adoption of economic efficiency
as the standard for anti-competitive behavior. Accounts of post-communist
bankruptcy and securities and exchange law point to some basic provisions
that parallel U.S. models. See generally Robert C. Art & Minkang Gu, China
Incorporated The First Corporation Law of the P.R. C., 20 YALE J. INT'L L. 273
(1995); Bufford, supra note 53 (regarding bankruptcy); Burke, supra note 177
(regarding the Reformation of NIS Legal Systems; Chang, supra note 118 (re-
garding Chinese bankruptcy); Celia R. Taylor, Capital Market Development in
ihe Emerging Markets: Time to Teach an Old Dog some New Tricks, 45 AM. J.
COWP. L. 71 (1997) (regarding CEE/NIS securities).
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problems of privatization or restructuring of debt-ridden state en-
terprises that reformist leaders have sought to tackle.291
The relatively high level of recipient-country interest and ac-
ceptance apparently enjoyed by U.S. assistance programs and U.S.
models that have addressed narrowly technical issues of economic
regulation also seem to indicate the advantages of small gaps or
minimal obvious conflicts between U.S. advice and examples, on
one side, and the inherited legal principles and practices or the le-
gal reform agendas of recipients and potential borrowers, on the
other. Parallelism, of a sort, seems to capture some important
reasons for the apparent success of technical assistance projects
ranging from the CLDP's project finance workshops, to the U.S.
PTO advice to Chinese authorities on how to improve intellec-
tual property protection, to U.S. counsel to the Ukrainian anti-
monopoly agency concerning methods of competition regulation
and the advantages of conjoining prosecutorial, adjudication, and
rule-making authority in a single organ. Precisely because such
advice often seems to have had an especially strong aura of scien-
tific or social-scientific truth, there has been less occasion to ques-
tion the advice's compatibility with the existing system or its
suitability as a legal means to already-accepted reformist policy
ends.
Moreover, such "technical" legal assistance often has been
provided through direct contacts between specialist lawyers on
both sides. Their shared specialist legal cultures- of foreign trade
and investment law, insolvency law, competition law, patent law,
securities law, and the like- very well may have rendered man-
ageable gaps between U.S. and recipient-country legal cultures
and legal systems that would have proved unbridgeable in the
context of legal advice or models addressing more general matters.
In less formal contexts, a variation of the same phenomenon
likely has emerged in many interactions among U.S. and
CEE/NIS or P.R.C. and other Asian business lawyers when they
have worked to structure and negotiate trade and investment
agreements and to develop legal forms that are acceptable to cli-
ents from different systems. In addition to the common ground
provided by their engagement in the same substantive legal spe-
cialties, the joint purposes of getting the present deal done and of
291 See Bufford, supra note 53 (regarding bankruptcy law); Lagenfeld &
Blitzer, supra note 165 (regarding competition law); Willer, Comparative Com-
petition Law, supra note 184.
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increasing the prospects for additional deals may have contributed
to a very concrete (if highly discrete and, arguably, narrowly pa-
rochial) sense of parallel purposes that has enhanced the opportu-
nities for transmitting U.S. legal ideas and models.
Cross-regional differences in the impact of U.S. advice and
models in fields of economic law also seem to bear out the advan-
tages of "parallelism." In China, as in some of the less Western-
ized parts of the former Soviet world, specific and especially seri-
ous problems of ill-fit between local legal traditions and goals and
U.S. models and advice may have exacerbated the commonplace
problems of poor parallelism that have stemmed from civil law
traditions and a desire for compatibility with nearer neighbors'
regimes of economic law. The comparatively unimpressive rec-
ord of U.S. economic law advice and models in such countries
may reflect these legal systems' lingering legacy of socialist and
authoritarian law which, with respect to such basic economic is-
sues as property, freedom of contract, and agency, has been much
more remote from- and hostile toward- U.S.-style common law
models than the civilian tradition generally has been.
Specific questions of economic law and regulation in the
P.R.C. and CEE/NIS region provide some suggestive, concrete
illustrations. For example, the nations in the former Soviet Bloc
which have gone especially far down the path of successful priva-
tization and the creation of functioning markets also have been
among the most likely to adopt U.S.-style economic efficiency
principles and U.S.-style enforcement mechanisms in their com-
petition law. 2 In such cases, parallelism between what host-
country conditions and reformers' immediate aims seem to de-
mand, and what U.S.-style solutions purport to supply, has been
relatively high. In contrast, some of the purposes that (at least
prior to recent changes) have been attributed to China's company
law and securities regulations (such as imposing a modicum of
market discipline while retaining majority state ownership and
control of major companies, or keeping state enterprises afloat by
bringing vast private savings into the state-controlled sector) sug-
gest a lack of congruence with the concerns of U.S. corporate and
292 See Kovacic, Competition Policy Entrepreneur, supra note 2; Mastalir, su-
pra note 163; Reed, supra note 286; Rodriguez & Coate, supra note 163.
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capital markets law. 93 The existence of such serious gaps would
suggest that U.S. models and advice would fit especially badly
with official Chinese aims, and that could explain (on parallelism
grounds) the relatively limited influence of U.S. ideas and ideals in
these areas. In some parts of the NIS, a similar story is quite plau-
sible. But in some of those states, including Russia, a different
sort of a lack of parallelism also may account for the meager im-
pact of U.S. models and advice in such fields as securities law,
competition law, and company law. Chaotic economic and insti-
tutional environments and deep popular resentment against ap-
parently corrupt and unfair modes of privatization likely have
made U.S. prescriptions seem relatively irrelevant in theory, as
well as unimplementable in practice.
294
In these varied ways, the idea of parallelism- like the notions
of power, prestige, and politicization- captures some of the re-
curring patterns in what substantive legal advice has fared well
and fared badly, and in what models of substantive U.S. law have
proved attractive and off-putting in the recent experience of the
American legal encounter with the former USSR, the P.R.C., and
neighboring regions. Like the four "process" lessons, these four
"substantive" lessons cannot be simply strung together to provide
an answer to what has worked best, or might work well, in U.S.
efforts to promote economic markets, democracy, and the rule of
law through fostering legal reforms in the CEE/NIS region,
China, and other nations in transition.
3.3. The Limits ofLessons and the Lesson that Laws are Not
Enough
The relationships among the foregoing lessons about "proc-
ess" and "substance" in U.S. legal export and assistance efforts are
complex. In some respects, most of the lessons seem fairly com-
plementary, even overlapping. Long-term, responsive, and col-
laborative programs seem likely to require, or over time to gener-
ate, local knowledge and a tendency to avoid parochially
American prescriptions. Legal assistance or export efforts that fo-
cus on substantive fields in which U.S. models enjoy high pres-
293 See Matthew D. Bersani, Privatization and the Creation of Stock Compa-
nies in China, 1993 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 301, 309 (1993) (discussing the"soak
up capital" argument).
294 See Stephen Holmes, What Russia Teaches Us Now, 33 THE AMERIcAN
PROSPECT July-Aug. 1997, 30-39.
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tige, or that provide seemingly "apolitical" prescriptions seem,
other things being equal, unlikely to face problems of poor paral-
lelism with recipient states' legal traditions and institutions, or lo-
cal law reformers' aims. Where U.S. examples or U.S. advisors'
prescriptions do not depart radically from the key features of the
host country's extant legal system or from the contours of an in-
digenous consensus for legal change, the advice or models are un-
likely to appear political. To the extent that prestige rests in part
on perceptions of efficacy or global importance, those aspects of
U.S. legal advice or U.S. legal models that are strongly backed by
U.S. power (especially of the passive or structural rather than po-
litically wielded and discretionary type) are likely to score rela-
tively high on "prestige."
Where the substantive content of U.S. advice or U.S. models
has the advantages of power, prestige, non-politicization, and
parallelism, such prescriptions seem more likely to be followed
and such models emulated when the project of transmitting ad-
vice or models is in the hands of well-established and well-
supported programs that enjoy extensive and developed channels
of communication and cooperation with recipient country insti-
tutions and individuals, that have staff who are skilled in local
languages and knowledgeable about local law, politics, and cul-
ture, and that are adept at packaging U.S. advice and models in
neutral or general terms. U.S. legal assistance programs and
channels for transmitting U.S. legal models that have these "proc-
ess" strengths seem likely to be most effective where the sub-
stance of what they convey enjoys the advantages of support from
U.S. "power," prestige in the eyes of relevant actors in the recipi-
ent country, insulation from political suspicion and backlash, and
a high degree of fit with practices and preferences in the recipient
country.
In other respects, however, the lessons seem to define alterna-
tive paths to "success." Some lessons suggest substitute "virtues"
that can be relied upon where the requisites of another lesson
cannot be satisfied. In some cases and contexts, the dictates or
predictions of one lesson can seem incompatible with those of
another. Bringing in advisors and assistance-providers with local
knowledge may be a substitute for a program's long-term cultiva-
tion of relationships with local lawyers or leaders. Stressing gen-
eral or universal principles may be an alternative to crafting ad-
vice uniquely suited to a recipient country's circumstances
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(whether through providers' careful development and use of ex-
pertise about local conditions and traditions, or through pro-
grams' collaboration with indigenous groups and responsiveness
to their requests and suggestions). The presence of parallelism or
prestige effects may make otherwise overly political prescriptions
into something palatable and feasible, even in the absence of effec-
tive U.S. power. Sometimes power alone may be enough, and
thus may stand as an alternative to prestige, parallelism, or a
seemingly apolitical agenda. Indeed, the very resort to "power"
may make the prescriptions seem more "political." The "pres-
tige" of some U.S. models seems to be in part a matter of their
perceived uniqueness. And that quality frequently will be at odds
with the notion, central to one important aspect of the "parallel-
ism" lesson, that U.S. advice fares better when it focuses on areas
characterized by minimal (or at least bridgeable) gaps between
U.S. prescriptions and existing legal systems.
The presence of U.S. power to push for the acceptance of U.S.
prescriptions or the imitation of U.S. exemplars, the prestige of
U.S. models, the seemingly apolitical content of U.S. examples or
advice, or the fit between those examples or advice and recipients'
existing legal systems or reformist goals seem to offer "substan-
tive" means to make up for a lack of ability or willingness to ad-
here to "process" lessons. Conversely, strong institutional and
personal ties, deep understanding of recipient country needs, hab-
its and attitudes, and great skill in casting advice or prescriptions
in appealingly general, universal, or seemingly appropriate terms
are "procedural" assets that might make it possible to market sub-
stantive prescriptions or models that initially seem politically
charged or ill-fitting, that enjoy little prestige among relevant
groups in recipient countries, or that draw only modest force
from the backing of the U.S. government or internationally en-
gaged U.S. business interests or from more subtle pressure to con-
form to U.S. standards as a condition of access to the U.S. econ-
omy or to U.S. government-controlled benefits.
Indeed, some of the most "prestigious" U.S. ideals, such as the
independent role of lawyers, the state-constraining powers of
courts, and the centrality of rights, and some of the prescriptions
most strongly backed by U.S. power, such as those concerning
trade and investment relations with the U.S., seem to have been
transmitted effectively through processes that have paid little heed
to preexisting systems and values, that have done little to make
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the advice or models seem "apolitical" or not distinctly "Ameri-
can," that have removed participants from their home environ-
ments (thereby leaving little scope for sustained collaboration
with local organizations and groups) and that have been of strik-
ingly short duration. On the other hand, relatively successful col-
laborative, local knowledge-informed programs have tended to-
ward advice that has appeared apolitical and that has paralleled
recipient country traditions and moderately reformist aspirations.
That approach, which has been pursed with reported success by
Ford Foundation and Soros-supported programs, among others,
seems to have entailed foregoing or disdaining reliance on the
power and prestige of some distinctly American models, eschew-
ing advice cast in the form of some arguably "general" or univer-
sal principles, and missing some promising, if potentially contro-
versial, opportunities to support bold prescriptions that might
have resonated with the goals of radical law reformers in some re-
cipient countries.
In light of these complicated relationships among the "les-
sons" taught by the recent experience of U.S. legal assistance pro-
grams and efforts to export U.S. legal models, the prescriptive
implications of these lessons, taken together, are not susceptible
to simple generalization. Which lessons apply most forcefully
and whether other lessons are complementary or contradictory is
likely to depend on the specific circumstances of a particular re-
cipient country, advice-providing program, substantive legal field,
or on a host of other forces and conditions.
The recent career of U.S. efforts to provide legal assistance to
the NIS and CEE countries and to the P.R.C. and its neighbors,
and recent experience with exporting U.S. legal ideas and ideals to
those regions also collectively point to a final, overarching lesson:
laws are not enough. Securing the acceptance of legal rules or
formal legal structures that follow U.S. programs' advice, imitate
U.S. models, or meet the U.S. government's or U.S. investors'
demands has not been sufficient to assure significant and durable
legal change in the P.R.C., NIS, and CEE states. Formally
adopted laws that have tracked U.S. advice or U.S. models have
faced such serious problems of poor implementation and exten-
sive adaptation that it seems clear that programs targeting only
such changes risk being wholly ineffective. The specific, recipi-
ent-country causes of the problems have been many, including: a
lack of sincere commitment to putting into practice laws that
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have been conceived as a grudgingly purchased ticket for admis-
sion to the international legal and political order or international
"respectability" more generally; weaknesses in the legal, political,
and economic infrastructures necessary to make specific legal
rules practically viable; and political-cultural environments and
policy contexts that have been either hostile to American-style (or
broader Western-style) laws or legality, or have produced very
exotic interpretations and glosses on the legal rules and concepts
that U.S. and other advice-providers and model-exporters have
sought to convey.
A narrow focus on positive laws and formal institutions, and a
resulting failure to take into account the strength or weakness of
underlying institutional and attitudinal features thus can produce
serious errors in assessing the impact and prospects of U.S. assis-
tance efforts and "exported" U.S. legal ideals, and in discerning
the lessons that recent experience teaches.
The evident implication for U.S. legal advice-providers and
aspiring exporters of U.S. legal models is that they should con-
sider working to foster the development of a favorable frame-
work of host-country legal-institutional and government-
institutional norms and practices, and broader attitudes toward
law and the rule of law. The project of promoting these under-
pinnings for effective legal change, however, takes much time and
effort, produces results that are, at best, hard to measure, and ap-
pears to promise only uncertain and long-term pay-offs. Helping
to prepare legislation, offering advice on formal legal and law-
making processes, and holding seminars on some specific fields of
U.S. law have offered the prospect of more immediate and more
measurable "results." Especially for the many advice projects and
programs that have depended on funds from federal government
or some foundation sources, mounting pressures to produce
short-term, demonstrable and, ideally, quantifiable outcomes has
reinforced the appeal of this approach. For other providers, there
may have been a sense that formal rule-focused reforms would be
enough to secure real change, or that the comparative advantage
of U.S. advice programs and purveyors of U.S. examples has lain
in such areas (and not in trying to affect underlying institutions
and attitudes directly). For any or all of these reasons, the course
of action seemingly demanded by the lesson that "laws are not
enough" has not been overwhelmingly popular among U.S. advi-
sors and model-mongers.
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Nonetheless, an appreciation of the lesson that such work is
essential has been evident in endeavors of many private and pub-
lic sector U.S. programs. Examples include: efforts to develop
professional competence, transmit technical skills, and instill atti-
tudes of autonomy among judges, lawyers, legal academics, regu-
lators, legislators, legislation-drafters, and legislative staffs in
China, the former Soviet Union, and its environs; assistance to
emerging non-governmental organizations with law-related and
"rule of law"-supporting agendas in the former Soviet world;
support for CEE/NIS and P.R.C. universities to develop teaching
and research programs for Chinese and post-Soviet students and
scholars to study and work in the U.S., and for publishing proj-
ects to disseminate American and other legal ideas in the
CEE/NIS and P.R.C. regions. Efforts of this sort appear to have
been on the rise, and programs that have not explicitly pursued
such institutional or attitudinal agendas may nonetheless prove to
have penumbral effects that can advance those ends indirectly and
over the long term.295
However much or little U.S. advisors and exporters of U.S.
models have acted in accordance with the lesson that laws are not
enough, some prominent observers and participants have en-
dorsed this lesson explicitly. For example, Jeffrey Sachs, an influ-
ential economist and long-time consultant who for many years
has advised thoroughgoing market reforms for former Soviet Bloc
states, has argued that Russia today needs lawyers more than it
needs economists.296 Similarly, Patricia Wald, a U.S. federal ap-
pellate judge and frequent participant in exchanges with CEE
countries, has declared that building the rule of law (and an inde-
pendent judiciary to support it) in the nations of the region re-
quires institution-building more than legislation-drafting. More
generally, in addressing and assessing economic law reform,
295 See generally, CAROTHERS, ASSESSING DEMOCRACY ASSISTANCE, supra
note 15; QUIGLEY, supra note 31 (suggesting relative growth of efforts targeting
"institutional" and "civil societyb issues); Newberg & Carothers, supra note
271. Some U.S. academics' concern, that the State Department's rule of law
initiative for China has imperiled a number of promising decentralized initia-
tives that had been developing with some U.S. inputs, suggests worries about
reversal of recent trends toward cultivating diffuse institutional/attitudinal
forms in U.S. legal advice and assistance efforts in China.
296 See Jenik Radon, Permitted Unless Prohibited: The Changed Soviet Men-
tality, 20 FoRDHAM INT'L L. J. 365, 366 (1996).
297 See Symposium, supra note 1, at 130-36.
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commentators have argued that U.S. assistance programs and as-
piring exporters of U.S. legal models would be well-advised to
work on strengthening public institutions and creating appropri-
ate levers for government regulation of the economy in recipient
countries because such measures are more essential (as well as
more politically acceptable to recipients and ultimately more ef-
fective) than pursuing an agenda that seeks to enact the "best" or
the "right" specific laws or for a market economy.2 9 Similarly,
commentaries addressing legal reforms to support democratiza-
tion have concluded that U.S. efforts have been most effective
when they have gone beyond a focus on electoral laws or consti-
tutions to emphasize the cultivation and consolidation of effec-
tively functioning judicial institutions, parliaments, and democ-
racy-supporting elements in civil society.'"
Certainly, participants and observers have leveled harsh criti-
cisms at programs that appear to have rejected the lesson that laws
are not enough. In one typical example, an experienced partici-
pant in U.S. programs to provide competition law assistance at-
tacked donors' preferences for short-term, measurable outputs
such as draft laws or numbers of sessions held to provide technical
advice on implementation.3" The same commentator criticized
the aid-funders' lack of interest in the difficult and indispensable
work of building institutions, training their staffs, and instilling
protocols and rules of regulatory and bureaucratic behavior- the
matters on which the implementation of "good" laws would de-
pend.3"' In much the same spirit, some of the most prominent
commentators on U.S. democracy assistance programs have con-
demned a "checklist" approach that has measured the success or
failure of democratization in terms of formal (and distinctly U.S.
model-based) legal criteria such as a democratic constitution and
democratic electoral laws.30"
29 See, e.g., Daniels & Howse, supra note 286, at 30; Kovacic, Competition
Policy Entrepreneur, supra note 2, at 445-51 (discussing foci of donor programs).
299 See Thomas Carothers, Recent U.S. Experience with Democracy Promo-
tion, 26 IDS BULLETIN 62, 67-68 (1995).
' See William E. Kovacic, Designing and Implementing Competition and
Consumer Protection Reforms in Transitional Economies, 44 DEPAUL L. REV.
1197, 1218-19 (1995).
"'3 See Kovacic, Competition Policy Entrepreneur, supra note 2, at 445-46.
302 See CAROTHERS, ASSESSING DEMOCRACY ASSISTANCE, supra note 15.
See also Newber & Carothers, supra note 271. The "checklist" that these
sources criticize includes other factors as well, including some that speak more
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Such charges of short-sightedness, impatience, parochialism,
and insufficient attention to institutional and ideological infra-
structure are not new criticisms of U.S. efforts to provide legal as-
sistance or to export U.S. legal models abroad. Broad failure to
follow the lesson that "laws are not enough," like widespread dis-
regard for the several other lessons about "substance" and "proc-
ess" taught by the recent experience of legal aid and legal export
to the former Soviet world and to the P.R.C. and its neighbors,
has been a principal count in contemporary indictments of such
efforts as either ineffective or immoral or both. These complaints
also recall the charges leveled at analogous undertakings from an
earlier time. The "law and development" projects of the 1960s
and 1970s- which involved some of the same U.S. government
agencies, foundations, and experts but which targeted primarily
Latin America, Africa, and parts of Asia other than China- drew
broadly similar condemnations.
To be sure, much has changed during the intervening twenty
to thirty years. The principal targets of efforts to provide U.S. le-
gal assistance and to export U.S. legal models are different. The
broader American and recipient-country goals and international
conditions that have defined the contexts for such "law reform"
or "legal development" undertakings have been transformed as
well, from those of promoting national economic development in
poor countries and preventing the spread of communism, to
those of securing global free-market capitalism and fostering lib-
eral democracy. It is still too soon to judge whether the contem-
porary enterprise of providing U.S. legal assistance and promot-
ing the export of U.S. legal ideas and ideals will enjoy, on the
whole, more favorable positive or normative assessments than
those which dogged the efforts of the "law and development" era.
Whether it does will depend, in part, on how much the change in
context has mattered and on how well participants have learned
the lessons taught by recent experience, and foreshadowed in the
experiences of the previous great wave of U.S. legal assistance
programs and efforts to disseminate U.S. legal models.
to the problems of effectively functioning institutions and a vibrant civil soci-
ety, but the checklist approach saw the f6rmal constitutional and electoral law
arrangements as indispensable first steps. See id.
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